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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis consists of three essays on trade, investment, and taxation that are uni-
fied by their policy relevance to developing countries. Following an introductory 
chapter on policy reform, the first essay revisits the institutional determinants of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) using a comprehensive new data set covering more 
than 80 countries. It exploits the presence of confirmed zero investment flows be-
tween countries to estimate productivity cut-offs of firms that invest abroad prof-
itably. This approach corrects likely biases arising from firm heterogeneity and 
country selection in a theoretically derived gravity-type model. The analysis finds 
inward FDI to be highly responsive to cross-country variation in specific institu-
tional provisions, such as arbitration of disputes and legal procedures to establish 
foreign subsidiaries. The importance of FDI-specific regulations stands out even 
after controlling for the general quality of inshtutions. Statutory openness to FDI, 
however, has no association with actual inflow of investment. 
The second essay examines cross-national differences in the survival of ex-
ports through the lenses of product, industry, and country characteristics. The 
estimates are derived from a new application of discrete-time models instead of 
the continuous-time (Cox) models that are standard in trade duration analysis. 
The examination of exports originating in more than 100 developing countries cov-
ering 4000 products over 12 years shows that export flows are much more fragile 
than suggested by trade theory. Using new measures of product sophistication and 
export diversification, the paper finds evidence of information and network exter-
nalities that aid export survival. Exports concentrated in a few industries or in a 
narrow range of destination markets exhibit higher rates of death, whereas export 
concentration within some industries is positively associated with survival, sug-
gesting a synergistic network effect. The probability of export death decreases with 
proximity from the capital content of products to the national factor endowment. 
competitive real exchange rate, and bilateral trade preferences. Further, death rates 
for dynamic subsets of exports like manufactured components and processed food 
differ from other products, belying the notion that short durations are necessarily 
a result of poor exporter capabilities. 
The third essay assesses the revenue implications of coordinated tariff and tax 
reforms. It is shown for a sample of low-income countries over 25 years that they 
have had a mixed record of offsetting reductions in trade tax revenue, and that 
Value-Added Tax (VAT) has, at best, played a limited role. The paper then analyzes 
the specific case of Nepal, using a unique data set compiled from unpublished 
customs records of imports, tariffs, and all other taxes levied at the border. It es-
timates changes to revenue and domestic production associated with two sets of 
reforms: i) proportional tariff cuts coordinated with a strictly enforced VAT; and 
ii) proposed tariff cuts under a regional free trade agreement. It is shown that a 
revenue-neutral tax reform is conditional on the effectiveness with which domestic 
taxes are enforced. Furthermore, loss of revenue as a result of intra-regional free 
trade can be minimized through judicious use of Sensitive Lists that still cover 
"substantially all the trade" as required by Article XXIV of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
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I N T R O D U C I N G T H E T H E S I S 
"The desire to put mankind into the saddle is the mainspring of most 
economic study." 
- A l f r e d Marsha l l , The New Cambridge Curriculum in Economics, 1903^ 
1 . 1 C O N T E X T 
The themes of trade, investment, and taxation have a rich historical root, a strong 
foundation in economic theory, and direct application to policy making. I write 
my three essays on these themes because they represent an irresistible trinity for 
a student of development economics. Research insights from these fields are fre-
quently translated into testable hypotheses, and applied as policy in countries in 
ways that influence their pace of progress. The disadvantage of working on fields 
that are beyond nascency, however, is that so much has been written on them that 
it is a challenge to find ones niche in the literature. I seek my niche in new data 
and empirical methods that have a close link to theory and relevance to policy. 
This thesis consists of three papers. The first paper deals with the determi-
nants of foreign direct investment^ with an emphasis on the role of institutions. 
It analyzes the most comprehensive cross-country data set to date on EDI regula-
tions. It does so using a technique that is not only derived from economic theory. 
1 See Marshall (1903). This quote is related to lines from Ralph Waldo Emerson's poem. Ode, Inscribed 
to William H. Channing: "Things are in the saddle/and ride mankind," in Emerson (2006). 
2 Foreign direct investment is a category of cross-border investment that involves residents of one 
economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise located in another economy. A lasting interest 
is commonly understood to involve at least 10 percent of ordinary shareholding or voting power 
(International Monetary Fund 1993). In effect, FDI need not entail much transfer of fimds, and might 
involve a foreign firm bringing its brand, technology, management and marketing strengths to bear 
on its local interest. 
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but also addresses methodological concerns that past empirical approaches have 
not taken seriously. 
The second paper examines the role of export diversification, product sophis-
tication, comparative advantage, trade preferences, and real exchange rate in the 
longevity of exports. I compute the length of export durations originating in more 
than 100 developing countries^ covering 4000 products over 12 years to find that 
export flows are much more fragile than suggested by trade theory. I focus on 
the "sustainability margin" of export performance because export growth occurs 
not only through new products and new markets, but also by sustaining ties that 
already exist. 
The third paper explores the revenue implications of coordinated tariff and do-
mestic tax reforms in low-income countries. I show that a politically feasible way 
to apply sound theory to durable reform is to incorporate the structural character-
istics of low-income countries, and demonstrate the viability of alternative policy 
scenarios. This is done through a combination of theory, cross-national evidence, 
and policy simulations using detailed country-specific data at the transaction level 
from Nepal. 
1 . 2 S E E K I N G N U A N C E W I T H I N P A R A D I G M S H I F T S 
There is little disagreement today among mainstream economists on the indispens-
ability of sustained economic growth for reducing poverty. Although there is no 
consensus on how to achieve sustained growth, the contours of a new paradigm 
have emerged after distilling the diverse development experiences in the 20th cen-
tury First, fast-growing economies are oriented towards greater participation in 
international trade and investment. Second, the quality of institutions at home -
3 In this thesis, "developing countries" are those defined by World Bank (2011b) as belonging to low-
income and middle-income categories as of July 2 0 1 1 . I exclude small developing countries with a 
population of less than one million in 1998. Low-income countries and " p o o r " countries are used 
interchangeably All poor countries also belong to the list of 48 least developed countries (LDCs) 
defined by United Nations (2011) . Not all LDCs, however, are low-income. For example. Equatorial 
Guinea is an LDC in the U N classification, but it is a high-income non-OECD country in the World 
Bank classification. 
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rule of law, contract enforcement, property rights, control of corruption, mecha-
nisms to resolve conflicts, prudent regulations - underpins development in the 
long run. Third, policies that maintain macro-economic stability are conducive to 
growth. A n d fourth, infrastructure in terms of software (people's skills) and hard-
ware (roads, ports, and energy) is v i t a l . 4 
The discontent within the new paradigm, it appears, lies more in nuance and 
moderation than in core substance. For example, growth is good, but "inclusive" 
growth is better because jobs are created and the poor benefit too, lessening in-
equality in society. The exact magnitude of cross-national relationship between 
openness and growth is contested, but autarky or models of self-sufficiency stand 
thoroughly discredited. Pro-business regulations are fine, but they ought not be en-
acted radically at the cost of dismantling social safety nets. Along these lines, the 
three essays in this thesis, described next, are firmly situated in the new paradigm, 
but my aim is to search for nuances within it. 
1.2.1 Investing Across Borders 
The debate on the role of FDI in economic development has evolved over the past 
four decades, moving from ideological opposition to enthusiasm for at least some 
forms of FDI. In the 1970s, concerns over FDI centered on i) their mobility across 
borders, hence evasion of authority of both host and home states; ii) possible anti-
competitive threats posed by large multi-national enterprises; iii) insecurity of ben-
efits in the host countries regarding employment, taxation, and technology trans-
fer;5 and iv) the "perverse" cultural influence of foreign enterprises (McCulloch 
4 T h e s e f o u r p o i n t s are consistent w i t h the f i n d i n g s of the C o m m i s s i o n on G r o w t h a n d D e v e l o p m e n t 
(2008) w h i c h s u m m a r i z e s f ive i n g r e d i e n t s for e c o n o m i c g r o w t h as fo l lows; i) publ ic i n v e s t m e n t that 
accumulates in frastructure a n d skills; ii) capaci ty to innovate a n d imitate to d o n e w things; iii) u n d i s -
torted pr ices that allocate capital a n d labor e f fect ive ly ; iv) pol ic ies that stabilize the m a c r o - e c o n o m y ; 
a n d v) e q u a l i t y a n d e q u i t y of o p p o r t u n i t i e s for a society that is inclusive. 
5 Mult i -nat ional enterpr ises are o f t e n a c c u s e d of dec lar ing prof i ts in tax h a v e n s to e s c a p e the tax bur-
d e n in host states, a n d i n t r o d u c i n g capita l- intensive m e t h o d s of p r o d u c t i o n l imit ing e m p l o y m e n t 
generat ion. Little (1999, p. 161) f i n d s that these e c o n o m i c a r g u m e n t s " g r e a t l y e x a g g e r a t e the di f fer-
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1979; Little 1982). Today, countries compete aggressively to lure FDI even when 
the gains are known to be context-driven and spillover benefits depend on host 
country characteristics. FDI, for example, is likely to improve efficiency only if 
the economy is already liberalized (see Balasubramanyam et al. 1996; Moran et al. 
2005). 
In the first paper, I explore the policy and institutional determinants of FDI 
using a new data set. Investing Across Borders (lAB) 2010, from World Bank Group 
(2010) on regulations that govern FDI in 87 countries. I use a theoretically derived 
gravity-type model, which is estimated using a methodology that corrects for two 
possible biases: "heterogeneity bias" that occurs when models do not account for 
the fact that investing firms differ widely in terms of productivity; and "selection 
bias" that arises when statistical controls for numerous country pairs that record 
a zero investment flow with each other are not incorporated. I find inward FDI 
to be highly responsive to cross-country variation in specific institutional provi-
sions, such as arbitration of disputes and legal procedures to establish foreign 
subsidiaries. The importance of FDI-specific provisions stands out even after con-
trolling for the general quality of institutions proxied by measures of rule of law, 
corruption, political stability, governmental effectiveness and regulatory quality. I 
find, however, that statutory openness to FDI has no association with actual inflow 
of investment. These results are robust to different empirical specifications. 
1.2.2 Analyzing Trade Survival 
To promote exports on a sustained basis, and not just in spurts through piecemeal 
reforms, policy makers are advised to look at all aspects of export performance, es-
pecially margins of growth that have been under-appreciated or ignored. Brenton, 
Pierola and von Uexkull (2009) find that countries that have rapidly diversified ex-
ports appear to outperform those that are diversifying slowly, not in introducing 
ence between indigenous and foreign enterprise...problems of monopoly, technology and products 
arise in either case., both do harm in over-protected markets." 
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new exports, but in sustaining exports after they have been introduced. Policies 
that determine the survival of exports are, therefore, no less important than those 
that encourage innovation of new product lines or search for new markets through 
trade negotiations. 
In the second essay, I explain cross-national differences in the survival of ex-
ports through the lens of product, industry, and country characteristics. I use new 
measures of sophistication of more than 4000 manufactured products and export 
diversification in more than 100 developing countries between 1997 and 2008 to 
find evidence for information and network externalities from exports that aid sur-
vival. The estimates are derived from a rigorous, new application of discrete-time 
models instead of the conhnuous-time (Cox) models that are standard in the liter-
ature on trade duration analysis. 
I find that exports originating in coimtries with concentrated industries or de-
pendent on a narrow range of destinahon markets exhibit higher rates of death, 
whereas export concentration within some industries is positively associated with 
survival, suggesting a synergistic network effect. The probability of export death 
decreases with proximity of the capital content of products to national factor en-
dowment, competitive real exchange rate, and bilateral trade preferences. Further, 
death rates for fast-growing, dynamic subsets of exports like parts and compo-
nents and processed food differ from other products, belying the notion that short 
durations are necessarily a result of poor exporter capabilities. 
1.2.3 Coordinating Tax Reforms 
Historically, the themes of trade and public finance are two of the most endur-
ing in economics.^ This is because of their intertwined relationship with national 
6 A broad understanding of trade subsumes investment because the analytical concepts concerning 
the movement of goods, services, and capital are similar. Foreign direct investment in sectors like 
telecommunications, banking, and electricity are governed by rules on trade in services in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Also recall that, like trade, foreign direct investment has been practiced 
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prosperity, statecraft, and the functioning of governments. Kautilya, the author of 
Arthashastra, c. 300 BCE, counseled wisely on trade and revenue practices for an 
ancient age (Waldauer et al. 1996)7 Nearly 2000 years later in 1662 William Petty 
"proposed innovations to improve efficiency, equity, and capacity to augment tax 
revenue" in A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions (Madisson 2007, p. 255).® Around 
the same time mercantilists were lobbying for (misguided) trade policies that max-
imized exports, minimized imports, and equated national wealth with the accu-
mulation of bullion.9 One of the most influential thinkers remains Adam Smith 
who extols the virtues of foreign commerce, systematically attacks mercantilism, 
and offers insights into revenue generation in the The Wealth of Nations (1776)/° Af-
ter Smith, other great economists from Ricardo and Marx to Marshall and Keynes 
have also written on these themes. 
Modern economic theory supports a switch of taxahon from international to 
national sources of production and exchange on grounds of efficiency. Trade taxes 
introduce a wedge between foreign and national prices, thereby distorhng incen-
tives and resource allocation. Because they encourage activities in sectors that are 
viable only at prices above the world average, the theoretical consensus is that 
domestic (consumption or income) taxes are superior to trade taxes. Domestic con-
sumption taxes can meet the government's revenue target with lower rates, a wider 
base, and without a protectionist bias. However, low-income countries hesitate to 
reduce distortionary taxes on international trade. This is because they are con-
cerned about short-term adjustment costs arising from the loss of tax revenue. The 
throughout history. From the merchants of Sumer c. 2500 BCE to the East India Company in the 17th 
century, investors routinely opened branches in foreign dominions (World Bank Group 2010). 
7 Kautilya offered guidance for the king's Superintendent of Commerce on the export of state-owned 
commodities, urged a reasoned regulation of imports, and developed principles for an ideal tax sys-
tem that emphasized convenience of payment, ease of calculation and administration, and fairness 
in burden. 
8 This period marks the beginning of European ascent in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. The 
Royal Society was founded in England in 1660 and chartered in 1662. Academic Royale des Sciences 
was founded in France in 1666. Isaac Newton published Principia Mathematica in 1687. 
9 Thomas Mun's England's Treasure by Forraign [sic] Trade, published posthumously in 1664, articulates 
the mercantilist position well (Mun 2003). 
10 Eight of the nine chapters in Book IV of Smith (1994) critiques mercantilism; Book V is on revenue 
and the role of the state. 
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collection costs of border taxes are also much lower than what it would cost to 
implement a modern consumption tax like the VAT. 
In the third essay, I present a case for coordinated trade-fiscal reforms, accept-
ing that a revenue-neutral switch from trade taxes to domestic consumption taxes 
is fraught with implementation challenges in poor countries with a large informal 
sector. I show for a sample of 40 countries over 25 years that low-income countries 
have had a mixed record of offsetting reductions in trade tax revenue, and that VAT 
has, at best, played a limited role. I then analyze the specific case of Nepal, one 
of the world's poorest countries. Using a unique data set compiled from unpub-
lished customs records of imports, tariffs and all other taxes levied at the border, 
the paper estimates changes to revenue and domestic production associated with 
two sets of reforms. First, proportional tariff cuts coordinated with a strictly en-
forced VAT are found to increase total revenue. Second, intra-regional free trade 
is shown to lead to a major loss of revenue that can only be recovered with an 
across-the-board increase in the domestic tax base or minimized through judicious 
use of Sensitive Lists that still cover "substantially all the trade" as required by 
Article XXIV of the GATT. 
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As stated at the beginning of this introduction, the topics of trade, investment, and 
taxation occupy a central place in development economics. Both the theory and 
the empirics in these fields frequently form an intellectual foundation for policy 
reforms in developing countries. The essays in this thesis combine theory and em-
pirical evidence to suggest certain policy directions. To attract FDI, policy openness 
is necessary but it is de facto inshtutional reforms that is more important. In the 
short run, it is FDI-specific provisions that are associated more strongly with FDI 
inflow than the average country-wide quality of institutions measured by, say, the 
rule of law or corruption. For export growth, understanding what contributes to 
the survival of existing exports is no less important than experiments with new 
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product lines and markets. In public finance, reduction of distortionary taxes is 
necessary, but this has to be sequenced and coordinated with alternative sources 
of revenue identified ex ante. 
Pritchett (2009) describes policy as a conditional mapping from states of the 
world to actions, and policy action as the application of policies to the realized 
states of the world. He makes a useful distinction between policy, polici/ action, and 
policy outcome. Framed this way, the challenge in development policy making is 
three-fold: i) to garner sufficient consensus for "good policies" that have a positive 
foundation and a normative justification; ii) to accept heterogeneity and avoid a 
policy straitjacket in areas where consensus is lacking; and iii) to implement re-
forms and produce results as originally intended. The implication is that while 
research helps narrow down a list of policy options, there is no guarantee that pol-
icy action follows to produce the desired outcomes. I close this chapter with some 
remarks on these generic challenges. 
The first challenge is in getting the theoretical underpinnings of policy right. 
Suitably sub-titled "how we learn," Krueger's 1997 article explains the dramatic 
change in ideas on trade and development over the past 40 years (Krueger 1997). 
She shows how application of good theory can go awry , " and argues that that 
could only be redressed over time with the aid of three factors: i) new research 
challenging stylized facts and evaluating the evidence from specific policy regimes, 
such as import-substitution;'^ ii) theory being refined to incorporate behavioral 
and institutional variables, leaving less room for misinterpretation; and iii) alterna-
1 1 Krueger argues that the mistakes economists made were i) misapplication of good theory; ii) focus 
on negative results, which means that more emphasis was given to excepHons under which a certain 
proposition failed rather than the general validity of the proposition; and iii) over-extension of good 
theory that concluded with dubious stylized facts. 
12 BhagwaH & Srinivasan (1999) cite in this regard the intellectual value of detailed country-level stud-
ies pursued under the aegis of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the World Bank in the 1960s and 1970s. Also 
see Little (1999) for personal recollections of his role in challenging entrenched viewpoints on trade 
and industrialization as a contributor to some of these studies. 
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tive policies being demonstrated as being viable in the light of experiences drawn 
from fast-growing developing countries. 
The second challenge is the failure to acknowledge heterogeneity in policy 
choices. There may be more than one path to good policy action and the most 
optimal of these may not be known beforehand. For example, economists know 
much more about the causes of long-term income differentials across countries 
than the pace at which to pursue reforms that either trigger or sustain growth. 
The risk of failure can be minimized if policies are tailored to the specific contexts 
and circumstances of countries. 
As Rodrik (2008) clarifies, this does not mean that economics works differently 
in poor countries. People do respond to incentives everywhere, but it is the envi-
ronments in which consumers and investors find themselves that affect the scale 
of opportunities and constraints. Rodrik (2008, p. 6) contends that while first-order 
economic principles of "market-based competition, protection of private property, 
appropriate incentives, and sound money" are desirable, how they map into pol-
icy actions differs across contexts. When it comes to specific policy prescriptions, 
professional biases intervene with, say, a trade economist seeing major problems 
in the lack of openness or a labor economist seeing the biggest problem in labor 
rigidities. This diversity in professional opinion often leads to a shopping list of de-
manding reforms that developing countries do not have the capacity to implement. 
This is what inspired the "diagnostics" approach where reforms are sequenced to 
target the most binding constraints (Hausmann et al. 2008). 
The third challenge is not so much getting the theory right, but avoiding 
half-hearted implementation of reforms that are generally accepted as sound. Ed-
1 3 In the Australian context, Leigh (2002) describes how the intellectual underpinnings for major tariff 
reductions initiated by leaders of the Labor Party in 1973, 1988, and 1991 were provided by the Pro-
ductivity Commission (in its prior form as the Tariff Board, the Industries Assistance Commission, 
and the Industry Commission) building on the work of theorists like W. Max Corden on the effective 
rate of protection. 
14 Triggering growth and sustaining growth are often different goals. Growth can be triggered with a lim-
ited set of reforms, but sustaining it requires an institutional overhaul that, among other advantages, 
handles shocks better and fosters productive dynamism (Rodrik 2008). 
1 0 I N T R O D U C I N G T H E T H E S I S 
wards (2010) argues that in a second-best world with inter-connected distortions, 
the effect of reforms is not additive: a little more of any reform is not always 
better than none. Ideally, reforms should be complete, with the concerns of po-
tential opponents managed in advance. In some countries, cultural and historical 
factors constrain the political feasibility of reforms. Edwards (2010) connects the 
difficulty of implementing reforms with Latin America's disappointing growth 
e x p e r i e n c e . H e emphasizes, for example, the role that the real exchange rate mis-
alignment resulting from currencies pegged at artificially high levels with the US 
dollar played in the stagnation of manufactured exports and in triggereing eco-
nomic crises through unsustainable budget deficits. The problems were known, 
yet reforms failed to redress the known causes of economic distress. 
Related to the third challenge above are reforms producing results not in-
tended by policy makers. Thomas & Grindle (1990) and Grindle (2001) explain this 
as often being the case when policy reforms do not have an implementation strat-
egy which anticipates opposition from vested interests affected by the change in 
the status quo. 
Above all else, the genesis of most meaningful reforms is in the force of an idea 
whose time has come. While academic research like this contributes to fragments 
of such ideas, the linkage between ideas and sound policy is only as effective as 
the Sherpas that shepherd it through the politico-bureaucratic process into action 
and outcome. 
15 According to Maddison (2007, p. 104), in 1820, the average GDP per capita of the United States and 
Canada was 1.5 times that of the eight major Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela); by 2003, the divergence was by a factor of 4.2. 
2 
I N V E S T I N G A C R O S S B O R D E R S : D O F D I - S P E C I F I C 
R E G U L A T I O N S M A T T E R ? 
" H a p p y famil ies are all alike; 
every unhappy fami ly is unhappy in its o w n way. " 
- Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, 1878 
2 . 1 I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) remains one of the most important forms of cross-
border capital f low into developing countries: in 2009, FDI inf low amounted to 
more than U S $ 5 1 0 billion, exceeding inward remittance (US$307 billion) and de-
velopment aid (US$91 bi l l ion)/ A s shown in Figure 2 . 1 , however, just nine coun-
tries have accounted for about 60 percent of FDI inf low into developing countries 
over the past decade.^ In an era w h e n almost all countries in the world welcome 
F D L al lowing full foreign equity ownership in most sectors (Table 2.22), this cross-
country a s y m m e t r y deserves explanahon that is beyond the obvious such as coun-
tries' sizes and growth prospects. 
In this paper, I focus on the policy and institutional determinants of FDI using 
a new cross-country data set drawn f rom World Bank G r o u p (2010). The data set 
consists of indicators of FDI regulation that specifically measure each country 's 
i) openness to foreign investment by sector; ii) quality of institutions related to 
1 The f igures on FDI, remittances, and development aid are f rom U N C T A D (201 1) , World Bank (2010a), 
and World Bank (2010b), respectively. 
2 With the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, FDI inflow into developed countries fell f rom a 
peak of U S $ 1 . 3 1 trillion in 2007 to US$602 billion in 2009, whereas the more modest fall in developing 
countries occurred with a lag of one year, from a peak of US$658 billion in 2008 to U S $ 5 1 1 billion 
in 2009. FDI flow increased rapidly f rom 1990 onward reaching the first peak of U S $ 1 . 4 trillion in 
2000. There w a s a dip in 2003, which is attributed to the drop in the share prices of high-technology 
companies (Helpman 20 1 1 ) . According to U N C T A D (201 1) , total FDI stock globally stands at a record 
U S $ 1 9 . 1 trillion as of 2010. 
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Figure 2.1: FDI Inflow into Developing Countr ies 
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Note 1: Nine large countries are Brazil, Russia, India, China, Mexico, Argentina, 
Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa 
Note 2: China includes Hong Kong & Macao 
resolving investment disputes; and iii) time, procedures, and rules required to set 
up wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries. These FDI-specific indicators are the most 
comprehensive to date in terms of topics and countries, and they obviate the need 
to rely on proxy indicators for policy openness or the quality of institutions. 
I also adopt a new methodological approach that corrects for two major biases 
prevalent in standard gravity models of FDI.3 The first one arises when limiting 
the sample to only those countries that actually have an investment relationship 
with each other and excluding those that do not. This is a problem of country 
selection induced by zero bilateral flows. The second bias arises when firms are 
not differentiated by their ability to meet the fixed costs of investing abroad. This 
is the problem of firm heterogeneity. The two biases are linked when zero flows 
3 Gravity models predict that bilateral flows such as trade, investment, and migration depend posi-
tively on economic pull such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of both home (exporter) and host 
(importer) countries, and negatively on frictions such as distance and policy barriers. For more on 
gravity models, see Bergeijk & Brakman (2010). 
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are caused by the fixed cost of investing abroad, and only the more productive 
firms meet such costs. 
I build on the insight of the new trade literature that firms are heterogenous 
within industries in terms of productivity, size, use of inputs, and wages.4 This 
translates into distinct decisions by firms (that co-exist within a narrowly-defined 
industry) on whether to export, or set up production bases in foreign countries, or 
just serve the domestic market (Greenaway & Kneller 2007; World Trade Organiza-
tion 2008; Helpman 2011) . When profits are a function of varying productivity and 
differing fixed costs, there is a natural sorting of firms, with the most productive 
self-selecting to undertake FDI (Helpman et al. 2004). The next tier serves the for-
eign market through export, and the least productive serve the domestic market 
only (Appendix B).5 
The earlier generation of "new" trade models that integrated economies of 
scale and monopolistic competition achieved a breakthrough in understanding a 
new source of comparative advantage (Helpman 2011) . However, they addressed 
neither heterogeneity nor country selection. In particular, the assumption of sym-
metry in firm size and productivity leading to a prediction that all firms export to 
all countries is not supported by evidence at the firm level.^ 
4 The seminal paper of this new literahire is Melitz (2003). He explains why only a fraction of firms 
export and why exporters are larger and more productive than non-exporters. Note, though, in the 
Melitz model, all firms pay the same wage. This model has generated a vast empirical literature on 
firm-level approach to international trade. It has also been applied to study the quantitative effects 
of simulated trade policy reforms (for a recent work, see Balistreri, Hillberry and Rutherford, 2011) . 
5 This is supported by data. Helpman et al. (2004) show for US manufachiring firms across 52 sectors 
and 38 countries that multinational enterprises had 15 percent more labor productivity than ex-
porters in 1994; exporters were 39 percent more productive than non-exporters. Girma et al. (2004), 
Girma et al. (2005), and Arnold & Hussinger (2005) all find significant productivity differences be-
tween firms that invest abroad and those that do not. Chen & Moore (2010) find in the case of French 
mulHnational firms that those with low productivity are less likely to invest in host countries with a 
small market size, high production costs, or low trade costs. 
6 The new trade models of the 1980s successfully explained the phenomenon of intra-industry trade as 
caused by product differentiation on the part of firms operating under economies of scale. However, 
firms were assumed to be symmetric. All of them traded, but only the volume depended on trade 
costs. In other words, trade costs affected only the intensive margin (the volume of export per firm), 
not the decision of whether to export in the first place. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature on 
the determinants of FDI, highlighting the institutional drivers on which the paper 
builds. Section 2.3 sketches the theoretical derivation of a gravity-like model for 
FDI and its empirical extension. Section 2.4 introduces the data. Section 2.5 ex-
plains the econometric method used to incorporate firm heterogeneity and redress 
country selection bias. Section 2.6 presents the main results by comparing bench-
mark estimates with those obtained after correcting for biases. Section 2.7 uses 
alternative dependent and explanatory variables to check for robustness of results. 
The final section concludes. 
2 . 2 R E L A T E D L I T E R A T U R E 
Three sets of literature address why and where firms choose to serve foreign mar-
kets by setting up foreign subsidiaries, and not through export or licensing ar-
rangements. The first (and early) batch of literature emphasized that firms with 
ownership advantages have an incentive to become multi-national as they seek 
to internalize their proprietary assets (technology, brand, distributional efficiency) 
while exploiting location-specific advantages such as market size or access to fac-
tors of production. This is the Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) paradigm 
(Dunning 1977). OLI is seen as a "big-tent" paradigm as it has evolved since 1973 
(when it was first introduced) to cover new ideas and practices in international 
business, including joint-ventures (alliance capitalism) and the internet. 
Helpman (2011), however, views the OLI paradigm as too broad for the con-
struction of a theory with sharp predictions. He highlights a more focused study 
of Internalization through three different lenses: the first is the transaction cost 
economics of firm boundaries; the second is the managerial incentives analysis of 
internalization; and the third is the property rights approach that builds on the 
theory of incomplete contracts. As the full rents for intangible assets cannot be 
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appropriated through arrangements with third parties because of market failures, 
firms internalize the market transaction by establishing their own subsidiaries.7 
The second set of literature attempts to account for the long-term determi-
nants of FDI in a general equilibrium framework. Helpman (1984) proposed the 
vertical model of FDI where a firm fragments production of differentiated final 
goods at locations that are abundant in factors used intensively in a specific phase 
of production. The headquarters specialize in research and development, and pro-
duction occurs at locations with competitive factor costs. This model predicts that 
FDI occurs between countries that are differently endowed. 
Markusen (1984) proposed a horizontal model where firm-level scale economies 
drive FDI, which explains a large share of FDI across countries with similar factor 
endowments. Firms produce the same product at multiple locations with the aim 
of serving local markets directly rather than through exports. Brainard (1997) finds 
that such FDI, relative to exports, is increasing with higher trade costs, decreasing 
with investment barriers, and decreasing with scale economies at the plant level.^ 
Although the typology of FDI as either horizontal (market-seeking) or vertical 
(efficiency-seeking) is neat, most multinational firms today combine vertical and 
horizontal models of FDI. Markusen (1997) calls this a knowledge-capital model, 
in which activities are split across geography based on differing skill intensities. 
At the same time there are multiple production units of the same good taking ad-
vantage of non-rivalrous intra-firm assets.^ Yeaple (2003) presents a model of why 
7 Within subs id ia r ies , Lerner & Schoar (2005) f ind that investors in countr ies w i t h w e a k e r legal prov i -
s ions for c o m p l e x contract en forcement are m o r e l ike ly to insist o n major i ty o w n e r s h i p a n d control 
of the b o a r d , e v e n if s u c h inves tments h a v e lower va luat ion and returns. T h e y contrast c o m m o n a n d 
civ i l legal r e g i m e s in the d e g r e e to w h i c h c o m p l e x contracts on cash f l o w a n d control can be a s s i g n e d 
to d i f f e rent part ies . C o m m o n law a l l o w s c o m p l e x contract cont ingencies that a l low investors to shift 
control r ights d e p e n d i n g on p e r f o r m a n c e . U n d e r civi l law, control o f ten has to be exerc ised through 
major i ty o w n e r s h i p . Lerner & Schoar (2005) s h o w that this l eads investors to opt for convert ib le 
p r e f e r r e d stock in c o m m o n law countr ies , a n d c o m m o n stock or debt in civil l aw countr ies . 
8 In Bra inard ( 1997) , all f i r m s m a k e the s a m e choices of either e x p o r t i n g or u n d e r t a k i n g FDI . C o n t r a r y 
to the f r a m e w o r k of H e l p m a n et al. (2004) e x p o r t s a n d FDI d o not co-exist in the s a m e industry . 
9 T h e vertical m o d e l s u g g e s t s that trade a n d FDI are c o m p l e m e n t s ; the hor izontal m o d e l s u g g e s t s 
they a re subst i tutes ; a n d , loosely, the k n o w l e d g e - c a p i t a l m o d e l s u g g e s t s that t rade a n d F D I tend 
to be subst i tutes for s imi lar countr ies a n d c o m p l e m e n t s for those w i t h d i f f e rent factor proport ion . 
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firms may choose "complex integration" of both horizontal and vertical motiva-
tions for FDI. 
The third set of literature takes a partial equilibrium approach by looking at 
exogenous and policy factors that affect the magnitude of FDI, not whether FDI 
takes place in the first place or not. It explores the role of exchange rates, trade 
protection, taxes, agglomeration, and the quality of institutions, among others, as 
driving the magnitude of FDI (Blonigen 2005). 
The empirical part of this paper, which is in the partial equilibrium tradition, 
focuses on the institutional determinants of FDI. I am mainly concerned with poor 
economic institutions that constrain human behavior by distorting incentives. This 
includes weak rule of law, limits on private ownership, expropriation risks, lack of 
enforcement of contracts, poor provision of public goods, over-regulation and high 
costs of doing business whose cumulative effect is to deter entrepreneurship. Poor 
institutions also contribute to an indifferent quality of public goods that discourage 
investment, domestic or foreign. The challenge in this literature has been to find 
appropriate measures of the quality of institutions.'" 
One of the first papers to explore the effects of policy and institutional quality 
on FDI is Wheeler & Mody (1992). They consider a list of 13 variables to represent 
institutional quality ("risk"), and nine variables to represent openness, and show 
both risk and openness to be insignificant determinants of FDI. Wei (2000) and Wei 
& Shleifer (2000) find that corruption and tax rates on multinational firms affect 
inward FDI negatively While firms may voluntarily choose not to invest in highly 
corrupt countries, all else being equal, Hines (1995) finds that legislation at source 
can be a deterrent: the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 in the 
United States led to a decline in American investment in bribe-prone countries. 
In the international business literature. Dunning (1993) summarized four motives for FDI: market 
seeking, natijral resource seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking. 
10 In economics, the primary focus is on market-creating institutions such as the protection of private 
property and the rule of law (Rodrik et al. 2002). The Economist argues that there is no consensus on 
what the rule of law constitijtes (The Economist 2008). 
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Stein & Daude (2002) and Daude & Stein (2007) use a broad set of "institu-
tional" variables to find that regulatory burden is an important determinant of 
FDI location. They draw on a wide range of sources: i) World Governance Indica-
tors (WGI) developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010);" ii) International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) variables on the risk of repudiation of contract, risk of expropriation, 
corruption, rule of law, and bureaucratic quality; iii) La Porta et al. (i999)'s index 
of shareholder rights, and iv) World Business Environment Surveys on taxes and 
regulations, policy instability, and corruption. 
Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) use 2001 survey data from the French Finance Min-
istry to find that effective bureaucracy and low corruption, among others, attract 
FDI. Kinda (2010) brings to bear firm-level data to find that institutional prob-
lems, together with poor infrastructure and financing constraints discourage FDI 
in a sample of 77 developing countries. Mottaleb & Kalirajan (2010) use panel 
data from 68 low-income and lower-middle income developing countries to show 
that open countries that rely on trade, have large GDP, high growth rate and are 
business-friendly tend to be more successful in attracting FDI. 
Alfaro et al. (2008) explain the "Lucas Paradox" of inadequate capital flows 
from rich to poor countries. Despite rates of return being higher in countries where 
capital is scarce, they argue that poor countries do not receive investment from 
abroad because of institutional weaknesses. But there are exceptions. Fan et al. 
(2009) attribute record inflow of FDI into China in recent decades, in spite of the 
indifferent quality of the country's institutions, to its stewardship of sustained 
economic growth. 
While this literature confirms the salience of specific institutional variables, 
it suffers from limitations relating to model mis-specification and variable mis-
measurement. The studies mentioned above do not address the problem of sample 
selection that arises when the pairing of FDI-sending and receiving countries does 
not occur randomly. They do not incorporate firm heterogeneity in a cross-national 
1 1 The data set is World Bank (2010c). 
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framework. And they associate FDI inflow with general quahty of institutions, not 
quality that is specific to FDI.'^ 
Bergstrand and Egger (2009) summarize the vast literature on the theoretical 
and empirical foundations of gravity models of trade and FDI. I am, however, not 
aware of any paper that addresses the three problems mentioned above in a study 
of the institutional determinants of bilateral FDI. As already menhoned, I use new 
data on regulations that are specific to FDI and the new empirical methodology 
that has been applied to export flows by Helpman et al. (2008). 
Central to the paper's methodology is the exploitation of the presence of zero 
flows between trading partners to estimate productivity cut-offs of firms that ex-
port abroad profitably. In trade, zero flows inferred from databases like the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) are flawed because un-
reported figures are conflated with confirmed zeros. Baranga (2009) estimates that 
roughly 20 percent of the sample used by Helpman et al. (2008) has been mis-
classified. In contrast, the database - OECD (2011) - that I use for FDI clearly 
distinguishes between missing and zero flows between investment partners. This 
greatly enhances the appropriateness of the use of the new methodology in this 
paper. 
2 .3 M O D E L 
The model is adapted from the gravity-type trade model of Helpman et al. (2008) 
and Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003). The derivation of the model - for FDI - is 
detailed in Appendix A, and summarized next. A representative consumer prefers 
variety (v) and maximizes a Constant Elasticity of Subsfitution (CES) utility func-
tion U = [Jx(v)Pdv]^/P subject to aggregate expenditure (E). All varieties have a 
constant demand elasticity, CT = yJ;^ > 1. A firm in country i produces one unit 
12 One exception is Wei & Shleifer (2000), but they acknowledge their coding of incentives and restric-
tions on FDI is coarse and limited to fewer than 50 countries. 
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Figure 2.2: Assets and Sales by US Affiliates, 2008 
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Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov) 
Note 1: Correlation coefficient is 0.97 
Note 2: Affiliates are majority-owned US companies 
of output with a cost-minimizing combination of inputs (Cia) where a indexes 
firm-specific productivity and measures the number of bundles of the country's 
inputs used per unit of output; Ci is the cost of the bundle which is uniform across 
country i. Firms maximize profit, and do not interact strategically with each other. 
Multinational firms from home country i sell goods through subsidiaries and 
face price and demand in host country j. Serving the foreign market through FDI 
(instead of exports) reduces transport costs, but adds non-trivial coordination and 
transaction costs represented by in addition to the fixed cost (f(j) of setting up 
a new plant which is assumed to exceed the fixed cost of exporting (f?j). (Serving 
country j through exports instead would involve exogenous trade and transport 
costs, Tfj, but lower fixed cost. It is assumed that xfj > T[j and f[j > f f j .) 
There is a wedge between the price of each variety in country j and country 
i represented by bilateral mark-up and transaction costs, so pj = Firm pro-
ductivity is assumed to be Pareto distributed with support [ql , Qh] and only firms 
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with productivity QIJ such that QL < QIJ < QH undertake FDI without incurring a 
loss. The profit condition (revenue over demand elasticity net of fixed costs) yields 
the cut-off productivity level as follows: 
Y j ( l - p ) pPj (2.1) 
The cumulative distribution function of firm productivity is Pr(a < Qij) = 
G (Qij) = ^a'^ kJa^k where k is the shape parameter such that k > cr — 1. The 
distribution of firm productivity G(a) is common across countries ex ante, but ex 
post G (QIJ) is the distribution of Q in country i conditional on the firm investing 
in country j. 
Total FDP3 from i to j is p jXjNidGfu) where G(Qij) is multiplied by the 
number of firms Ni which proxies for country i's economic size. Investment can 
increase on either the extensive or the intensive margin. If demand or policy costs 
in country j are constant, the only way investment can increase is through an 
exogenous productivity shock in country i allowing an increased fraction of firms 
to invest abroad (Fij). If, on the other hand, productivity is constant, investment 
can increase only with an increase in the GDP (Yj) or a fall in the fixed and variable 
costs in host country j. 
Substituting for pj and Xj, 
FDIij = 
PPj 
l - a 
YjNiFi j (2.2) 
13 Technically, in this model, FDI should be measured by sales of foreign-owned subsidiaries, but 
because of the lack of detailed data, it is proxied by FDI stock. Affiliate sales and FDI stock are 
highly correlated. The correlation between total assets (that is, FDI stock plus liabilities) and sales 
of US majority-owned foreign subsidiaries across 1 1 3 countries in 2008 was 0.83. The correlation 
coefficient of the values of assets and sales, expressed in natural logarithm, is 0.97 (Figure 2.2). 
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As shown in Appendix A: 
" ( k - a + I K a n ' ^ - Q L ' ^ ) \ ai 
k - o - + l ^ 
- 1 (2.3) 
The first component is common across all countries, but the second term in brack-
ets reflects the country-specific frachon of firms that invests abroad. 
Equation 2.2 can now be estimated empirically in its log-linear form in equa-
tion 2.4. The main host country (j) variables are as follows: GDP (InYj), aggregated 
CES Price Index (InPj), and factor costs relevant for FDI (Incj). Factor costs cap-
ture per unit cost of production in country j such as wages, and all policy-related 
costs. 
fdi i j = ( C T - l ) l n p - h ( c T - l ) l n P j - h ( l - c r ) l n c j - c r ) l n T i j (2.4) 
-h InNi-I-InYj-hVij 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how country-specific FDI-relevant 
policies and institutions affect the attraction of FDI in a single cross-section, so host 
countries are not assigned dummies. I approximate Cj by quantified FDI-specific 
regulations, GDP per capita, tariffs, and education levels. Variables with subscript 
i are captured by a fixed effect for the FDI source country. 
Bilateral variables specific to country pairs such as distance, colonial tie, con-
tiguity and shared ethnic language can either hinder or facilitate bilateral transac-
tions. Such costs have an observed component dij and an unobserved component 
An important additional regressor is w^j. It captures the ij component of 
Fij, the index for extensive margin. It is a monotonic function of the productiv-
ity cut-off, Qij, and is correlated with dij because many of the same variables 
that determine FDI flow determine the extensive margin. Although wtj is unob-
served, the cut-off condition in equation 2.1 implies that it can be estimated by 
14 Bilateral transaction costs T-, ° are parametrized as D^.e Uij ~ N(0, CT^) 
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the conditional probability of a positive investment flow from a probit (first-stage) 
estimation. Omission of w^j would create a heterogeneity bias. 
The second bias arises because of the correlation between etj and the included 
regressors in equation 2.4 as country pairs with zero investment f lows are excluded 
from the sample. Only after controlling for these heterogeneity and sample selec-
tion biases can coefficients be rendered more accurate. The discussion so far per-
mits the specification of the benchmark regression (without correcting for biases) 
in equation 2.5. 
l o g ( F D I i j ) = X i j a + b i log(Openness ) j + b^loglArbitration)] + bj loglProcedures)] 
-H b4(Qualityof Institutions)j + b 5 l o g ( G D P ) j -Fb6log(GDPpercapi ta ) j 
-I- byloglRemoteness)) -I- bs loglWeighted Tariff) j + b , log(School ing ) j 
+ (Source D u m m y j j * Dj + ejj (2.5) 
Full definihon of all the explanatory variables in the above equation is given 
in Table 2.13. The dependent variable is the positive stock of bilateral FDI from 
country i to country j, averaged between 2007 and 2008.^ 5 A m o n g the "gravity" 
explanatory variables. Vector X consists of distance, and dummies for whether two 
countries share a border, an ethnic language, or have had a colonial relationship. 
The benchmark regression also includes a d u m m y for whether the two countries 
have signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) to assure reciprocal protection of 
foreign investment in each other's territory.'^ This variable later serves as a valid 
15 U N C T A D (2011) def ines FDI stock as the v a l u e of the share of capital and reserves ( including re-
tained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise (total assets m i n u s total liabilities), p lus the net 
indebtedness of the associate or subsidiary to the parent f irm. FDI f l o w s p l u m m e t e d in 2008-09 
because of the global financial crisis. I therefore disregard FDI v a l u e s after 2008. 
16 M o s t BITs contain broad c o m m i t m e n t s to protect investments by investors of one state ("the in-
vestor") in the territory of the other state ("the host state"), r a n g i n g from assurances of fair, equi-
table, a n d non-discr iminatory treatment to u n d e r t a k i n g s to observe investment contracts and other 
investment-related obligations. A s Mal ik (2006) explains, these protect ions are a c c o m p a n i e d b y a 
p o w e r f u l international arbitration m e c h a n i s m that a l l o w s investors to br ing c la ims directly against 
the host state a l leg ing violat ions of these protections u n d e r international law. T h e ability of investors 
to enforce their r ights directly against a state w i t h o u t the n e e d of an a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n the investor 
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exclusion restriction in a two-step Heckman procedure to control for selection bias. 
The "policy" explanatory variables are openness to FDI, start-up procedures 
for FDI, and FDI-related arbitration regime. A simple theory on how they restrain 
FDI is illustrated in Figure 2.3. In Panel A, hurdles to start-up a subsidiary or 
resolve disputes act as cost-escalating measures that reduce the supply of the good 
or service (from Q to Q') as they raise the real resource cost to providers at every 
price level. If the supply of foreign providers is choked off at Q' (like a quota) there 
is a rent-creating effect in favor of incumbent f i r m s . 
Panel B of Figure 2.3 shows another effect of restricting foreign capital from 
Holmes & Hardin (2000). If there is no restriction at the world rental rate (R^) 
foreign capital meets the demand between Q' and Q freely. With maximum own-
ership restriction of, say, 30 percent, every unit of foreign capital is matched by two 
units of domestic capital which needs a higher rate of return to be diverted into 
the sector. This leads to a derived demand (D') for domestic capital. The effect 
is that the rate of return is higher and less capital is used overall than in a state 
where there is no restriction on ownership of equity. The "tariff-equivalent" of the 
investment barrier is the difference between the return in the restricted sector and 
the return in the world market (R' - R^) . 
and state or the involvement of their own state is seen as one of the most far reaching innovations of 
BITS. 
17 Dee (2003) explains this in terms of liberalization leading to a "triangle gain" from allocative ef-
ficiency as the tax-equivalence posed by restrictions to entry are removed, and a "rectangle gain" 
from productivity enhancement when the high cost of starting or running a business is reduced in a 
manner that saves real resources to be used elsewhere. 
Figure 2.3: Illustration of the Impact of Restricting FDI 
A. Effects of procedural 
restrictions 
B. Effects of equity 
restrictions 
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I posit that the three indicators of openness, procedures, and arbitration cap-
ture a defining thought process of a typical foreign investor. First, the investor is 
concerned about whether the host country permits foreigners to set up a business 
in a specific sector; if it does, how much equity can foreigners own? Second, if en-
try is permitted, what additional hurdles (legal and bureaucratic) does the country 
pose through regulations and how costly are they? Third, after the operation com-
mences, and if commercial disputes arise, can they be resolved with enforceable 
outcomes in a reliable manner? The first issue is about FDI-specific openness; the 
second and third issues represent the quality of FDI-specific institutions. 
FDI Openness is measured by computing the average of the percentage of 
equity that foreign investors can own in firms across 1 1 sectors (more in the next 
section). FDI Procedures measure the number of legal steps required before and 
after incorporation to start a wholly foreign-owned business. I construct the FDI 
Arbitration index by averaging indicators measuring i) the Ease of Arbitration Pro-
cess and ii) the Extent of Judicial Assistance in resolving commercial disputes from 
the lAB data set. The Ease of Arbitration Process assesses whether there are restric-
tions on what the conflicting parties can or cannot do to resolve their dispute. The 
Extent of Judicial Assistance measures the role of domestic courts in assisting the 
process of arbitration and enforcing awards. 
To control for the general quality of institutions, I compute a composite indi-
cator of five W G l developed by Kaufmann et al. ( 2 0 1 0 ) with weights derived from 
Principal Components Analysis ( P C A ) . The W G I variables are: i) the rule of law; ii) 
control of corruption; iii) regulatory quality; iv) political stability; and v) govern-
mental effectiveness. Of the six WGI indicators, the one that I exclude is "voice 
and accountability" which is argued to capture citizens' participation in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
free media. I find this to be a less relevant determinant of FDI.'^ 
1 8 I c o n c u r w i t h T h o m a s (2006) w h o a r g u e s that the concept of voice first articulated b y H i r s c h m a n 
( 1 9 7 0 ) is not s y n o n y m o u s w i t h accountability, f r e e d o m to select g o v e r n m e n t , or other polihcal free-
d o m s . N o r is there a w e l l - d o c u m e n t e d relationship b e t w e e n them. Overall , in terms of coverage of 
countries a n d topics, the W G I indicators are p e r h a p s the most authoritative a n d w i d e l y u s e d to 
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The control for a general quality of institutions as measured by the WGI vari-
ables is important because I want to see whether FDI-specific regulations matter 
for FDI over and beyond the general quality of institutions. In other words, after 
controlling for the general quality of institutions, do FDI-specific provisions add 
any value? 
Market size of the host country, proxied by GDP, is one of the most important 
determinants of horizontal FDI. Motives for vertical FDI are captured by GDP per 
capita (which proxies for average wage and the quality of infrastructure). Tariff 
rates are measured by the weighted average of applied tariffs on manufactured 
imports. The effect of high tariffs on FDI, a priori, is ambiguous: it may encourage 
tariff-jumping horizontal FDI, but discourage vertical FDI that relies on repeated 
flows of parts and components across borders. The general skill level in the country 
is assessed by the average number of years of schooling undertaken by adults aged 
25 and over. Other determinants of FDI that are not included as regressors are 
subsumed under the unobserved term, e. The description, source, and summary 
statistics of the variables are in Tables 2.13 and 2.14. 
2 . 4 D A T A 
I average outward FDI position (stock) in US dollars for 2007 and 2008 from 30 
OECD countries into 87 OECD and non-OECD countries belonging to the lAB 
sample (Table 2.16). The years 2007 and 2008 represent the latest and most stable 
number of observations in the OFCD's FDI database, prior to the plunge in cross-
border flows in 2009 because of the global financial crisis. Two-year averages are 
used to smooth out annual fluctuations. For robustness, I also use un-averaged 
annual data for 2006, 2007, and 2008. Bilateral FDI from each source country, in-
stead of aggregate FDI from all source countries, is used to cast the relationship in 
assess the quality of institutions across countries over time. They are imperfect because they are 
a quantitative aggregation of perceptions (subjective data). For a summary of criticisms of these 
indicators and the response from the authors, see Kaufmann et al. (2007). 
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a gravity framework yielding a richer set of observations than would be the case 
for a cross-country regression with aggregate FDI. Source countries include only 
members of the OECD because of data constraints; however, they have historically 
accounted for the majority of global FDI outflows/^ 
The choice of FDI stock, rather than FDI flow, as the dependent variable needs 
elaboration. The model in Melitz (2003) which inspired Helpman et al. (2008) is in-
herently cross-section because it assumes steady state productivity levels for each 
year, and does not predict how firm productivity changes year to year. Because 
I do not have a variable time dimension in my econometric model, the effects of 
explanatory regressors are on an equilibrium level of FDI. This is better reflected 
by FDI stock because it is far less volatile on an annual basis than FDI flows. Im-
portantly, the extensive margin of FDI measured by whether mulhnational firms 
from country i operate in country j can only be estimated by FDI stock, not flows. 
For the main explanatory variables, I use the new lAB indicators of FDI regu-
lation across 87 economies, prepared by the World Bank Group in 2010. With 21 
countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, 20 from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 14 
from Latin America and Caribbean, 10 from East Asia and Pacific, five from South 
Asia, and five from the Middle East and North Africa, this sample of 87 countries 
can be considered random, and a fair representation of the actual world. In 2007-
08, they constituted 87.1 percent of global population and 77.9 percent of global 
output (Table 2.15). The sample includes 15 high-income OECD countries. 
As shown in Figure 2.4, in terms of market size, the mean and standard de-
viation of the sample of all countries^® in the world and the subsample of 87 lAB 
countries are almost identical. However, within the lAB sample the distribution 
of the subgroup with zero FDI observations is remarkably different from the sub-
19 FDI outflows from non-OECD countries are increasing. For example, in 2003, 12.3 percent of total 
FDI inflow into the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was 
from China, India, and other ASEAN countries; by 2008, the corresponding share had reached 24.8 
percent (ASEAN 2010). 
20 Excludes countries with total populahon of less than one million in 2008. 
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Figure 2.4: Randomness of Country Samples 
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group with non-zero observations. The sample selection bias is, therefore, likely to 
be more prominent within the l A B sample. 
The 23 l A B indicators measure, among others, openness to FDI through eq-
uity ownership permitted in 11 sectors (11 indicators); time, procedures and reg-
ulations for starting a foreign business (three indicators); arbitrating commercial 
disputes (three indicators); and accessing industrial land (6 indicators). The data 
are compiled from detailed surveys filled out by over 2350 local experts from lead-
ing law and accounting firms, chambers of commerce, and investment promotion 
agencies. Collected during the period 2006-08, these indicators reflect regulations 
that prevailed before 2006 in each of the 87 countries. 
In terms of the coverage of subjects, sectors and countries, this data set on FDI 
regulations is the most comprehensive to date. It comprises both de jure indicators 
measuring laws and regulations on paper, and de facto indicators that measure 
the implementation of those laws. To the extent possible, I create sub-indices of 
primarily de facto indicators of FDI Arbitration and FDI Procedures to use in the 
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empirical estimation. On FDI Openness, the indicators are only de jure, and these 
tend to do less justice to countries that are open to foreign investment in prac-
tice but have not enshrined it in written lav^. I expand on the main explanatory 
variables below. 
2.4.1 Investing Across Sectors 
Restriction on equity ownership across sectors is one of the most important in-
dicators of a country's policy attitude towards foreign investment. The index of 
FDI openness is created for 86 countries^^ by averaging the equity ownership per-
mitted for foreign companies across 33 subsectors. These measure statutory (not 
de facto) restrictions to the ownership of equity by foreigners in new (greenfield) 
investment, and investment in existing firms through mergers and acquisitions. 
Sixty-six data points for each country are aggregated first into 33 subsectors, and 
then into 1 1 industries (eight of which are services, two are resources/primary, 
and one manufacturing). The final index shows on a scale of 0 to 100 the overall 
openness in a given country to ownership of firms by foreign investors (o being 
least open). 
2.4.2 Arbitrating Commercial Disputes 
Most foreign companies prefer resolving disputes through arbitration over lengthy 
litigation in local courts. The indicators assess the strength of legal frameworks for 
alternative dispute resolution by combining the Ease of Arbitration Process and 
the Extent of Judicial Assistance indices to represent the quality of FDI-specific 
institutions. This index directly deals with how foreign investors prefer to resolve 
contractual or commercial disputes. It is also strongly correlated with the rule of 
law, government effectiveness, corruption, and regulatory quality pillars of the 
21 Excluding Papua New Guinea for which equity data could not be confirmed. 
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Worldwide Governance Indicators that summarize a country's institutional regime 
in general (Figure 2.5).^ ^ 
Specifically, the index on the Ease of Arbitration Process scores, among oth-
ers, best practice provisions for party autonomy and tribunal integrity. Autonomy 
assesses whether the laws allow parties to choose arbitrators or arbitral institu-
tions, the language of proceedings, and whether foreign counsels can represent 
investors. Tribunal integrity measures whether there exist provisions to ensure 
that arbitrators remain independent and impartial and whether the proceedings 
remain confidential. The other index on judicial assistance evaluates whether local 
courts follow a "pro-arbitration" policy, whether tribunals decide the jurisdiction 
of disputes and whether the courts assist tribunals by requiring the appearance of 
witnesses and production of evidence. 
What are the bases for these indicators? Investors need to be assured that 
their investments will not be unjustly expropriated and that in instances of dis-
putes, there is a predictable course for resolution. A n effective arbitration regime 
for FDI mitigates risk by providing legal security to investors (including assurance 
of contract enforcement rights, due process, and access to justice). It gives parties 
autonomy to create systems tailored to their disputes. According to World Bank 
Group (2010), countries that score well on these indicators have a strong arbitration 
legal framework, receive support from local courts for arbitration proceedings and 
efficient enforcement, adhere to internahonal conventions, and provide autonomy 
to parties seeking to resolve their commercial disputes. 
22 The scatter plots in Figure 2.5 exclude outliers - Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands - that score 
zero on the Ease of Arbitration Process index and the Extent of Judicial Assistance index. Serbia is 
excluded from the WGI data set. This leaves 84 country observations. 
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Figure 2.5: General Quality of Institutions and Arbitration Regimes 
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2.4.3 Starting a Foreign Business 
Starting a Foreign Business indicators record the time, procedures, and regulations 
involved in establishing a local subsidiary of a foreign limited liability company. 
Here, I use the number of procedures required to establish a foreign business. This 
resembles a cost that affects the decision about whether and hov^ ^ much a firm 
invests in a foreign country. The steps include both pre- and post-incorporation 
procedures with which foreign businesses are officially required to comply. Ac-
cording to World Bank Group (2010), countries that score well on the Starting a 
Foreign Business indicators have simple and transparent establishment processes 
that abolish unnecessary steps (which create opportunities for rent-seeking). High 
scorers also treat foreign and domestic investors equally, and differences in treat-
ment vary only by company size, legal form or commercial activity, not the nation-
ality of shareholders. Tables 2.19 to 2.21 describe how indicators of FDI-specific 
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regulations are constructed in the l A B data set. I separately construct composite 
country scores for the quality of selected FDI regulations in Table 2.22.^3 
2.4.4 Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Data on bilateral investment treaties between 30 OECD source countries and 87 
l A B host countries are collected from U N C T A D ' s Investment Instruments On-
line.^4 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are agreements between countries for 
the reciprocal encouragement, promotion, and protection of investments in their 
territories. Like preferential trade agreements, BITs, too, have proliferated dramat-
ically in recent decades from around 400 in 1990 to over 2,500 at present. 
2.4.5 Gravity and Other Variables 
The gravity variables - distance, past colonial relationship, contiguity, and shared 
languages - are obtained from CEPII (2010). Economic variables - GDP, G D P per 
capita, average (weighted) applied tariff on manufactured imports - are from the 
World Development Indicators (WDl) database (World Bank 2010^?). Mean years 
of schooling are from Barro & Lee (2010), as intrapolated in U N D P (2010). These 
explanatory variables available annually are averaged over the preceding five years, 
that is, 2002 to 2006 to minimize the possibility of simultaneity. I compute the 
remoteness index as the sum of all bilateral distances between a country and all its 
partners, weighted by the share of the partner's GDP in total world output. 
23 The Investing Across Sectors score (1) averages the maximum percentage of equity permitted for 
foreign ownership in the 1 1 sectors mentioned in Table 2.19. The Ease of Process Index (2) and the 
Ease of Judicial Assistance Index (3) are obtained by normalizing the country score for those indices 
using the min-max rule: the score for a country is subtracted from the best-performing country, 
divided by the difference in scores between the best and worst-performing countries. The number 
is then multiplied by 100. Higher the score, better is the regime in place for resolving commercial 
disputes. The score for the Number of Procedures (4) is also obtained by normalizing the country 
score using the min-max rule. However, the final score is multiplied by, and subtracted from, 100. 
Higher the score, the fewer the number of pre- and post-incorporation procedural steps formally 
required to establish a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary. 
24 See UNCTAD (2010). 
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With 30 source countries and 87 host countries, there are 2610 potential ob-
servations. Gravity-related informahon is not available for three host countries 
(Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia). Because 15 OECD countries also appear in the 
lAB sample of FDI recipients, another 15 observations are lost, reducing the num-
ber of observations to 2505. If FDI stock data are missing for the years 2007-08, but 
they were reported for the period 2002-06,1 recode the missing data points as zero. 
This affects 82 country pairs; 641 data points are deemed missing and dropped 
along with 29 negative values for FDI stock (divestitures). 
Of the remaining 1835 observations, there are 724 observations that are con-
firmed to be zeros.^5 Not all of the 87 countries in the lAB sample have values for 
all explanatory variables. Papua New Guinea has no data on FDI Openness; Sierra 
Leone, Haiti, and Liberia do not have data on tariffs. Further, four OECD source 
countries (Italy, Spain, Japan, and Switzerland) do not have zero FDI in any of the 
remaining lAB countries (after missing values are dropped). This poses a problem 
for the two-step econometric methodology employed in this paper; those source 
countries are therefore dropped. Belgium and Mexico do not report any data for 
FDI stock for the years under consideration. All these reduce the number of obser-
vations used in the estimation of the main regressions to 1578 bilateral FDI stock 
values between 24 OECD source countries and 80 lAB host countries, including 
666 observations of confirmed bilateral flows with the value of zero. 
2.5 ESTIMATION METHOD 
The estimation method proceeds in five stages. First, I estimate the log-linear grav-
ity equation 2.5 using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, without correcting 
for biases. Second, I correct for the selection bias in two steps. A probit model pre-
dicts the probability, ptj, of countries having a positive FDI relahonship conditional 
on explanatory variables that are used to estimate equation 2.5. I use the binary 
25 As already explained, one positive aspect of OECD's bilateral FDI statistics is that they clearly distin-
guish between values that are missing and values that are confirmed to be zeros. In trade statistics, 
this is often not done, leading researchers to erroneously treat unreported (missing) data as zero. 
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BIT variable as a valid exclusion restriction. This permits the computation of the 
inverse Mills ratio (ff^j) for inclusion as an additional regressor in the second step 
to control for sample selection. 
In Figure 2.6, the top-left graph shows predicted probability of OECD coun-
tries i investing in country j on the y-axis. The x-axis plots the normalized fitted 
values of the latent variable that affects FDI participation. The top right graph plots 
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the unit normal (predicted probabil-
ity) on the y-axis against the PDF of the fitted value of the latent variable on the 
x-axis. The ratio (PDF/CDF) obtained is the inverse Mills ratio (fi), as depicted on 
the x-axis of the bottom-left graph. The inverse Mills ratio controls for the fact that 
there are countries in the sample v^ith low predicted probability (and large errors). 
Selection bias occurs in two ways: i) when only countries with "high" values 
of observed variables are included in a non-random sample; and ii) when coun-
tries with " low" values of observed explanatory variables are also in the sample 
with large, unobserved error terms. It is (ii) that is a more serious problem because 
the correlation between the error terms and the observed variables biases the co-
efficients. For example, the Sub-Saharan economy, Mali, in 2007-08 had an FDI 
relationship only with France (among OECD members). Conditional on observed 
explanatory variables, the predicted probability of a positive FDI relationship be-
tween Mali and France is 0.57. If France had not been a former colonial power, the 
predicted probability would have been 0.36. The second scenario would then have 
led to a higher inverse Mills ratio.^^ 
26 Note that probit also predicts a moderately high probability of two other source countries - United 
States (US) and the Netherlands - having a direct investment relationship with Mali even though 
in reality they do not invest there. This is because the two countries have invested in similar-sized 
African economies: the Netherlands in Burkina Faso and Rwanda, and the US in Rwanda. The Nether-
lands also has a BIT signed with Burkina Faso and the US has one with Rwanda. 
Figure 2.6: Correcting for Country and Firm Selection Biases 
XI ra XI g 
c. 
T3 
V 
T3 O) 
1-
• 
USA^ 
• FRA 
.5- NLq|» 
• KOR 
• 
0 - • 
-5 0 
Fitted values - HI 
p 
•a 0) 
"O 
a 
a. 
1 2 
IMR: control for sample selection 
X 
"o p-
Q U 
XI o 
-a 
P 
.5-
0 -
1 -
.5-
0 -
• 
U^SA 
NLdV • 
4H» * * 
• 
« 
KOR 
1 1 
0 .1 
1 
.2 
PDF of HI 
1 
.3 
1 
.4 
• 
• • • 
• FRA • 
1 2 3 4 
Z1: control for heterogeneity 
Source: Regressions by author using data from OECD (2011) 
Note 1: Diamond-shaped dots are FDI to Mali and squared dots are FDI to Spain 
Note 2: Other (gray) dots represent other country pairs 
(O 
On » 
H 
> 
H 
O 2 
S 
M 
H 
a 
o 
a 
UJ 
3 6 I N V E S T I N G A C R O S S B O R D E R S : DO F D I - S P E C I F I C R E G U L A T I O N S M A T T E R ? 
Third, I take into account firm heterogeneity by incorporating controls derived 
from predicted probabilities which are first normalized, Zij = (pij]. Because 
the latent variable that determines whether or not two countries have an FDI rela-
tionship is linked to the productivity level of the marginal firm, it can be used to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity term in equation 2.4. If firm productivity 
is Pareto-distributed, this has the form - 1, o | where 6 = The la-
tent variable is unobserved, but its log value is estimated by the inverse of the unit 
normal of predicted probabilities, Zij = (f ^ (Pij)- Given that E [zijjFDlij = l] = 
E [zij] -I- E [riijIFDIij = 1], Helpman et al. (2008) show that control for unobserved 
firm heterogeneity can be estimated by f i j = zij + ff^j. In other words, the index 
Zij, shown on the bottom right graph of Figure 2.6 as Z i , controls for the effect of 
investment restrictions on the proportion of firms able to profitably invest abroad. 
If the host (and bilateral) country characteristics pose low barriers (cj, Ti j ,f i j ) and 
there is high demand in (Yj), for a given level of productivity (oij) a greater frac-
tion of firms will find it profitable to invest. 
Fourth, the final regression is estimated both by Non-linear Least Squares 
(NLS) and OLS. The former is a parametric estimation that requires firm productiv-
ity to be Pareto-distributed. Helpman et al. (2008) suggest that estimates can also 
be obtained from OLS if the extensive margin is represented by a polynomial of 
Zij Because the OLS coefficients have the same sign and are very close in magni-
tude to the NLS estimates, I opt for the simpler OLS method to report most of the 
robustness results in subsequent sections. 
Fifth, the two biases that are corrected in the preceding step are disentangled 
to assess the relative dominance of each. The purpose is to find whether the fail-
ure to control for firm heterogeneity biases the coefficients more than the failure 
to control for sample selection bias arising from zero investment flows between 
numerous country pairs. 
27 Note that f i= Zij = O" Vpij); and £ij = i i j + n i j 
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All the inferences are based on standard errors that are robust and clustered 
by host country under the assumption that FDI from OECD countries flowing to 
a common host country is influenced by the latter's characteristics that apply in 
common to all source countries, in addition to pair-specific characteristics. If a 
shock in a host country affects potential investment from all source countries, then 
FDI inflows are correlated. As Moulton (1990) shows, if errors within groups are 
correlated, but incorrectly assumed to be independent, standard errors are likely 
to be substantially biased downward leading to findings of statistical significance 
that are spurious. In this paper, clustering of standard errors by host country yields 
the most conservative set of inferences on the significance of coefficients, and is the 
chosen approach in all the regressions.^® 
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Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.1 report the main results, obtained from NLS and 
OLS estimators, respectively. When both the biases introduced by country selection 
and firm selection are corrected, FDI-specific institutions significantly affect the 
accumulation of foreign direct investment. 
The coefficient of FDI Arbitration - a variable with a close relationship with 
a judicial regime and enforcement - is significant with the expected negative sign 
at the 5 percent level, whereas it was not statistically different from zero in the 
benchmark estimation that does not correct for biases (column 2). An improve-
ment of ten percent in the standardized score for FDI Arbitration (say, from 70 to 
77) increases the stock of FDI by at least 4 percent. The coefficient on FDI Proce-
dures is significant in the (biased) OLS estimate of column 2, but its magnitude 
increases in the bias-corrected estimates of columns 3 and 4. Both FDI Procedures 
28 I also cluster standard errors by source country (to account for agglomeration tendencies) and by 
country pairs. Clustering by source country makes several coefficients appear much more significant 
than when clustering is by host country. Note that the magnitudes of coefficients do not change 
irrespective of how the standard errors are clustered. 
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and FDI Arbitration coefficients are highly significant after controUing for the gen-
eral quality of institutions in the country. The coefficient on institutional quality is 
not positively significant either w h e n it is proxied by the composite W G I indicator 
or w h e n it is replaced by each of the five separate constituents of W G I in Tables 
2.4 through 2.8. 
Previous studies (for example, Daude & Stein 2007) found a strong associa-
tion between good institutions and high FDI inflow. M y results suggest that FDI-
specific provisions in practice offer direct incentives for FDI in a manner over and 
above what is of fered by good institutions in general. FDI is responsive to specific 
instruments such as an effective arbitration regime and less onerous business start-
up procedures. In the presence of sound FDI-specific provisions, the generally high 
quality of institutions and governance appears to add no additional attraction to 
FDI. From a policy maker ' s perspective, this is not bad news. A minister keen on 
attracting FDI into her country need not be despondent that it would take decades 
to overhaul the rule of law or reduce high levels of corruption; she can start with 
piecemeal reforms in regulation and enforcement that are of direct concern to in-
vestors. 
The coefficient of FDI Openness, however, is not significant in any of the re-
gressions. This implies that openness to FDI "on p a p e r " is not meaningful . While 
FDI Procedures and FDI Arbitration indices mainly consist of de facto indicators 
that assess the implementation of laws and not just the written text, the FDI Open-
ness index comprises solely of de jure indicators. High FDI-receiving countries like 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), for example, have lower openness scores 
than countries like Afghanistan and Haiti which receive insignificant amounts of 
FDI. Obviously BRIC offers conspicuous advantages like market size to investors 
that small, conflict-ridden economies do not. That, on paper, the poorer countries 
allow 100 percent ownership of equity should foreigners invest does not seem to 
matter w h e n most other determinants of FDI are accounted for. This is illustrated 
in Figure 2.7 with outward sectoral FDI data f rom the United States to 87 l A B coun-
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T a b l e 2 . 1 : D e t e r m i n a n t s o f F D I ( M a i n R e g r e s s i o n s , 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 8 ) 
( 1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) ( 5 ) (6 ) 
P r o b i t B e n c h m a r k H e t e r o g e n e i t y B i a s I B i a s II 
N L S O L S 
F D I P r o c e d u r e s - . 0 6 0 . 4 5 8 * * . 5 1 4 * * . 5 0 1 * * . 5 1 5 * * •457** 
( 0 9 5 ) (•197) ( . 2 0 0 ) ( . 2 0 2 ) (•199) ( . 2 0 3 ) 
F D I A r b i t r a t i o n - . 1 5 9 " . 2 6 0 . 4 1 1 * * . 4 0 9 * * . 3 6 2 * . 3 0 0 
( . 0 6 4 ) ( . 2 0 6 ) ( . 2 0 0 ) (•197) (•195) ( . 2 0 6 ) 
F D I O p e n n e s s - . 1 1 3 . 0 5 4 . 141 . 1 2 7 . 1 1 9 . 0 6 1 
( . 1 0 7 ) ( . 1 2 8 ) ( . 1 2 6 ) ( . 1 3 0 ) ( . 1 2 4 ) ( . 1 2 6 ) 
Q u a l i t y o f I n s t i t u t i o n s . 3 9 0 " - . 1 1 1 - . 3 1 6 - . 3 3 0 -•337 - . 1 3 2 
( 1 5 3 ) ( . 2 0 3 ) ( . 2 0 7 ) ( . 2 0 8 ) ( . 2 1 2 ) ( . 2 0 7 ) 
G D P . 6 2 4 * " . 8 5 7 * " . 4 6 8 * * * . 4 9 6 * * * . 4 9 2 * * * . 8 4 2 * * * 
( . 0 6 7 ) ( . 0 8 3 ) ( . 1 2 4 ) (•134) (•124) ( . 0 9 2 ) 
G D P P e r C a p i t a - . 1 8 9 * . 0 3 6 . 1 5 0 . 141 . 1 4 3 . 0 0 8 
( . 1 0 9 ) ( . 1 8 4 ) ( . 1 9 0 ) ( . 1 8 5 ) ( . 1 8 7 ) ( . 1 8 0 ) 
W e i g h t e d T a r i f f - . 2 5 5 * - . 3 9 0 * * - . 0 2 6 - . 2 2 1 - . 2 3 2 - . 3 8 7 * 
( 1 3 7 ) ( . 1 9 6 ) ( . 0 2 0 ) ( . 2 0 6 ) ( . 2 0 3 ) ( . 1 9 6 ) 
S c h o o l ( M e a n Y e a r s ) • 5 7 5 " * . 295 - . 1 4 6 - . 0 8 3 - . 0 8 1 . 3 2 3 
( 1 7 5 ) (•305) ( . 3 2 8 ) (•331) (•324) ( . 3 0 2 ) 
R e m o t e n e s s 2 . 8 1 4 * * * 2 . 8 2 2 * * * 1 . 2 5 1 * 1 . 4 6 6 * 1 . 4 1 7 * 2 . 7 8 7 * * * 
(•459) ( . 6 6 9 ) ( . 6 8 2 ) (•798) ( . 7 1 8 ) ( . 6 9 2 ) 
D i s t a n c e - 1 . 5 7 8 " * - 1 . 3 8 2 * * * - . 4 6 6 * - . 5 5 0 * * -•534** - 1 . 3 6 4 * * * 
( . 1 6 8 ) (•147) ( . 2 3 6 ) ( . 2 6 4 ) (•225) (•155) 
C o n t i g u i t y •347 1 . 0 8 3 * * 1 . 0 3 0 * * 1 . 0 6 6 * * 1 . 0 5 3 * * 1 . 0 8 0 * * 
( . 6 1 5 ) (•454) (•437) (•427) (•430) (•448) 
C o l o n y . 6 3 2 * . 9 3 8 * * * •544* . 6 0 5 * •578* •937*** 
(•363) (•311) ( . 2 9 1 ) ( . 3 1 0 ) ( . 2 9 6 ) ( . 3 0 6 ) 
I n v e s t m e n t T r e a t y . 3 9 2 * * * 
( . 1 4 0 ) 
. 2 6 7 
(•179) 
6 f r o m ( ^ i j ) . 6 8 2 * * * 
( . 2 0 1 ) 
I n v e r s e M i l l s R a t i o j . 177 
( . 3 5 8 ) 
. 0 0 3 
( . 6 0 0 ) 
- . 1 7 9 
(•378) 
1 . 1 7 5 * * * 
(•405) 
H i ( < D - V p > ) ) . 6 6 3 * * * 
( . 1 4 8 ) 
N o . 1 5 7 8 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 
A d j . R - s q . .66 .68 .67 . 6 7 . 66 
N o t e 1: r o b u s t s t a n d a r d e r r o r s ( c l u s t e r e d b y 
N o t e 2: s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n d i c a t e d a s * 
h o s t coun>i_ , , . . . 
f o r p < o . i , ** f o r p < 0 . 0 5 , a n d * * * for p < o . 
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Table 2.2: Determinants of FDI ( O E C D Source Countr ies Excluded) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II 
FDI Procedures -.049 .326** .312* •334" .300* 
(.096) (.156) (.158) (.158) (.156) 
FDI Arbitration -.150" .246 .379** .327* .286 
(.065) (.196) (.190) (.184) (.192) 
FDI Openness -.092 .072 .117 .106 .082 
(.116) (•125) (132) (.126) (.126) 
Quality of Institutions •274 -.130 -.233 -.238 -.078 
(171) (•243) (•257) (.256) (.238) 
GDP .668*" .939*** .669*** .659*** .974*** 
(.067) (.082) (.162) (•149) (.088) 
GDP Per Capita -.207* .140 .210 .210 .105 
(.117) (.186) (.192) (195) (.182) 
Distance -1.832*" -1.945"* -1.283** -1.222*** -2.026*** 
(.203) (.190) (•503) (•424) (.190) 
Remoteness 3.823*** 4.657*** 3.309** 3.153*** 4.702*** 
(•565) (•723) (1.302) (1.177) (•756) 
Weighted Tariff -.296** -.489** -.363 -.368 -.489** 
(.150) (.229) (.225) (•225) (.224) 
School (Mean Years) .598*** .108 -.164 -.141 .170 
(.187) (•327) (•394) (•390) (•332) 
Contiguity .217 2.297*** 2.122** 2.143*** 2.323*** 
(•609) (•775) (.819) (•789) (•787) 
Colony •494 1.246*** 1.029*** 1.018*** 1.258*** 
(•386) (.289) (•339) (•332) (.301) 
Language .468** •445 .228 .227 .415 
(•234) (•279) (•324) (•313) (.283) 
Bilateral Investment Treaty .489*** 
(.151) 
.296 
(.219) 
Inverse Mills Ratio ) .306 .160 
* \ 
(•693) (•430) 
1.204** 
(•511) 
Zi*Zi -.116 
(•094) 
H i ( O - ' ( p r ) ) .448* 
(.238) 
No. 1220 622 622 622 622 
Adj. R-sq. .62 .63 .63 .62 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o. i , ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<o.i 
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Figure 2.7: US FDI by Sector and Statutory Openness 
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Source: lAB and US Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov) 
Note 1: 87 countries, 5 sectors; 133+ values (out of 435) 
tries.^9 There is no systematic relationship between countries' openness score and 
actual FDI received by sector. 
In the bias-corrected models of columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.1, the elasticity 
of FDI with respect to distance drops dramatically, by two-third, from that in 
the (biased) benchmark model in column 2. The positive effect of a shared bor-
der increases, but the coefficient of common colony falls modestly in the bias-
corrected models. Coefficients on remoteness and GDP are also subdued in the 
bias-corrected models. Coefficients on the average education level of the adult 
population and the mean level of weighted tariff on manufactured import in host 
countries are also not statistically different from zero. 
A curious result is that the coefficient of GDP per capita is not statistically 
significant in any of the (bias-corrected) regressions. This raises concern over mul-
ticollinearity in the model. As shown in Table 2.17, GDP per capita is highly cor-
29 The five sectors are mining, manufacturing, banking, insurance, and telecommunications. Concor-
dance between the sectors defined by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and lAB is not exact. FDI 
stock figures from the US are averaged between 2007 and 2008. 
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related with the quality of institutions. It is possible that pairwise collinearity in 
the model exaggerates the variance of some coefficients, either rendering them 
statistically insignificant or having them carry the ' V r o n g " sign. While there is a 
debate on whether the quality of institutions makes a country rich or rich countries 
end up acquiring good institutions, there is no doubt that the two move together 
in general. To redress the problem of collinearity, I run alternative regressions by 
dropping GDP per capita. When this is done, the economic and statistical signifi-
cance of the main coefficients of interest do not change, and the R-squared values 
of the models do not drop. Ordinarily, a diagnostic exercise of this kind could be 
used to exclude a variable to reduce the incidence of high collinearity. However, I 
retain GDP per capita because there is no evidence that its inclusion is contributing 
to the model's mis-specification. 
I detail the estimation procedure and additional results in the rest of this sec-
tion. In Table 2.2, FDI-receiving OECD countries in the sample are dropped so 
that the FDI relationship is now between the 24 OECD source countries and 65 
non-OECD host countries. Coefficients on FDI Arbitration and FDI Procedures are 
both statistically significant although the magnitudes are lower than in the fuller 
Regressions on FDI Stock in 2008sample (Table 2.1). The elasticity of distance in 
the biased regression is much higher than in the main regression, which drops by 
about one-third when biases are corrected. This indicates that the inclusion of 15 
OECD countries in the sample overestimated the effect of FDI-specific provisions 
and underestimated the hurdle posed by bilateral distance. When the proportion 
of developing countries in the sample grows, the elasticity of distance increases, 
indicating that among less developed countries, traditional barriers remain impor-
tant. 
Column 1 of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show probit estimates of the marginal effects 
of variables that affect the probability that two countries would have an FDI rela-
tionship. OECD countries are more likely to invest in countries whose market size 
is big, are closer in terms of bilateral distance, and with which they share a colonial 
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and linguistic heritage. They are less likely to go to a country with high trade pro-
tection. The propensity to invest in countries with good FDI-specific institutions 
is low after controlling for the quality of institutions and other country-specific 
characteristics. The coefficients on the implicit start-up cost for foreign businesses 
(measured by the number of legal procedures) and openness to FDI are not signif-
icant. 
Importantly, in the probit model (column i in Tables 2.1 and 2.2), the coeffi-
cient of BIT is significant at the 1 percent level indicahng a strong propensity for 
OECD countries to invest in host countries that assure protection against expropri-
ation and provide other guarantees for foreign investors. Column 2 reports OLS 
estimates of an augmented gravity-type model with the same variables used in 
the probit regression, but without any correction for biases. The coefficient on the 
BIT variable is not significant, suggesting that it does not affect the volume of FDI 
after the decision to locate in a country has been made. In other words, it affects 
the propensity to invest (driven by fixed cost) but not the volume of investment 
(driven by variable cost). The BIT variable is, therefore, a valid exclusion restriction 
that is vital for identification in models aimed at correcting truncation biases. 
The coefficient of FDI Procedures in the (biased) benchmark regression of col-
umn 2 is highly significant. As in the probit estimates, coefficients for GDP, tariff, 
distance, colonial history, and contiguity are of the same sign and similar mag-
nitude. One major difference between the probit and the biased OLS coefficients 
is that the coefficient for the quality of institutions is not significant. Remoteness 
appears to be highly significant and positive, indicating that the relatively dis-
tant countries in the sample like the Solomon Islands, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, 
and Southern African countries are attractive destinations for FDI. This could be 
because these countries attract resource-based FDI (which is locahon-specific), or 
because remote country pairs invest much more in each other than an equi-distant 
pair elsewhere that is less remote. 
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Figure 2.8: Outward FDI and Zero Flows from OECD Countries 
Reported 
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A s mentioned earlier, a major problem with log-linearized OLS regression 
(column 2) is that the sample only includes countries that have an active FDI re-
lationship, and drops all country pairs between which the FDI flow on average 
between 2007 and 2008 is zero. Over 42 percent of the remaining sample drops 
out in this manner, which represents not only a mammoth loss of information, as 
shown in Figure 2.8, but also points to a potential cause of selection bias. After 
this, the dependent variable is not really bilateral FDI, but bilateral investment 
contingent on a relationship existing. A crucial variable left out of the model is the 
probability of being included in the sample, that is, having a non-zero FDI flow. If 
countries with active FDI relationships are not randomly selected from the popula-
tion, and the probability of selection is correlated with independent variables like 
distance, then the gravity coefficients are no longer reliable. 
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2.6.1 Country Selection Bias 
Column 5 in Table 2.1 reports results after correcting for selection bias using the 
standard Heckman procedure. In the first stage, the probit estimates in column 
1 give the probability of an FDI relationship existing conditional on the same ex-
planatory variables used to estimate the benchmark equation. An inverse Mills ra-
tio is computed from the conditional probabilities and then included as a regressor 
in the second stage, which excludes the identifying variable (BIT). The magnitudes 
of a number of coefficients change modestly between the (biased) benchmark re-
gression and the selection corrected model, but the overall sign and significance 
are retained. The inverse Mills ratio is also not statistically significant, indicating 
that the bias arising from country selection is not a serious problem in the case of 
bilateral FDI. This means that even if countries with zero FDI flows excluded from 
the country sample in the benchmark regression are now included, the benchmark 
elasticities of the impact of barriers would not change much. 
This result, however, does not undermine the case for the correction of poten-
tial selection bias. Indeed, the common practice in the extant gravity literature of 
making an ad hoc correction to zero flows by recoding zeros as unity, and then 
including the logged value of unity (zero) in the sample is flawed. This is seen in 
Table 2.3. The first column reports estimates when the zeros are simply dropped. 
Columns 2-4 correct for sample selection following three similar approaches: col-
umn 2 estimates the full model with maximum likelihood; column 3 reports results 
from the Heckman two-step model (with probit selection equation estimated with 
maximum likelihood, and the outcome equation by OLS); column 4 repeats the 
procedure of column 3 manually. The coefficients are identical, but this approach 
yields more conservative standard errors.3° All three approaches confirm that the 
30 The two-step approach is more popular and is the one used by Helpman et al. (2008). Verbeek (2004) 
argues that a full maximum likelihood estimation of the sample selection model is more efficient than 
the two-step procedure. Further, the OLS regression provides incorrect standard errors because the 
remaining residual is heteroskedastic and the inverse Mills ratios (lambdas) are not directly observed 
but estimated from the first stage regression. The two-step method will also not work if the lambdas 
do not vary much across observations. Verbeek argues that the full maximum likelihood estimation 
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coefficients of the biased benchmark model do not alter much in the version with 
correction for sample selection. (The coefficient on the FDI Arbitration variable is, 
however, significant at the lo percent level in two of the three models that correct 
the sample selection bias). 
Now, compare the selection corrected estimates of columns 2-4 with those 
from an ad hoc adjustment in column 5. Coefficients on the FDI-related policy 
variables, the quality of government and schooling are completely different. Coef-
ficients on the gravity variables, however, are similar in magnitude. Although the 
R-squared is much higher in the ad hoc regression, the results show that the co-
efficients vary and inferences would be very different depending on whether the 
model ignores the zeros (as in column 1), corrects for them (as in columns 2-4), or 
makes an atheoretical ad hoc adjustment (column 5). 
Finally, Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) point out that the presence of het-
eroskedasticity in trade data actually requires the use of non log-linearized models. 
Their method allows the inclusion of zero flows in the sample by estimating the 
gravity model with original (non-log) FDI as the dependent variable. The results 
from their Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method in column 6 do 
not show coefficients on the FDI-related policy variables to be statistically signifi-
cant, but some variables have surprising coefficients. The elashcity of distance, for 
example, drops by about two-third as in the main bias-corrected model. An issue 
with the method proposed by Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) in the context of FDI 
flows is that it does not seek to explain zeros as anything special. In my model, 
zeros are intimately linked to heterogeneous productivity of firms. A zero bilateral 
flow indicates that firms are not finding it profitable to invest abroad because, for 
a given level of foreign demand, either the firm productivity is low, or the fixed 
and variable costs induced by distance and policy are prohibitive. 
(MLE) offers an integrated approach to estimating the parameters. However, MLE requires a stronger 
assumption that the errors of the selection and outcome equations are jointly normally distributed. 
2 . 6 R E S U L T S 4 7 
Addressing the zero observation problem (regardless of whether the selection 
bias is serious or not) still does not give us consistent estimates when firms are 
heterogeneous. In earlier trade models that follow Krugman (1979), firms are sym-
metric and all firms export. Only their volume is constrained by trade costs, not 
the decision of firms of whether to export. When trade barriers are infinite, foreign 
varieties are still consumed, but zero quantity of each. The effect of trade costs is 
only on the intensive margin of trade. Helpman et al. (2008) show that the cor-
rection of selection bias is inadequate when the assumption of symmetric firms is 
rejected and firms are not affected by FDI barriers in an identical manner. 
When firms are heterogeneous, an additional bias needs to be controlled for. 
As FDI barriers go down, multinational firms face lower variable costs of investing 
abroad, so they increase their FDI. At the same time, firms that were not productive 
enough earlier to incur fixed costs are now in a position to do so, and contribute 
to increased FDI. Both the intensive and extensive margins of adjustment must be 
acknowledged to obtain an accurate picture of how barriers to FDI affect inflow. 
Ignoring the extensive margin misattributes the importance of specific barriers in 
restricting total investment flow because they conflate the impact of FDI barriers on 
these two separate margins of FDI, and render the coefficients inconsistent (Behar 
& Nelson 2009). This issue is addressed next, and is illustrated in Figure 2.6. 
2.6.2 Firm Selection Bias 
I follow the two-step methodology proposed by Helpman et al. (2008) to control 
for unobserved firm heterogeneity in a cross-country data set, as explained in the 
section on estimation strategy. Column 3 in Table 2.1 reports results from an NLS 
model that has controls for firm selection - 1)] and country selection (riij). 
The coefficient of Wij (6) is highly significant at the one percent level indicating that 
there is a severe truncation bias.3^ The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio, however. 
31 In the parametric estimation, I assume delta to be 0.6. 
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is insignificant. Column 4 in Table 2.1 is exactly the same model as in column 
3, except that it is now estimated non-parametrically by OLS after dropping the 
Pareto assumption and the non-linearity of the unobserved heterogeneity term, 
which is estimated by a polynomial in Zij (denoted in the results tables by Z i and 
Z2). 
In the bias-corrected estimates of columns 3 and 4, the coefficients of FDI 
Arbitration and FDI Procedures are highly significant even after controlling for the 
general quality of institutions. Compared to the benchmark regression (column 2), 
the elasticity of distance drops dramatically from approximately -1 .5 to -0.5. The 
coefficient of FDI Openness is not significant. 
In columns 5 and 6, I decompose the country and firm heterogeneity biases 
to assess which of the two biases is more prominent. Column 5 reports results 
controlling only for heterogeneity bias and not the selection bias. In column 6, or\ly 
the sample selection bias is corrected. It is evident that the coefficients in column 
5 are close to those in columns 3 and 4, whereas coefficients in column 6 are close 
to that obtained in the benchmark regression (column 2). This indicates that an 
overwhelming share of the bias has arisen because of unobserved heterogeneity. 
While the dominating presence of zero bilateral f lows between numerous country 
pairs potentially posed serious selection bias, I find that in actual estimation, it is 
the failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity that produces most of the bias 
in a gravity-like model of FDI. 
2.6.3 Endogeneity Bias 
A pertinent concern in the relationship between FDI regulations and FDI inflow is 
that regulations could be endogenous to inflow. Improved regulation can be a re-
sponse by governments to low levels of FDI, or large foreign investors can exercise 
their influence to lobby governments for regulatory reform after choosing to locate. 
Reverse causation of this nature would imply that errors are not independently and 
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identically distributed leading to inconsistent estimates. Generally, while openness 
to FDI could be increased by "stroke-of-the-pen" reforms, improvement in institu-
tional practices and provisions are attained only over the long run. In this paper, 
it is the more institutions-oriented de facto indicators of FDI Procedures and FDI 
Arbitration that are associated with high levels of FDI, not statutory openness. Fur-
ther, case studies on FDI policy reforms suggest that major FDI inflows typically 
follow, not precede, reforms. 
I formally test for the exogeneity of FDI regulations with three alternative 
instrumental variables related to accessing land. The first instrument measures as-
pects of whether the land registry or cadastre have a publicly accessible inventory 
of private and public land. The second instrument on the Availability of Land In-
formation scores the richness of 18 pieces of land-related information (for example, 
plot size, land value, address, previous contracts). And the third instrument cap-
tures the time taken (number of days) to lease public or private land in the host 
country on average (World Bank Group 2010). These instrumental variables are 
chosen because they are associated with the soundness of domestic institutions; 
but they are not a determinant of FDI in their own right because a substantial 
share of aggregate global FDI is in services for which access to industrial land is 
not as important as for FDI in manufacturing. 
The tests follow a three-stage process. First, I conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
(DWH) test for the endogeneity of each of the Openness, Arbitration, and Proce-
dures variables. After confirming a high degree of correlation between the poten-
tially endogenous variable and its instrument. Openness is instrumented by the 
Access to Land Information index, FDI Arbitration is instrumented by the Avail-
ability of Land Information index, and FDI Procedures is instrumented by the time 
it takes to lease private land. I also instrument for all the three variables together. 
In all the four cases, the p-value of the DWH test is greater than 0.15, which fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of regressors. 
5 0 I N V E S T I N G A C R O S S B O R D E R S : D O F D I - S P E C I F I C R E G U L A T I O N S M A T T E R ? 
Second, I check for the validity of the instruments in an over-identified model. 
None of the p-values of the Hansen's J chi-squared is less than 0.44; the null hy-
pothesis that the overidentifying restriction is valid is not rejected. Finally, the 
results reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments for the Openness and Arbi-
tration variables, but not the Procedures variable. However, when the Arbitration 
and Procedures variables are instrumented together in a just-identified model, the 
F-statistic exceeds the critical value in the Stock-Yogo test, rejecting the null hy-
pothesis of weak instruments.^^ 
2 . 7 R O B U S T N E S S 
Three robustness checks are performed on the bias-corrected OLS estimates re-
ported in column 4 of Table 2.1. First, is the high statistical significance of co-
efficients on FDI Procedures and FDI Arbitration robust to more disaggregated 
controls for the quality of institutions in lieu of a single composite index? Tables 
2.4 through 2.8 replicate the main result by proxying the general quality of insti-
tutions by five separate WGI variables. These five indicators are highly correlated 
with each other (Table 2.18). To avoid multi-collinearity, each is run in a separate 
regression. 
The results for all variables are consistent with the main results. The coeffi-
cients for four of the five institutional variables - control of graft, regulatory quality, 
government effectiveness, and political stability - are not statistically significant af-
ter FDI-specific regulations are included in the bias-corrected regressions. The only 
coefficient attached to an institutional variable that is not statistically insignificant 
is the rule of law. It is negatively significant at the 5 percent level (column 3, Table 
2.5). This is perhaps a result of a high degree of correlation between the rule of law 
and the average income level of the country. When the log of GDP per capita is 
not included in the regression, the coefficient on the rule of law index is no longer 
32 These methods follow Cameron & Trivedi (2009) in checking for regressor endogeneity, overidentify-
ing restrictions, and weak instruments. 
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significant. In all results, FDI Arbitration and FDI Procedure coefficients retain 
their high level of significance at either the 5 or 10 percent levels. The elasticity 
of distance drops as dramatically as in the main result, although coefficients on 
other gravity variables - colonialism, contiguity and language - are affected only 
slightly. 
In all models, the BIT coefficient is highly significant in the selection equation 
(column 1) and not in the benchmark outcome equation (columns 2), reaffirming 
its appropriateness as a candidate for exclusion restriction. It passes the prima 
facie test of a valid exclusion restriction by being shown to affect the propensity to 
invest, but not the volume of investment. This point is worth emphasizing because 
as appealing as the technique for controlling truncation bias is, its efficacy can 
be stymied by the lack of a convincing exclusion restriction. The main exclusion 
restriction in Helpman et al. (2008) is religion, which Anderson (2011) does not 
find convincing. Baranga (2009), too, finds problems with the way Helpman et al. 
(2008) have used the religion variable. Using an alternative but similar index yields 
a highly significant coefficient in the benchmark OLS regression, weakening the 
case for the variable's validity as an exclusion restriction. 
Second, how do coefficients change when a dummy for natural resource-rich 
countries is added to test whether poor countries rich in oil, gas and minerals 
attract FDI in the extractive industries? To restrict the sample to just developing 
countries, I drop the FDI-receiving OECD countries. Host countries are assigned a 
dummy value of one if during 2002 and 2006 their average share of fuel, ores, and 
metal exports in total exports exceeded 20 p e r c e n t . 3 3 In Table 2.9, the coefficient of 
the resource dummy is not statistically different from zero indicating that resource-
rich developing countries are not likely to attract more FDI after controlling for 
FDI regulations, the quality of institutions, and other host country characteristics. 
The statistical significance of coefficients of the FDI Procedures and Arbitrations 
variables is retained. 
33 Fuel products belong to SITC Section 3; metals and ores belong to SITC Divisions 27, 28, and 68. 
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Third, do the main results stand when alternative time periods, namely the 
individual years of 2006, 2007, and 2008, are considered? I do not consider years 
prior to 2006 because the explanatory indicators of FDI regulation cover prevailing 
regimes during or before 2006. Table 2.10 reports results obtained by estimating 
the model using data for 2006. GDP, GDP per capita, and tariffs averaged over 
the preceding 5 years, from 2001 to 2005. The basic results not only stand, but the 
coefficient of FDI Arbitration increases substantially when the dependent variable 
uses FDI stock for the year 2006. A 10 percent increase in a country's combined 
score in the Ease of Process and the Judicial Assistance indices increases FDI by 
over 5.6 percent. 
Table 2.11 reports results obtained by estimating the model using data for 
2007. Here, both the coefficients of FDI Arbitration and FDI Procedures fall to the 
extent that the FDI Arbitration coefficient is statistically significant only at the 10.6 
percent l e v e l . I t is conjectured that host country regulations and characteristics 
matter less when there is a global glut in investment funds. Recall that the year 
2007 recorded the highest levels of outward FDI ever in the world. Total FDI stock 
was valued at nearly US$18 trillion and FDI flows nearly reached the US$2 trillion 
mark for the first time. 
Table 2.12 reports results obtained by estimating the model using data for 2008. 
The estimates are comparable to the main results, except for the coefficient of the 
quality of institutions. As in Table 2.5 when it was measured by the rule of law 
indicator, the coefficient is negative and significant, that is, an improved measure 
of the rule of law is associated with lower FDI. As stated earlier, this coefficient 
becomes insignificant when GDP per capita is dropped from the regression. 
34 It is significant at the 3 percent level if standard errors are clustered by source country, but I opt for 
the more conservative estimates. 
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2.8 C O N C L U S I O N 
Gravity models have long been used to explain patterns of trade, investment, and 
migration flows between countries. They fit the data well, but until recently, they 
were seen as atheoretical (Anderson & Van Wincoop 2003). This paper uses a new 
empirical methodology to estimate the impact of FDI-specific regulations on FDI 
inflow in a theoretically derived gravity-like model. 
The traditional estimates obtained from log-linearized models of barriers to 
FDI are not consistent because they do not account for all the information con-
tained in bilateral data, especially between countries that invest zero amounts in 
each other (country selection problem). These models also do not acknowledge 
that firms are heterogeneous and that only a fraction of them are in a position 
to invest abroad (firm selection problem). The amount of FDI between countries i 
and j is not just a function of low barriers to FDI, but also of the fraction of firms 
that invest in country j from country i. Not controlling for the latter assigns exag-
gerated elasticities to policy costs and gravity variables by conflating the extensive 
and intensive margins of investment flow. 
I find that FDI-specific regulations do matter for attracting FDI. Using a new, 
painstakingly prepared data set on FDI regulations across 87 countries, I show 
that de facto implementation of laws related to the arbitration of commercial dis-
putes and the number of procedures required to set up wholly-owned foreign 
subsidiaries are strongly associated with high levels of FDI stock. These provisions 
proxy for the quality of FDI-specific institutions in the country, and affect FDI more 
directly than measures of the general quality of institutions. 
I also show that it is how the targeted laws and regulation are translated into 
practice that is important rather than what is written in statutes. This is reflected 
by the fact that (the coefficient on) openness to FDI, measured by the average 
percentage of equity permitted to be owned by foreign investors, is not a signifi-
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cant determinant of FDI. Further, the correction of biases dramatically reduces the 
salience of bilateral distance - a proxy for transaction costs and information asym-
metry - as a barrier to inward foreign direct investment from OECD countries. 
A P P E N D I X 
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Consumption: A representative consumer prefers variety (v) and maximizes an 
iso-elastic utility function U = [Jx(v)Pdv]^/P subject to aggregate expenditure, 
E = Jp (v )x (v ] . Aggregate expenditures equal aggregate income (Y). The elasticity 
of substitution across products, cr = 1/1 - p, is the same across countries. When 
goods 1 to n are continuous, E takes the form J ^ p(v)x(v) where C is the "mass" 
of goods. The consumer optimizes A = — [Jp(v)x(v)dv] — E] as follows: 
6A 
= px(v)P- ' - A p ( v ) = 0 (2.A.1) 
Relative demand for two varieties is: 
x(vi 
X(V2) 
x(vi ) 
p(vi ) 
= X(V2) 
p(vi ' p - 1 (2.A.2) 
Multiplying both sides of (2.A.2) by p(vi ) and taking integral with respect to V] : 
E = x ( V 2 ) p ( V 2 ) - J p ( v i ) l - d V i . 
The CES price index (true cost of living index) of all varieties is as follows: 
I 
The Marshallian demand for a variety (v) is: 
p i -CT 
rp(v)" E 
P 
(2.A.3) 
5 6 I N V E S T I N G A C R O S S B O R D E R S : D O F D I - S P E C I F I C R E G U L A T I O N S M A T T E R ? 
Production: A country i firm produces one unit of output with a cost-minimizing 
combination of inputs (Cio) where a measures the number of bundles of inputs 
used per unit of output; c^  is the cost of the bundle, which is uniform across 
country i. A firm's productivity is therefore given by ^. Monopolistic competition 
with increasing returns implies decreasing average cost as quantity produced in-
creases [l(x) = f - I - ex]. Each firm produces one distinct variety. Each country i has 
a continuum of firms measured by Ni. Relative size of two countries can therefore 
be estimated by There is no strategic interaction among firms, and they only 
charge a constant mark-up over the marginal cost to maximize profit as follows: 
Tti = P i X i - C i Q X i - C i f i (2.A.4) 
— = X i - l - ( p i - C i Q ) — = 0 
6pi 6pi 
Xi 
Pi = ' ^ i ' l - s i -
6pi 
Substituting = EP^"' in equation 2.A.4: 
CiQ 
Pi = CiQ 
a 
CT- 1 
(2.A.5) 
Investing across borders: Firms serving the foreign market through exports face 
higher variable costs [r?- > T[j) and firms undertaking FDI face higher fixed costs 
(f[j > f?j). Production through subsidiary in country j by parent firms in country 
i reduces transport costs, but there exist non-trivial coordination and transaction 
costs. For exports, price in country j is p ixf j = which differs from price in 
country i by including bilateral trade costs. For FDI, or more precisely sales by 
foreign affiliates, the price in country j of products sold by firms headquartered in 
country i is: 
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P i = 
T | j C j Q 
(2.A.6) 
Note that factor cost is Ct for exporters and Cj for investors. Take Ej = Yj. 
Substituting equation 2.A.6 in equation 2.A.4, and using equation 2.A.3: 
7T; = P j x j - C j a x j - C j f [ j 
Tlij = ( 1 - p ) 
TijCjQ 
PPj 
] 
1 cr 
Y j - C i f [ j (2.A.7) 
Productivity threshold: Sale by multinational firnis from i are profitable in j 
when TTij^ o. This implies that the minimum productivity cut-off Uij required to 
invest abroad is: 
Qii = Yj (1 - p ) (2.A.8) 
The cumulative distribution function of the productivity index a is assumed 
to be a truncated Pareto distribution with support [ql, uh]- Only firms with pro-
ductivity q l < a < aij invest abroad. This is captured by the fraction of such firms 
G('ii j) = ^QH J^a^ k'' where k is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution such 
that k > a — 1. Total sales generated by foreign-owned subsidiaries from i to j are 
J"^' PjXjNidG(Q) where G(aij) is multiplied by Ni. 
Substituting for pj and Xj, and characterizing FDI flows, F^ j = J"^' a ' ""^dGla) 
for Uij > Ql, the gravity-type equation for FDI is obtained as follows: 
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FDIij -
PPj 
l-cr 
YjN.Fij (2.A.9) 
Aggregate FDI sales abroad is the measure of firms Ni multiplied by the aver-
age value of FDI of a representative firm. Note that Nij = NiG(avj). Yj is the eco-
nomic size of the host country. Fij can be expressed as a^ ^ ^ ^ f z ^ d a . 
Further, 
Fii = 
Q h ' q l ^ k - ( j + 1 
k-CT+l a k-(T+l 
aL 
k-a+1 
- 1 ( 2 . A . I O ) 
The first multiplicative term is common across all countries; the second term 
k-cr+l 1 
— 1 >. Now, log-linearizing 
ClL 
is specific to i and j, and termed Wij 
equation 2.A.9, FDI can be estimated in equation 2 . A . 1 1 . (pt captures all variables 
with subscript i as a fixed effect for the FDI source country, (pj amalgamates coun-
try j specific variables: GDP (InVj), factor and policy costs (Incj), and inward 
multi-lateral resistance (InPj); Wij captures the ij component of Fij. 
fdiij = ao + (Pi + (P j+ .d i j +Wi j + Cij ( 2 . A . 1 1 ) 
Sample selection: Equation 2 . A . 1 1 is observed only for positive values of FDI, 
that is, FDIij = 1 if Zij > 0 where Zij is the latent (unobserved) variable that de-
termines whether country pairs enter into an FDI relationship or not. This latent 
variable can be estimated by probit conditional on characteristics contained in the 
outcome equation 2 . A . 1 1 . Identification requires at least one variable that affects 
only the propensity of investing but not the actual amount of investment. In other 
words, this term (4)ij) affects fixed cost, but not the variable cost. Equation 2 . A . 1 2 
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specifies the determinants of the latent variable affecting FDI participation. Equa-
tion 3 4 calculates the fitted values of the latent variable (zij) through predicted 
probabilities of firms from country i profitably investing in country j, where O is 
the standard normal distribution. 
59 
Zij = To * * + C v * + y d i j *-|-K4)ij *+r|ij (2.A.12) 
Pr(FDIij = 1 Izij > 0 ) = O ( y o * + t j * + C i * + y d i j *+K4)i j * ) (2.A.13) 
Note that the error terms of the selection equation 2 .A .12 and the outcome 
equation 2.A. 11 are correlated because the unobserved factors that determine FDI 
participation also affect the magnitude of FDI. These two error terms are jointly 
normally distributed. This leads to a sample selection bias because in equation 
2.A.11, E[eij|FDIij = 1] ^ 0. Under the assumptions of the model, there exists a 
consistent estimator of E[eijlFDlij = 1] which is ^ ^ t j , where is the inverse 
Mills ratio obtained from equation 3.4. 
Unobserved heterogeneity bias: The latent variable z^ is related to the productiv-
ity of the marginal FDI-undertaking firm. If this firm does not find it profitable to 
undertake FDI, then no firm from country 1 will. From equation 2.A.7, the ratio of 
profits to fixed cost of this firm can be expressed as: 
1 - CT 
Yi 
(2.A.14) 
( 1 - p ) pPi 
C i l j 
Now, define the latent variable Zu ~ Qi) 
Ql 
cr-1 
where Zij = exp(zi 
From equation 2.A.10, Wij = (Zij)^ - 1 where 6 = 
Zij is unobserved, but E[zij] can be estimated by Zij from equation 3.4. 
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Helpman et al. ( 2 0 0 8 ) show that both the sample selection and productivity 
heterogeneity biases can be redressed in a two-step estimation procedure begin-
ning with the same probit selection equation. However, as explained earlier, to 
prevent the model from being under-identified, this method requires at least one 
other variable that enters the probit equation but not the FDI outcome equation to 
remove the collinearity problem between Zij and investment barriers. Without the 
extra identifying variable, z-i, is merely a linear combination of the same explana-
tory variables used in both the selection and outcome equations. 
We know that E[zij|FDlij = 1] = E[zij] + E[r|ij|FDlij = 1]. 
Given that the bilateral FDI flow is positive, the expected value of the latent 
variable can be estimated by Zij = Zij -l-fi^j, the sum of the fitted value of the latent 
variable and the inverse Mills ratio. 
In equation 2.A.11, the control for firm selection bias ( w ^ j ) is ln|exp[6(z i j ) ] — 1) 
and the control for sample selection bias is fiij. This is a parametric non-linear 
regression. When the Pareto assumption is relaxed, Helpman et al. ( 2 0 0 8 ) show that 
equation 2.A. 11 can be estimated non-parametrically in an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression where sample selection is controlled by the inverse Mills ratio 
(ff^j) and firm selection is controlled by a polynomial of f . 
Finally, to sum up the estimation procedure on a practical note, how do I 
obtain ztj and fiij ? A probit model predicts probabilities of positive FDI from a 
regression that includes the standard gravity variables, host country FDI barriers 
and dummies for source countries. This includes the identifying variable - BIT -
which is excluded in the second stage. From the predicted probabilities, an inverse 
Mills ratio (Ti^ j) is computed. Because the inverse Mills ratio would be undefined 
for predicted probabilities of 1 , all probabilities > 0 . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 are converted to equal 
0 . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 . Next, the fitted values of the latent variable ztj = (p^j) are obtained 
from the normalized predicted probabilities. This is added to the inverse Mills 
ratio to obtain Zij = Zij -I- ff^j. 
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2.B F I R M P R O D U C T I V I T Y , E X P O R T S , A N D H O R I Z O N T A L FDI 
The model is from Helpman et al. (2004) and Helpman (2006) where firms vary 
by productivity which is discovered after entering the industry Factor cost (c) 
is country-specific and productivity (inverse of a) is firm-specific. Fixed cost of 
serving the domestic market is c f o and the firm charges a marked-up price to 
maximize profit as follows: 
TrD(e) = e i v j ' ^ - i B - c f D where B = A ( 1 ( 2 . B . 1 ) 
P 
If a firm sells in a foreign country with the same demand elasticity (CT) but 
different demand function, and faces transport and transaction cost as well as fixed 
export cost, c f x , it makes additional profit from exports as follows: 
7TX(6) = T ' - ' ^ G B ' - c f x where e = (2.B.2) 
Firms with productivity 6 D < 8 < produce for the domestic market. 
Those with productivity G > export. A firm that undertakes horizontal FDI 
builds a second plant in country j incurring fixed cost cf i and variable cost CjQ to 
reap profit as follows: 
7Ti(e) = e B ' - c f i (2.B.3) 
For the case in which demand level is the same in two countries, B' = B, Cj = 
c and f i > T*^  ^  f x > f o , the model shows: 
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6 0 < 0i< < (2.B4) 
This leads to a natural sorting of firms by productivity. If the liberalization of 
trade or investment reduces marginal costs, not only can firms trade or invest more, 
but new firms can participate in foreign trade or investment as the productivity 
cut-off required to do so falls. In Figure 2.9, the profit schedules tti and Ttx swivel 
backwards. A s an example, Baldwin et al. (2003) found that 4.5 percent reduction 
in Canada-US tariffs increased firms' propensity to export by 63 percent. 
Figure 2.9: Sorting of Firms by Productivity 
Source: Helpman (2006) 
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T a b l e 2 . 3 : D e t e r m i n a n t s o f F D I ( A d d r e s s i n g t h e Z e r o P r o b l e m ) 
(1) ( 2 ) (3 ) (4) (5 ) (6 ) 
Z e r o D r o p p e d M L E 2 S t e p 2 S t e p A d - h o c P o i s s o n 
A u t o M a n u a l 
F D I P r o c e d u r e s . 4 5 8 " . 4 5 3 " * . 4 5 7 * * * •457** . 156 . 026 
( 1 9 7 ) (•125) (•125) ( . 2 0 3 ) ( . 1 0 3 ) ( . 1 8 2 ) 
F D I A r b i t r a h o n . 2 6 0 . 3 0 5 * . 3 0 0 * . 3 0 0 - . 1 8 7 . 226 
( . 2 0 6 ) (•177) (•177) ( . 2 0 6 ) ( . 1 4 0 ) (•594) 
F D I O p e n n e s s . 0 5 4 . 0 6 0 . 061 . 061 . 0 6 9 . 3 3 8 
( . 1 2 8 ) ( . 1 1 0 ) ( . 1 1 0 ) ( . 1 2 6 ) ( . 0 9 2 ) (•244) 
Q u a l i t y o f I n s t i t u t i o n s - . 1 1 1 - . 1 2 7 - . 1 3 2 - . 1 3 2 •377** . 2 8 4 
( . 2 0 3 ) ( . 1 5 3 ) (•153) ( . 2 0 7 ) (•144) (•233) 
G D P . 8 5 7 " * . 8 5 1 " * . 8 4 2 * * * . 8 4 2 * " . 8 2 0 * " . 7 3 8 * " 
( . 0 8 3 ) ( . 0 5 2 ) ( . 0 5 5 ) ( . 0 9 2 ) ( . 0 7 0 ) (•075) 
G D P P e r C a p i t a . 036 .003 . 008 . 0 0 8 - . 0 9 6 . 0 2 7 
( . 1 8 4 ) ( . 1 1 6 ) (•117) ( . 1 8 0 ) (•125) ( . 2 1 4 ) 
W e i g h t e d T a r i f f - . 3 9 0 - - . 3 8 9 " * - . 3 8 7 * " - . 3 8 7 * - . 3 9 8 * " - . 1 9 1 
( . 1 9 6 ) (•133) (•133) ( . 1 9 6 ) (•149) ( . 2 8 6 ) 
S c h o o l ( M e a n Y e a r s ) . 295 . 336 . 323 •323 . 3 0 0 * * - . 1 1 2 
(•305) ( . 2 2 4 ) ( . 2 2 5 ) ( . 3 0 2 ) (•124) (•499) 
R e m o t e n e s s 2 . 8 2 2 * " 2 . 8 1 2 " * 2 . 7 8 7 * * * 2 . 7 8 7 * * * 2 . 8 4 5 * " . 468 
( . 6 6 9 ) (•395) (•397) ( . 6 9 2 ) (•444) (•587) 
D i s t a n c e - 1 . 3 8 2 " * - 1 . 3 8 0 " " - - 1 . 3 6 4 * * * - 1 . 3 6 4 * " - 1 . 3 9 5 * " - . 5 1 3 * * * 
(•147) ( . 1 2 2 ) ( . 1 2 6 ) (•155) ( . 1 0 7 ) ( . 0 8 3 ) 
C o n t i g u i t y 1 . 0 8 3 " 1 . 0 7 4 * " 1 . 0 8 0 * * * 1 . 0 8 0 " •937** - . 2 0 8 
( 4 5 4 ) (•347) (•347) ( . 4 4 8 ) (•449) ( . 2 3 0 ) 
C o l o n y . 9 3 8 " * • 9 4 3 " * . 9 3 7 * " . 9 3 7 * * * 1 . 0 7 0 " * . 4 4 2 * * 
(•311) ( . 2 9 0 ) ( . 2 9 1 ) ( . 3 0 6 ) ( . 3 1 6 ) ( . 2 2 2 ) 
L a n g u a g e . 8 8 9 " * . 8 4 0 " * . 8 3 6 * " . 8 3 6 * * * . 8 5 8 * " . 9 0 0 * * * 
( . 2 6 0 ) (•237) (•237) ( . 2 6 5 ) (•231) ( . 2 2 6 ) 
B i l a t e r a l I n v e s t m e n t T r e a t y . 2 6 7 
( 1 7 9 ) 
. 117 
(•124) 
•135 
(•143) 
I n v e r s e M i l l s R a t i o - . 1 7 9 
(•239) 
- . 1 7 9 
(•378) 
N o . 9 1 2 1 5 7 8 1 5 7 8 9 1 2 1 5 7 8 1 5 7 8 
A d j . R - s q . .66 .66 .76 
N o t e 1: r o b u s t s t a n d a r d e r r o r s , c l u s t e r e d b y 
N o t e 2 : s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n d i c a t e d a s * 
h o s t c o u n t r y , r e p o r t e d i n p a r e n t h e s i s 
f o r p < o . i , ** for p < 0 . 0 5 , a n d * * * for p < o . o i 
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T a b l e 2 . 4 : D e t e r m i n a n t s o f F D I ( G r a f t ) 
(1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4) (5 ) 
P r o b i t B e n c h m a r k H e t e r o g e n e i t y B i a s I B i a s II 
F D I P r o c e d u r e s - . 0 6 1 . 4 5 6 * * •494** . 5 0 9 * * . 4 6 0 * * 
( . 0 8 8 ) ( 1 9 7 ) ( . 2 0 1 ) (•199) ( . 2 0 3 ) 
F D I A r b i t r a t i o n - . 1 2 6 " . 2 4 7 . 3 6 8 * . 3 2 1 . 2 8 4 
( . 0 6 2 ) ( . 2 0 5 ) (•197) (•194) ( . 2 0 5 ) 
F D I O p e n n e s s - . 1 1 2 . 0 5 8 . 1 2 6 . 1 2 0 . 065 
( . 1 0 2 ) ( 1 2 5 ) ( 1 2 7 ) ( . 1 2 1 ) (•123) 
C o n t r o l o f G r a f t . 2 9 2 * * - . 0 7 3 - . 2 0 9 - . 2 1 6 - . 1 0 0 
( . 1 4 1 ) ( . 1 8 7 ) ( . 1 8 8 ) (•191) ( . 1 8 8 ) 
G D P .627*** . 8 5 7 " * . 5 0 4 * * * •493*** . 8 3 9 * * * 
( . 0 6 8 ) ( . 0 8 2 ) ( . 1 3 6 ) ( . 1 2 4 ) ( . 0 9 2 ) 
G D P P e r C a p i t a - . 1 7 6 . 0 2 6 . 1 1 0 . 1 1 3 . 005 
( . 1 2 0 ) ( . 1 9 6 ) (•197) (•199) (•194) 
W e i g h t e d Tar i f f - . 2 9 9 * * - . 3 7 8 * - . 1 8 5 - . 1 9 2 -•375* 
( . 1 4 0 ) ( . 1 9 1 ) ( . 2 0 5 ) ( . 2 0 2 ) ( . 1 9 2 ) 
S c h o o l ( M e a n Y e a r s ) • 5 9 5 * " . 291 - . 0 7 9 - . 0 8 3 . 305 
( . 1 8 8 ) ( . 3 0 6 ) (•333) (•327) (•303) 
R e m o t e n e s s 2 . 8 4 2 * * * 2 . 8 2 3 * * * ^•475* 1 . 3 9 7 * 2 , 7 8 6 * * * 
( . 4 6 4 ) (•677) ( . 8 2 3 ) (•735) ( . 7 0 0 ) 
D i s t a n c e - 1 . 5 7 2 * * * - 1 . 3 8 1 * * * -•574** - . 5 4 2 * * - 1 . 3 5 8 * * * 
( . 1 6 8 ) (•147) ( . 2 6 8 ) ( . 2 2 5 ) ( . 1 5 6 ) 
C o n t i g u i t y •352 1 . 0 8 0 * * 1 . 0 5 9 * * 1 . 0 4 0 * * 1 . 0 7 7 * * 
( . 6 1 1 ) ( 4 5 7 ) (•427) (•431) (•450) 
C o l o n y . 6 5 2 * . 9 3 6 * * * . 6 0 0 * . 5 6 3 * . 9 3 3 * * * 
( . 3 6 6 ) (•311) (•314) ( . 2 9 8 ) (•306) 
L a n g u a g e . 6 1 5 * * * . 8 8 7 * * * . 5 0 9 * . 5 1 4 * . 8 3 6 * * * 
( . 2 2 9 ) ( . 2 6 0 ) (•279) (•277) ( . 2 6 6 ) 
B i l a t e r a l I n v e s t m e n t T r e a t y . 4 1 3 * * * . 2 6 3 
( . 1 4 1 ) ( . 1 8 0 ) 
I n v e r s e M i l l s R a t i o ^ n t j ) . 011 - . 2 0 3 
/ a. \ 
( . 6 0 2 ) ( . 3 8 1 ) 
ft) 1 , 1 8 1 * * * 
(•403) 
Z i * Z i - . 0 7 5 
( . 0 7 1 ) 
H i ( O - ^ p r ) ) . 6 5 6 * * * 
(•149) 
N o . 1 5 7 8 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 
A d j . R - s q . . 66 .67 . 66 .66 
N o t e 1: r o b u s t s t a n d a r d e r r o r s , c l u s t e r e d b y h o s t c o u n t r y , r e p o r t e d in p a r e n t h e s i s 
N o t e 2 : s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n d i c a t e d a s * for p < o . i , ** for p < o . o 5 , a n d f o r p < o . o i 
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Table 2.5: Determinants of FDI (Rule of Law) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II 
FDI Procedures -.048 •476*' .511** .526*** •477** 
(.092) (.190) (.196) (193) (.196) 
FDI Arbitration -.136** .278 .409* .363* •314 
(.065) (.213) (.206) (.203) (.213) 
FDI Openness -.097 .046 .109 .100 .051 
(.112) (.132) (•134) (.128) (.130) 
Rule of Law .277" -.199 -.348** -•353** -.217 
(.122) (.166) (.169) (•171) (.170) 
GDP .617*** .863*** .511*** .505*** .846*** 
(.067) (.085) (133) (.124) (•094) 
GDP Per Capita -.139 .080 •155 .156 .052 
(.100) (•171) (.170) (•171) (.166) 
Weighted Tariff -.293" -•399** -.212 -.221 -•395** 
(.132) (.191) (.202) (199) (•191) 
School (Mean Years) .541*- .264 -.088 -.087 .287 
(.176) (.301) (•325) (•319) (.298) 
Remoteness 2.886*** 2.818*** 1.443* 1.384* 2.775*** 
(459) (.666) (.803) (.720) (.690) 
Distance -1.576*** -1.382*** -.564** -•543** -1.360*** 
(.168) (.146) (.265) (.225) (.156) 
Contiguity •342 1.072** 1.056** 1.040** 1.070** 
(.610) (457) (430) (•433) (•450) 
Colony .646* .951*** .616** .587** •947*** 
(.365) (.308) (•307) (•293) (•303) 
Language .606*** .914*** .536* .548* .863*** 
(.226) (.263) (.278) (•277) (.269) 
Bilateral Investment Treaty .403*** 
(.141) 
•257 
(•179) 
Inverse Mills Ratio j -.013 
(.608) 
-.196 
(.380) 
z . ( i - , ) 1.152*** 
(411) 
Z i * Z i -.069 
(.071) 
Hi ( t ^p>)) .654*** 
(•147) 
No. 1578 912 912 912 912 
Adj. R-sq. .66 .67 .67 .66 
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<o.oi 
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T a b l e 2 . 6 : D e t e r m i n a n t s o f F D I ( R e g u l a t o r y Q u a l i t y ) 
(1) (2) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) 
P r o b i t B e n c h m a r k H e t e r o g e n e i t y B i a s I B i a s II 
F D I P r o c e d u r e s - . 0 3 3 . 4 3 7 - . 4 6 3 * * • 4 7 9 " • 4 3 5 " 
( . 0 9 2 ) ( . 2 0 6 ) ( . 2 1 1 ) ( . 2 0 8 ) (•213) 
F D I A r b i t r a t i o n - . 1 6 3 * * . 2 2 2 . 3 7 6 * . 3 2 8 * . 2 6 2 
(•073) ( . 2 0 7 ) ( . 1 9 8 ) ( . 1 9 6 ) ( . 2 0 6 ) 
F D I O p e n n e s s - . 1 3 0 . 053 . 1 3 6 . 1 2 7 . 061 
(•113) ( 1 2 5 ) ( . 1 2 6 ) ( . 1 2 0 ) (•123) 
R e g u l a t o r y Q u a l i t y . 3 2 3 " . 0 3 2 - . 1 5 0 - . 1 6 4 . 0 1 4 
( 1 5 4 ) (•249) (•244) ( . 2 5 0 ) ( . 2 5 2 ) 
G D P . 6 1 8 * " • 8 5 7 * " . 5 0 5 * * * . 4 9 4 " ^ . 8 4 1 * * * 
( . 0 6 7 ) ( . 0 8 2 ) ( . 1 3 9 ) (•125) ( . 0 9 1 ) 
G D P P e r C a p i t a - . 1 3 6 - . 0 2 9 . 0 4 6 . 0 5 0 - . 0 6 0 
( . 1 0 2 ) ( . 1 9 2 ) ( 1 9 1 ) (•193) ( . 1 8 9 ) 
W e i g h t e d Tar i f f - . 2 3 0 -•355 - . 2 0 5 - . 2 1 5 -•353 
(•149) (•213) ( . 2 2 5 ) ( . 2 2 1 ) (•213) 
S c h o o l ( M e a n Y e a r s ) . 5 4 6 - * •334 - . 0 2 5 - . 0 2 6 . 363 
( 1 7 4 ) (•311) (•338) (•330) (•308) 
R e m o t e n e s s 2.876*** 2 . 7 8 3 * " 1 . 4 1 8 * 1 - 3 3 7 * 2 . 7 4 5 * " 
(•467) ( . 6 7 8 ) ( . 8 4 2 ) ( . 7 3 8 ) ( . 7 0 1 ) 
D i s t a n c e - 1 . 5 9 2 " * - 1 . 3 8 1 * " - • 5 5 3 " - . 5 2 0 * * - 1 . 3 6 1 * * * 
( . 1 6 4 ) ( 1 4 7 ) ( . 2 7 8 ) ( . 2 2 7 ) (•155) 
C o n t i g u i t y . 281 1 . 0 8 5 * * 1 . 1 0 3 * * 1 . 0 8 4 * * 1 . 0 8 3 * * 
( . 6 1 0 ) (•452) (•429) (•433) (•445) 
C o l o n y . 6 4 1 * . 9 2 6 * * * •596* . 5 6 0 * . 9 2 4 * * * 
( . 3 6 2 ) (•312) (•314) ( . 2 9 8 ) ( . 3 0 6 ) 
L a n g u a g e .627*** . 8 6 7 * * * . 4 8 2 * . 4 9 1 * . 8 1 4 * * * 
( . 2 2 6 ) (•251) (•273) ( . 2 6 9 ) (•257) 
B i l a t e r a l I n v e s t m e n t T r e a t y 
( . 1 4 0 ) 
. 2 7 2 
( 1 7 9 ) 
I n v e r s e M i l l s R a t i o ^ 
/ ^ \ 
. 0 3 0 
( . 6 0 2 ) 
- . 1 8 6 
(•377) 
z . ft) 1 . 2 0 9 * * * 
( . 4 0 1 ) 
Zi*Zi - . 0 7 8 
( . 0 7 1 ) 
H i ( ® - V p r ) ) . 6 6 3 * * * 
( . 1 5 0 ) 
N o . 1 5 7 8 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 
A d j . R - s q . . 66 .67 .66 .66 
N o t e 1: r o b u s t s t a n d a r d e r r o r s , c l u s t e r e d b y h o s t c o u n t r y , r e p o r t e d in p a r e n t h e s i s 
N o t e 2 : s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n d i c a t e d a s * for p < o . i , ** f o r p < 0 . 0 5 , a n d * * * for p<o.( 
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T a b l e 2 . 7 : D e t e r m i n a n t s -
( 1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4) (5 ) 
P r o b i t B e n c h m a r k H e t e r o g e n e i t y B i a s I B i a s II 
F D I P r o c e d u r e s - . 0 4 8 •456** •492** .506** •455** 
( . 0 9 1 ) ( • 1 9 7 ) ( . 2 0 2 ) ( . 2 0 0 ) ( . 2 0 4 ) 
F D I A r b i t r a t i o n - . 1 5 0 " . 2 6 6 .410** . 3 6 2 * . 3 0 6 
( . 0 6 7 ) ( . 2 0 2 ) ( . 1 9 2 ) ( • 1 9 1 ) ( . 2 0 2 ) 
F D I O p e n n e s s - . 1 0 7 . 0 5 2 . 1 2 1 . 1 1 2 . 0 5 8 
( . 1 0 8 ) ( . 1 3 0 ) ( •131) ( •125) ( . 1 2 8 ) 
G o v t . E f f e c t i v e n e s s . 3 5 2 - - . 1 1 9 - . 3 1 6 - . 3 2 2 - . 1 3 9 
( 1 5 3 ) ( • 2 2 4 ) ( . 2 2 2 ) ( . 2 2 7 ) ( . 2 2 6 ) 
G D P •599*** . 8 6 3 " * . 5 1 8 * " . 5 1 2 * " . 8 4 9 * " 
( . 0 6 8 ) ( . 0 8 6 ) ( • 1 3 7 ) ( . 1 2 6 ) ( • 0 9 5 ) 
G D P P e r C a p i t a - • 1 5 3 . 0 3 7 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 2 . 0 0 8 
( . 1 0 4 ) ( . 1 8 8 ) ( . 1 8 7 ) ( . 1 9 0 ) ( • 1 8 4 ) 
W e i g h t e d T a r i f f - . 2 5 2 * - •395** - . 2 2 8 - . 2 3 8 - . 3 9 2 * 
( • 1 4 7 ) ( • 1 9 7 ) ( . 2 0 8 ) ( . 2 0 5 ) ( • 1 9 7 ) 
S c h o o l ( M e a n Y e a r s ) •552*** . 2 9 1 - . 0 7 1 - . 0 7 1 . 3 1 8 
( 1 7 4 ) ( • 3 0 3 ) ( •329) ( . 3 2 2 ) ( . 3 0 0 ) 
R e m o t e n e s s 2 . 8 5 9 " * 2 . 8 2 9 * " 1 . 4 4 5 * 1 . 3 9 2 * 2 . 7 9 3 * * * 
( • 4 6 9 ) ( . 6 8 1 ) ( . 8 2 9 ) ( • 7 4 2 ) ( • 7 0 5 ) 
D i s t a n c e - 1 . 5 8 2 " - " - 1 . 3 8 1 * " - . 5 4 8 * * - . 5 2 9 " - 1 . 3 6 2 * * * 
( . 1 6 7 ) ( . 1 4 6 ) ( • 2 7 1 ) ( . 2 2 9 ) ( . 1 5 6 ) 
C o n t i g u i t y • 3 1 7 1 . 0 8 5 * * 1 . 0 7 9 * * 1 . 0 6 6 * * 1 . 0 8 2 * * 
( . 6 1 1 ) ( • 4 5 3 ) ( •427) ( • 4 3 1 ) ( • 4 4 7 ) 
C o l o n y . 6 3 8 * . 9 4 1 * " . 6 0 1 * •573* . 9 4 0 * " 
( • 3 6 7 ) ( • 3 1 4 ) ( •317) ( . 3 0 0 ) ( •309) 
L a n g u a g e . 6 0 2 * " .888*** . 5 1 0 * . 5 2 2 * . 8 3 6 * " 
( . 2 2 2 ) ( . 2 5 8 ) ( •274) ( •273) ( •264) 
B i l a t e r a l I n v e s t m e n t T r e a t y •394*** . 2 6 5 
( 1 3 9 ) ( . 1 8 0 ) 
I n v e r s e M i l l s R a t i o ( ^ i j ) . 0 0 2 - . 1 8 0 
( . 6 0 9 ) ( • 3 7 9 ) 
Z . ( S - 0 1 .176*** 
( . 4 1 0 ) 
Z i ' ^ Z i - . 0 7 1 
( . 0 7 1 ) 
H i ( 0 - 1 ( p r ) ) . 6 6 3 * " 
( •151) 
N o . 1 5 7 8 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 
A d j . R - s q . . 6 6 . 6 7 . 6 7 . 6 6 
N o t e 2 : s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n d i c a t e d a s * f o r p < o . i , ** f o r p < 0 . 0 5 , a n d *** f o r p < o . o i 
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T a b l e 2 . 8 : D e t e r m i n a n t s o f F D I ( P o l i t i c a l S t a b i l i t y ) 
(1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) ( 5 ) 
P r o b i t B e n c h m a r k H e t e r o g e n e i t y B i a s I B i a s II 
F D I P r o c e d u r e s - . 0 4 8 •443** . 4 8 2 * * . 4 9 8 * * . 4 4 1 
( . 0 8 1 ) (•197) ( . 2 0 3 ) ( . 2 0 0 ) ( . 2 0 4 ) 
F D I A r b i t r a t i o n - . 1 3 2 " . 2 3 6 •373* . 3 3 2 . 2 6 8 
(•059) ( . 2 0 8 ) ( . 2 0 4 ) ( . 2 0 2 ) ( . 2 0 9 ) 
F D I O p e n n e s s - . 1 1 9 . 0 5 4 . 1 3 6 . 1 2 6 . 061 
( . 1 1 8 ) (•127) ( . 1 2 9 ) (•123) (•125) 
P o l i t i c a l S t a b i l i t y . 2 4 7 " - . 0 1 9 - . 1 8 4 - . 1 9 3 - . 0 1 6 
( . 1 0 9 ) ( . 1 6 1 ) (•174) ( . 1 6 7 ) ( . 1 6 1 ) 
G D P . 6 4 4 - * . 8 5 5 " * . 4 6 2 * * * . 4 4 8 * * * . 8 3 6 * " 
(•074) ( . 0 8 6 ) ( . 1 4 6 ) ( . 1 3 2 ) (•097) 
G D P P e r C a p i t a - . 1 4 6 - . 0 0 8 . 0 8 8 . 0 9 0 - . 0 4 7 
( . 1 0 1 ) ( 1 7 2 ) (•173) (•173) ( . 1 6 2 ) 
W e i g h t e d Tar i f f - . 3 0 0 " - . 3 6 9 * -•173 - . 1 7 6 -•359* 
( 1 3 1 ) ( . 1 9 0 ) ( . 2 0 0 ) ( . 1 9 8 ) ( . 1 9 0 ) 
S c h o o l i n g ( M e a n Y e a r s ) . 5 3 2 " * •327 - . 0 5 0 - . 0 4 8 •355 
( . 1 8 5 ) (•309) (•336) (•329) (•306) 
R e m o t e n e s s 2 . 8 0 4 " * 2 . 7 9 6 * " 1 . 3 8 5 * 1 . 2 8 0 * 2 . 7 4 3 * * * 
( 4 4 4 ) ( . 6 4 8 ) (•798) (•713) (•677) 
D i s t a n c e - 1 . 5 4 0 " * - 1 . 3 8 2 * " - . 5 2 8 * - . 4 8 8 " - 1 . 3 5 6 * " 
( . 1 6 9 ) ( 1 4 5 ) ( . 2 6 9 ) ( . 2 2 7 ) ( . 1 5 6 ) 
C o n t i g u i t y . 3 9 6 1 . 0 8 6 " 1 . 0 3 8 * * 1 . 0 1 0 * * 1 . 0 8 6 " 
( . 6 3 0 ) (•453) (•421) (•430) (•447) 
C o l o n y . 6 8 5 * . 9 2 9 * * * •559* •515* . 9 2 3 * * * 
(•364) (•307) (•305) ( . 2 9 2 ) (•303) 
L a n g u a g e . 6 9 4 * * * . 8 7 2 * * * . 4 1 9 . 4 2 3 . 8 1 3 * " 
( . 2 2 2 ) ( . 2 5 7 ) (•284) ( . 2 8 0 ) ( . 2 6 3 ) 
B i l a t e r a l I n v e s t m e n t T r e a t y . 3 8 1 " * 
( . 1 4 0 ) 
•273 
( . 1 8 4 ) 
I n v e r s e M i l l s R a t i o ) - . 0 6 0 
( . 6 1 4 ) 
- . 2 1 6 
(•389) 
( i ' O 1 . 2 2 4 * * * 
(•413) 
Z i * Z i - . 0 7 6 
(•073) 
H i ( O - ^ p - r ) ) . 7 0 6 * * * 
(•155) 
N o . 1 5 7 8 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 9 1 2 
A d j . R - s q . .66 . 6 7 . 6 7 .66 
N o t e 1: r o b u s t s t a n d a r d e r r o r s , c l u s t e r e d b y h o s t c o u n t r y , r e p o r t e d in p a r e n t h e s i s 
N o t e 2 : s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n d i c a t e d a s * for p < o . i , ** for p < 0 . 0 5 , a n d * * * f o r p < o . o i 
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Table 2.9: Determinants of FDI (Resource-Rich Countries) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II 
FDI Procedures -.032 .356** .334** .356** .329** 
(.092) (149) (149) (•152) (•151) 
FDI Arbitration - . 1 5 3 - .240 .376** .321* .281 
(.065) ( 195) (.187) (.183) (.190) 
FDI Openness -.086 .082 .126 . 1 1 2 .093 
( 1 1 9 ) (.130) (.136) (.130) ( . 131) 
Quality of Institutions .224 -•173 -•255 -•257 - . 1 18 
(.178) (.211) (.218) (.216) (.202) 
GDP .669*** .941*** .673*** .663*** .978*** 
(.068) (.081) (.162) (•149) (.088) 
GDP Per Capita -.185 •159 .221 .219 .123 
(.121) (.184) (.187) (.190) (.178) 
Distance -1.835*** -1.937*** -1.282** -1.222*** -2.024*** 
(.203) (.190) (•496) (.418) (.187) 
Remoteness 3.886*** 4.692*** 3-335** 3.177** 4.745*** 
(.602) (.722) (1.328) (1.198) (.762) 
Weighted Tariff (Manu) -.291* -479** -•355 -.360 -•479** 
(•151) (.233) (.228) (.228) (.227) 
School (Mean Years) .591*** .106 -.162 -•137 .170 
(•197) (•331) (•396) (•392) (•335) 
Resource Dummy -.086 -.086 -.053 -.046 -.084 
(.192) (.226) (•235) (.231) (.223) 
Contiguity .221 2.305*** 2.127** 2.149*** 2.332*** 
(.613) (•774) (.818) (•789) (•787) 
Bilateral Investment Treaty .491*** 
(•151) 
.296 
(.219) 
Inverse Mills Ratio ^ •335 
(.686) 
.177 
(.426) 
ft) 1.222** 
(.510) 
Z i » Z i - . 1 19 
(•094) 
H i ( 0 - 1 (pr)) •444* 
(.236) 
No. 1220 622 622 622 622 
Adj. R-sq. .62 .63 .62 .62 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i, ** for p<0.05, and for p<o 01 
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Table 2.10: D e t e r m i n a n t s of FDI (2006 Stock) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II 
FDI Procedures -.130^ .370" .415*" .437*** . 3 4 1 " 
(.076) (•155) (•154) (•151) (•157) 
FDI Arbitration -.160* .491"* .565"* .535*" .513*" 
(.096) (•152) (.130) (•139) (•133) 
FDI Openness -.056 .007 .054 .032 .010 
(.088) (.112) (.116) (.109) (•115) 
Quality of Institutions •437*" -.080 -.254 -.242 -.049 
(.164) (.214) (.204) (.209) (.212) 
GDP (2001-05) .756*" .868*" .498"* •575"* .917*** 
(.080) (.080) (.162) (•134) (.086) 
GDP Per Capita (2001-05) -.340*- .062 .228 .203 .020 
(.103) (.169) (•174) (•173) (.166) 
Weighted Tariff (2001-05) -.286* -.221 -.073 -.113 -.231 
(.161) (.198) (.208) (.205) (.201) 
School (Mean Years) •537*" .492* .191 •235 .578" 
(.206) (•247) (.256) (•255) (.250) 
Remoteness 2.006"* 2.621*" 1.784" 1.974*** 2.708*** 
(•465) (•655) (.691) (•639) (•674) 
Distance -1.289"* -1.272*** -.675*" -.807*** -1.344"* 
(.161) (.136) (.214) (•179) (.146) 
Contiguity .815 1.116** .918** .962** 1.127** 
(•570) (•469) (•433) (•434) (•475) 
Colony •793* .783** .408 .488 .825** 
(•432) (•332) (.361) (•339) (•333) 
Language .782"* .630** .206 .316 .649** 
(.176) (•264) (.285) (.286) (.269) 
Bilateral Investment Treaty .273* 
(•153) 
.072 
(.183) 
Inverse Mills Ratio j .560 
(•572) 
•495 
(•372) 
z . ( t y 1.055*** 
(•393) 
Z i * Z i -.051 
(.069) 
H i ((D-'(pr)) •447*** 
(•149) 
No. 1561 881 881 881 881 
Adj. R-sq. .67 .68 .68 .68 
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<o.( 
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Table 2 . 1 1 : Determinants of FDI (2007 Stock) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias 11 
FDI Procedures - . 1 1 0 •333* .380** •393" •333* 
(.106) (.187) (.183) (.182) (•191) 
FDI Arbitration - . 1 6 9 " * .249 .314 .288 .268 
(.062) (.206) (.192) (•197) (.201) 
FDI Openness -.080 .054 .098 .084 .055 
(.124) (.123) (.126) (.120) (.122) 
Quality of Institutions •449*" -.022 -•173 - . 179 -.034 
(.158) (.196) (•195) (•199) (•199) 
GDP •704"* . 836"* .563*** .568*** .830*** 
(.070) (•078) (•144) (.128) (.086) 
GDP Per Capita -.306*** .028 .164 .162 .018 
(.107) (•179) (.188) (.187) (.176) 
Weighted Tariff (Manu) -•353" -•359" -.208 -.221 -•357** 
(•146) (.170) (.185) (.176) (.169) 
School (Mean Years) •477" .293 .037 .047 .310 
(.198) (.285) (•304) (•295) (•279) 
Remoteness 2 . 5 4 3 - * 2 . 6 3 5 " * 1 .818** 1.828** 2.628*** 
(•475) (•673) (.802) (•730) (.682) 
Distance - 1 , 5 3 0 " * -1.367*** -.818*** -.832*** -1.362*** 
(•177) (.142) (.264) (.227) ( • 151) 
Contiguity .885 1.069** •953" .938** 1.058** 
(.614) (•431) (•384) (•394) (•421) 
Colony •494 .926*** .740** ,732** .929*** 
(•423) (.321) (•324) (•312) (•318) 
Language .908*" .740*** •379 .409 •717" 
(.232) (•279) (.302) (,301) (.284) 
Bilateral Investment Treaty .520*** 
(•139) 
. 105 
(•179) 
Inverse Mills Ratio ) .126 
(•679) 
-.064 
(.412) 
( t y .829* 
(•444) 
Z i * Z i -.049 
(•074) 
H i ( c p - ' l p r ) ) •435"* 
(.146) 
No. 1636 939 939 939 939 
Adj. R-sq. .66 .67 .67 .66 
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i , ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<o.oi 
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Table 2.12: Determinants of FDI (2008 Stock) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II 
FDI Procedures -.051 •423" .455** •477** .415** 
(.087) (.188) (.192) (•191) (.192) 
FDI Arbitration -.178*- .260 .435** .372** .301 
(.061) (194) (.178) (.181) (.187) 
FDI Openness -.114 -.007 .075 .057 -.000 
(.086) (.109) (.112) (.106) (.108) 
Quality of Institutions .389- -•155 -.381** -.387** -.160 
(.156) (.187) (.190) (•194) (.188) 
GDP .629"* .847*** .463*** .464*** .856*** 
(.065) (.086) (133) (.123) (•094) 
GDP Per Capita -.215* .054 .185 .187 .024 
(.110) (.180) (.180) (.184) (•175) 
Weighted Tariff (Manu) -.219 -.279 -.115 -•137 -.282 
(•144) (.189) (.196) (•195) (.189) 
School (Mean Years) .630*" .518* .100 .089 .567* 
(.185) (•299) (•333) (.318) (.298) 
Remoteness 2.884"» 2.736*" 1.268* 1.233* 2.769*** 
(•442) (•635) (•741) (.648) (.667) 
Distance -1.569-* -1.340*" -.462* -.465** -1.365*** 
(.168) (147) (•235) (.198) (•155) 
Contiguity .568 1.041" .874** .869** 1.031** 
(.619) (•442) (•409) (.416) (•442) 
Colony .751** .686** .284 .252 .695** 
(.377) (.306) (•307) (•297) (•307) 
Language .626"* .769*** •345 .385 •735*** 
(•224) (•251) (•271) (.269) (•257) 
Bilateral Investment Treaty .312** 
(•145) 
.194 
(•177) 
Inverse Mills Ratio ^Hij) 
zx ( t y 
Z i * Z i 
.271 
(•529) 
(•399) 
-.096 
(.071) Hi (a)- ' (pr)) 
No. 
Adj. R-sq. 
1532 853 
.66 
853 
.67 
(.140) 
853 
.67 
.062 
(•355) 
853 
.66 
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i, ** for p<0.05, and for p<o.oi 
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Table 2.13: Description and Source of Variables 
Variables Description Source 
Stock of FDI Log of absolute FDI stock (in US$ million) between two 
countries. (The main regression results average FDI stock 
from 2007 to 2008; robustness results use values for 
individual years 2006, 2007, 2008) 
O E C D 
FDI Arbitration Log of index (o to 100) created by averaging two separate 
l A B indices; i) the Ease of Arbitration Process and ii) the 
Extent of Judicial Assistance. The former assesses whether 
there are obstacles that the disputing parties face in 
seeking a resolution to their dispute; and the latter 
measures the interaction between domestic courts and 
arbitral tribunals, including the courts' wil l ingness to assist 
during the arbitration process and their effectiveness in 
enforcing arbitration awards. 
l A B 
FDI Procedures Log of index (o to 100) derived by normalizing the number 
of pre- and post-incorporation procedural steps required to 
set u p a w h o l l y foreign-owned subsidiary. 
l A B 
FDI Openness Log of index (0 to 100) of average percentage of foreign 
equity ownership permitted across 2 primary sectors 
(mining and oil and gas; agriculture and forestry), 1 light 
manufacturing sector, and 8 services sectors (from banking 
and telecommunications to transport and electricity). 
l A B 
General Qual i ty 
of Institutions 
G D P 
Weighted s u m of five indicators of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). Weights derived from 
principle components. (1) Control of Graft measures the 
extent to w h i c h public power is exercised for private gain, 
as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests. 
(2) Rule of Law measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. (3) 
Government Effectiveness measures the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of 
its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government 's commitment to such policies. (4) 
Regulatory Quality measures the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. (5) Political Stability captures perceptions of 
the l ikelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
inc luding politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
C o m p u t e d 
by author 
from 
Kaufmann et 
al. (2010) 
Gross domestic product in current US dollar. WDI 
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GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita in current US dollar. WDI 
Weighted Tariff Weighted mean applied tariff is the average of effectively 
applied rates weighted by the product import shares 
corresponding to each partner country. When the 
effectively applied rate is unavailable, the most favored 
nation rate is used. Manufactured products are 
commodities classified in SITC revision 3 sections 5-8 
excluding division 68. 
WDI 
Schooling Log of average number of years of education received by 
people aged 25 and older in the lifetime based on 
education attainment levels of the population converted 
into years of schooling based on theoretical durations of 
each level of education. 
Barro and 
Lee(2010) 
Remoteness Log of the sum of a country's bilateral distance with all 
other countries in the world, weighted by the share of the 
GDP of the partner country in total world GDP. 
Computed 
by author 
Distance Distance in kilometers between two countries using the 
great circle formula which uses latitudes and longitudes of 
each country's most populated cities or official capital. 
CEPII 
Contiguity 1 for pairs of countries that share a border; 0 otherwise CEPII 
Colony 1 for pairs of countries ever in a colonial relationship; 0 
otherwise 
CEPII 
Language (ethnic) 1 if a language is spoken by at least 9 percent of the 
population in both coimtries; 0 otherwise. 
CEPII 
Bilateral 
Investment Treaty 
1 for pairs of countries that have a bilateral investment 
treaty in force as of 2005; 0 otherwise. 
U N C T A D 
Access to Land 
Information 
index 
Log of index (from 0 to 100) that measures aspects of 
whether the land registry or cadastre have publicly 
accessible inventory of private and public land; if the 
inventory is online; if the cadastre shares data about land; 
and whether there is a publicly accessible land information 
system or geographic information system. 
lAB 
Availability of 
Land Information 
index 
Log of index (0 to 100) which scores countries on 18 pieces 
of land-related information (for example, plot size, land 
value, address, previous contracts, existing land claims, tax 
classification, information on surroundings). 
lAB 
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Table 2.14: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
FDI Stock (US$ million), 
2007-08 
1835 3691.18 21210.30 0 437939 
Log of FDI Stock, 2007-08 1 1 1 1 5-39 3 1 7 -5-99 12.99 
FDI Openness (Log) 83 4.27 0.66 0 4.62 
FDI Arbitration (Log) 84 4.08 0.68 0 4-53 
FDI Procedures (Log) 84 3-95 0.63 0 4.62 
Quality of Institutions, 
averaged 2002-06 
84 -0.23 0.82 -1.74 1.76 
Bilateral Investment Treaty 1835 0 1 
Log of GDP, averaged 
2002-06 
84 24.42 2.11 19.77 30.11 
Log of GDP per capita, 
averaged 2002-06 
84 7-59 1.48 4-99 10.68 
School (Log of Mean 
Years), 2005 
84 1.81 0.56 0.10 2-57 
Log of Applied Tariff 
(Weighted Mean, 
Manufacturing), averaged 
2002-06 
81 1.88 0.69 0.00 3.10 
Log of Remoteness 84 8.95 0.25 8.55 9.42 
Log of Distance 1835 8.55 0.90 4.09 9.88 
Contiguity 1835 0 1 
Colony 1835 0 1 
Common Ethnic Language 1835 0 1 
Access to Land 
Information (Log) 
83 3.86 0.58 0 4.56 
Availability of Land 
Information (Log) 
83 4.13 0.76 0 4.62 
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Table 2.15: Share of lAB Count r ies , 2007-2008 
Inward FDI Stock 
f r o m O E C D 
(US$ billion) 
FDI Inf low 
f r o m O E C D 
(US$ billion) 
G D P 
(US$ bill ion) 
Popu la t i on 
(billion) 
lAB Countr ies* 67733 810.6 45200 5-77 
World 12500 1855.3 58800 6.62 
Share 54.2% 43.7% 77.9% 87.1% 
Source: FDI figures compiled from UNCTAD and OECD sources; GDP and population from WDI 
Note 1: 'include 84 out of 87 lAB countries (excluding Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro) 
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Table 2.16: Lists of Countries 
FDI Source Countries (OECD sample)* 
1 . Australia 2. Austria** 3. Belgium 4. Canada** 5. Czech Republic** 6. Denmark 7. Finland 
8. France** 9. Germany 10. Greece** 1 1 . Hungary 12. Ireland** 13 . Iceland 14. Italy 15. 
Japan** 16. Korea, Rep.** 17. Luxembourg 18. Mexico** 19. The Netherlands 20. Norway 
21 . New Zealand 22. Poland** 23. Portugal 24. Slovak Republic** 25. Spain** 26. Sweden 
27. Switzerland 28. Turkey** 29. United Kingdom** 30. United States** 
*Excludes Chile, which became O E C D member only in 2010. 
**Also in the lAB sample of FDI recipients 
FDI Host Countries (lAB sample) 
1 . Afghanistan 2. Albania 3. Angola 4. Argentina 5. Armenia 6. Austria 7. Azerbaijan 8. 
Bangladesh 9. Belarus 10. Bolivia 1 1 . Bosnia and Herzegovina 12. Brazil 13 . Bulgaria 14. 
Burkina Paso 15. Cambodia 16. Cameroon 17. Canada 18. Chile 19. China 20. Colombia 21 . 
Costa Rica 22. Cote d'lvoire 23. Croatia 24. Czech Republic 25. Ecuador 26. Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 27. Ethiopia 28. France 29. Georgia 30. Ghana 31 . Greece 32. Guatemala 33. Haiti 34. 
Honduras 35. India 36. Indonesia 37. Ireland 38. Japan 39. Kazakhstan 40. Kenya 41. Korea, 
Rep. 42. Kosovo 43. Kyrgyz Republic 44. Liberia 45. Macedonia, FYR 46. Madagascar 47. 
Malaysia 48. Mali 49. Mauritius 50. Mexico 5 1 . Moldova 52. Montenegro 53. Morocco 54. 
Mozambique 55. Nicaragua 56. Nigeria 57. Pakistan 58. Papua New Guinea 59. Peru 60. 
Philippines 61. Poland 62. Romania 63. Russian Federation 64. Rwanda 65. Saudi Arabia 66. 
Senegal 67. Serbia 68. Sierra Leone 69. Singapore 70. Slovak Republic 71 . Solomon Islands 
72. South Africa 73. Spain 74. Sri Lanka 75. Sudan 76. Tanzania 77. Thailand 78. Tunisia 79. 
Turkey 80. Uganda 81 . Ukraine 82. United Kingdom 83. United States 84. Venezuela, R.B. 
85. Vietnam 86. Yemen, Rep. 87. Zambia. 
T a b l e 2 . 1 7 : C o r r e l a t i o n A m o n g E x p l a n a t o r y V a r i a b l e s 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 1 0 ) ( 1 1 ) ( 1 2 ) ( 1 3 ) ( 1 4 ) 
( 1 ) F D I A r b i t r a t i o n 1 
( 2 ) F D I P r o c e d u r e s - 0 . 0 0 2 1 
( 3 ) F D I O p e n n e s s - 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 6 4 1 
( 4 ) Q u a l i t y o f I n s t i t u t i o n s 0 - 3 3 9 0 . 1 8 2 0 . 1 0 9 1 
( 5 ) G D P 0 . 3 5 1 - 0 . 0 7 7 - 0 . 1 6 5 0 . 5 8 0 1 
( 6 ) G D P p e r c a p i t a 0 . 2 8 1 0 . 1 2 3 0 . 1 0 3 0 . 8 2 4 0 . 7 2 0 1 
( 7 ) W e i g h t e d t a r i f f - 0 . 1 9 6 - 0 . 1 9 1 - 0 . 1 4 0 - 0 . 6 5 8 - 0 . 3 4 2 - 0 . 6 7 0 1 
( 8 ) S c h o o l i n g 0 . 2 6 8 0 . 0 5 2 0 . 1 9 2 0 . 5 0 0 0 . 4 2 3 0 . 6 7 7 - 0 . 5 5 8 1 
( 9 ) R e m o t e n e s s - 0 . 2 2 5 - 0 . 2 7 6 - 0 . 1 7 7 - 0 . 2 2 6 - 0 . 1 2 0 - 0 . 3 2 7 0 . 3 4 2 - 0 . 3 0 4 1 
( 1 0 ) D i s t a n c e - 0 . 1 6 3 - 0 . 1 6 3 - 0 . 0 8 2 - 0 . 1 1 0 - 0 . 0 6 6 - 0 . 1 5 6 0 . 1 8 7 - 0 . 1 5 6 0 . 6 2 0 1 
( 1 1 ) C o n t i g u i t y 0 . 0 6 1 0 . 0 6 0 0 . 0 4 7 0 . 1 4 6 0 . 0 9 3 0 . 1 5 6 - 0 . 1 4 3 0 . 1 3 7 - 0 . 2 0 3 - 0 . 2 3 8 1 
( 1 2 ) C o l o n y 0 . 0 2 6 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 3 8 0 . 0 7 3 0 . 0 5 6 0 . 0 6 0 - 0 . 0 1 7 0 . 0 1 8 - 0 . 0 1 7 - 0 . 0 5 2 0 . 1 6 3 1 
( 1 3 ) L a n g u a g e 0 . 0 7 6 - 0 . 0 3 8 0 . 0 4 4 0 . 0 9 5 0 . 0 7 3 0 . 0 3 8 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 2 1 0 . 0 7 1 0 . 1 2 8 0 . 0 8 8 0 . 3 6 0 1 
( 1 4 ) B i l a t e r a l I n v e s t m e n t T r e a t y 0 . 1 5 6 - 0 . 0 3 2 - 0 . 0 3 8 - 0 . 0 1 6 0 . 1 0 9 0 . 0 3 4 - 0 . 0 0 9 0 . 1 5 0 - 0 . 0 9 2 - 0 . 2 2 8 0 . 0 4 6 0 . 0 8 7 - 0 . 0 7 1 1 
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Table 2.18: Correlation Among WGI Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Control of Graft 1 
(2) Rule of Law 0.944 1 
(3) Regulatory Quality 0.891 0.908 1 
(4) Government Effectiveness 0.948 0.943 0.948 1 
(5) Political Stability 0.763 0.835 0.720 0.752 1 
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Table 2.19: Construction of the FDI Openness Variable 
Broad industries Further disaggregation 
I. Resource sector (1) Mining; (2) Oil and gas 
II. Primary sector (3) Agriculture; (4) Forestry 
III. Light manufacturing (5) Light manufacturing; (6) Food products; (7) 
Pharmaceuticals; (8) Publishing 
IV. Telecommunication (9) Fixed line infrastructure; (10) Fixed line telephony 
services; (11) Wireless/mobile infrastructure; (12) 
Wireless/mobile services 
V. Electricity (13) Electric power generation from coal; (14) Electric power 
generation from solar; (15) Electric power generation from 
biogas; (16) Electric power generation from hydro; (17) 
Electric power generation from w i n d (18) Electric power 
transmission; (19) Electric power distribution 
VI. Banking (20) Banking 
VII. Insurance (21) Insurance 
VIII. Transportation (22) Railway freight; (23) Domestic air services; (24) 
International air services; (25) Port operations; (26) Airport 
operations 
IX. Media (27) Television broadcasting; (28) Newspapers 
X. Construction, 
tourism and retail 
(29) Construction; (30) Tourism; (31) Retail distribution 
services 
XI. Health care and 
waste management 
(32) Health care services; (33) Waste management and 
recycling 
Source: World Bank Group (2010) 
FDI Openness: This measures the average equity ownership permitted for foreign in-
vestors in greenfield investment as well as mergers and acquisitions across 11 sectors, 
which are themselves averaged equity limits for foreign ownership in 33 sub-sectors listed 
below. A s an example, the Philippines al lows 100 percent of foreign ownership in insur-
ance and tourism, but imposes tight restriction in other sectors. In mining, and oil and 
gas industries m a x i m u m foreign equity permitted by the Philippine Constitution is 40 
percent unless the investor enters into a 25 year agreement with a minimum investment 
of $50,000,000. The Constitution also limits foreign capital participation in public utilities 
(telecommunications and transportation) to a m a x i m u m of 40 percent. The media indus-
tries (newspaper publishing and television broadcasting) and publishing sector are closed 
to foreign owners. This gives the Philippines an openness score of 60.06 out of 100. O n 
the other hand, countries that allow 100 percent of foreign equity ownership in all sectors 
score the m a x i m u m of 100. This includes some of the world 's least developed countries 
like Afghanistan, Haiti, Cote d' lvoire, Rwanda, Senegal and Zambia. 
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Table 2.20: Construction of the FDI Arbitration Variable 
Indices Issues measured 
Ease of Judicial 
Assistance 
(1) Role of the courts in assisting and facilitating arbitration; 
(2) Role of the courts in confirming, enforcing and setting 
aside arbitration awards; (3) Time taken to enforce a 
hypothetical arbitration award. 
Ease of Process (1) Freedom to choose arbitrators' nationality, gender, 
qualifications, language, seat of arbitration, use of foreign 
counsel; (2) Tribunal integrity, that is, impartiality and 
confidentiality; (3) Choice of arbitration methods and 
institutions; (4) Time taken between filing of request for 
arbitration to the constitution of a tribunal. 
Source: World Bank Group (2010) 
FDI Arbitration: This is measured by the average of two indices related to commercial 
arbitration. The first one is the Ease of Process index, scored from 1 to 100, comparing how 
easy it is for investors and other parties to design arbitration proceedings in their chosen 
manner and conduct fair and predictable arbitration. The second is the Ease of Judicial 
Assistance index, scored from 1 to 100, comparing the extent of judicial assistance to the 
arbitration proceedings before, during and after the proceedings. 
For example, Saudi Arabia has one of the lowest scores (29.5 out of 100) on measures re-
lated to arbitration because its laws are not detailed and they impose several restrictions. 
According to World Bank Group (2010), the arbitrator must be a Saudi national or a Mus-
lim foreigner; in practice, following the Hanbali school of thought arbitrators must be male. 
The list of arbitrators is determined by the government, hearings must be public, and be 
conducted in Arabic. Arbitral proceedings must be conducted in accordance with Islamic 
law and any applicable regulations. There are no legal provisions for court assistance with 
interim measures and evidence taking during arbitration proceedings. Both domestic and 
foreign awards are enforced by the Board of Grievances, Commercial Section, which can 
take up to 56 weeks. 
At the other extreme, France is one of the leading forums for international arbitration 
(scoring 90.3 out of 100). It recognizes international arbitration as involving the interests of 
international trade. International arbitration does not need to be in writing. French courts 
strongly support arbitration, upholding an arbitrator's jurisdiction wherever possible. On 
average, it takes around 5 weeks to enforce an arbitration award rendered in France or in a 
foreign country, from filing an application to a writ of execution attaching assets (assuming 
there is no appeal). 
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Table 2.21: Construct ion of the FDI Procedures Variable 
Issues 
W h a t is counted as a 
separate procedure 
(1) Procedures that must be completed in the same bui ld ing, but 
in different offices; (2) If the same office has to be visited several 
t imes for different sequential procedures, each is counted 
separately; (3) Each electronic procedure is counted separately; 
(4) If t w o procedures can be completed through the same 
website but require separate filings, they are counted as two 
procedures; (5) Procedures required for official correspondence 
or transactions with public agencies (for example , if a c o m p a n y 
seal or stamp is required on official documents , such as tax 
declarations, obtaining the seal or s tamp is counted); (6) If a 
c o m p a n y must open a bank account before registering for sales 
tax or value a d d e d tax, this transaction is counted as a 
procedure. 
W h a t is not counted as 
a procedure 
(1) Procedures that the c o m p a n y undergoes to connect to 
electricity, water, gas, and waste disposal services; (2) 
Interactions between c o m p a n y founders or c o m p a n y officers 
and employees; (3) Industry-specific procedures are exc luded 
(for example, environmental regulations are included only w h e n 
they apply to all businesses); (4) procedures that are not legal, 
unavailable to the general public, or not used by the majority of 
companies. 
Source: World Bank Group (2010) 
F D I P r o c e d u r e s : This measures the number of pre- and post-incorporation procedural 
steps formally required to establish a w h o l l y foreign-owned, domestical ly incorporated 
company. A procedure is def ined as any interaction of the parent c o m p a n y or its legal 
representatives w i t h external parties (for example, government agencies or notaries). The 
initial number of procedures that a p p l y to local ly-owned SMEs are taken from the D o i n g 
Business series of reports (www.doingbusiness .org) . Addi t ional procedures required for 
foreign companies are then a d d e d , such as the requirement to submit authenticated legal 
documentat ion of the parent company, obtain a trade license, or acquire an investment 
approval . In countries w h e r e there is no difference between the requirements for domestic 
and foreign companies, the list of procedures is identical to that of D o i n g Business (World 
Bank G r o u p 2010). 
For example, Canada scores the highest a m o n g the 87 countries (100 out of 100) in re-
quiring the least number of legal procedures (two) and time (6 days) for foreign investors 
to set u p a business. A c c o r d i n g to World Bank G r o u p (2010), foreign companies can file 
for federal incorporaHon or provincial registration via Industry C a n a d a ' s online Electronic 
Filing Centre. They require n o additional procedure other than the post-incorporation no-
tification within 30 days. A t the other end, Venezuela scores 10.5 because it requires 19 
separate procedures and 169 days, on average, for a foreign business to be set up. T h e 
19 procedures range from authenticating documents at the country of origin to obtaining 
w o r k permit for foreign workers. 
Table 2.22: Composite Country Scores of Selected FDI Regulations 
Code Country 
Investing Across 
Sectors 
Arbitrating Commercial Disputes Starting a Foreign 
Business 
Average Equity 
Ownership 
(1) 
Ease of 
Process Index 
(2) 
Ease of judicial 
Assistance Index 
(3) 
Average of 
(2) and (3) 
(Normalized) 
Number of Procedures 
(4) 
A F G Afghanistan 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 89.47 
A L B Albania 9542 40.70 68.50 54.6 73-68 
A G O Angola 72.20 57-30 59.90 58.6 47-37 
A R G Argentina 91.78 72.20 55.10 63.65 15-79 
A R M Armenia 89.10 82.30 27.30 54.8 68.42 
A U T Austria 93.18 83.70 83.00 83-35 57-89 
A Z E Azerbaijan 87.77 53.60 37.00 45-3 73.68 
B G D Bangladeshi 100.00 67.50 55-30 61.4 63.16 
BLR Belarus 81.66 79.00 84.90 81.95 78.95 
BOL Bolivia 85.16 65.70 54.20 59-95 15-79 
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina 92.91 57.10 76.30 66.7 36.84 
B R A Brazil 86.18 45-70 57.20 51-45 21 .05 
BGR Bulgaria 98.15 64.70 68.60 66.65 84.21 
BFA Burkina Faso 99.50 67.60 67.90 67.75 84.21 
K H M Cambodia 95-95 48.60 46.00 47-3 57-89 
C M R Cameroon 87.67 79.60 64.60 72.1 36.84 
C A N Canada 81.44 84.70 94.00 89-35 100 
C H L Chile 100.00 62.80 74.80 68.8 52.63 
CHN China 64.93 76.10 60.20 68.15 15-79 
COL Colombia 97.27 52.30 18.20 35-25 42.11 
CR] Costa Rica 94.09 59.00 50.90 54-95 36.84 
HRV Croatia 97.22 71.40 52.70 62.05 63.16 
CZE Czech Republic 98.15 88.50 65.80 77-15 52.63 
CIV Cote d'lvoire 100.00 82.90 55.80 69.35 47-37 
ECU Ecuador 93.61 58.30 59.80 59-05 26.32 
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. 87.18 74.90 54.20 64.55 73.68 
ETH Ethiopia 50.00 74.00 34.80 54-4 57.89 
ERA France 87.24 86.60 94.00 90.3 73.68 
GEO Georgia 100.00 75.20 53.60 64.4 89.47 
GHA Ghana 99.09 88.50 40.90 64.7 57.89 
GRC Greece 86.31 86.10 48.60 67-35 15-79 
GTM Guatemala 100.00 72.30 58.40 65-35 47-37 
HTI Haiti 93-55 74.90 28.50 51-7 42.11 
HND Honduras 99.07 73.30 59.50 66.4 31.58 
IND India 74.98 67.60 53.40 60.5 26.32 
IDN Indonesia 71.89 81.80 41.30 61.55 47-37 
IRL Ireland 98.15 79.60 75.80 77-7 84.21 
JPN Japan 84.83 77.70 65.90 71.8 57-89 
KAZ Kazakhstan 88.09 70.40 78.20 74-3 63.16 
KEN Kenya 89.96 77.10 56.30 66.7 47-37 
KOR Korea, Rep. 86.68 81.90 70.20 76.05 52.63 
KOS Kosovo 99.09 63.90 27.50 45-7 52.63 
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic 98.15 72.30 61.70 67 89.47 
LBR Liberia 9714 56.40 42.00 49-2 68.42 
MKD Macedonia, EYR 98.15 74.90 69.70 72.3 78.95 
MDG Madagascar 97,17 74.20 83.30 78-75 94-74 
MYS Malaysia 67.50 81.80 66.70 74-25 52.63 
MLI Mali 94.91 67.50 8.30 37-9 68.42 
MUS Mauritius 96.36 71.20 77.10 74-15 63.16 
MEX Mexico 63.76 84.70 52.70 68.7 52.63 
MDA Moldova 97.68 81.80 60.90 71-35 63.16 
MNE Montenegro 100.00 60.00 46.50 53-25 36.84 
MAR Morocco 84.87 69.50 64.70 67.1 68.42 
MOZ Mozambique 90.45 80.90 22.20 51-55 47-37 
NIC Nicaragua 96.75 73.30 40.30 56.8 68.42 
NGA Nigeria 97.27 82.30 71.50 76.9 47-37 
PAK Pakistan 8333 68.50 35-50 52 52.63 
PNG Papua New Guinea n / a 55.60 26.20 40.9 57-89 
PER Peru 99.07 83.30 62.60 72-95 52.63 
PHL Philippines 60.06 87.00 33-70 60.35 21.05 
POL Poland 93-97 82.80 77.30 80.05 73.68 
ROM Romania 98.15 75.20 93.20 84.2 73.68 
RUS Russian Federation 91.24 76.10 76.60 76.35 57-89 
RWA Rwanda 100.00 80.10 73.30 76.7 94-74 
SAU Saudi Arabia 58.79 30.40 28.60 29-5 78.95 
SEN Senegal 100.00 85.10 98.80 91-95 84.21 
SRB Serbia 97.68 71.40 90.20 80.8 68.42 
SLE Sierra Leone 100.00 70.50 20.50 45-5 68.42 
SGP Singapore 88.58 81.80 93.50 87.65 89-47 
SVK Slovak Republic 98.15 85.70 88.50 87.1 68.42 
N) 
h 
H > 
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SLB Solomon Islands 100.00 0.00 0.00 0 57-89 
ZAF South Africa 91.27 79.00 94.50 86.75 68.42 
ESP Spain 89.96 76.10 75-30 75-7 4 2 . 1 1 
LKA Sri Lanka 85.14 71.30 38.00 5465 78-95 
SDN Sudan 67.00 73.30 67.80 70-55 4 2 . 1 1 
TZA Tanzania 86.86 74.70 39.10 56.9 36.84 
THA Thailand 52.07 81.80 40.80 61.3 63.16 
TUN Tunisia 97.40 71.40 52.30 61.85 36.84 
TUR Turkey 91.86 69.50 68.60 69.05 68.42 
UGA Uganda 98.70 62.90 39.30 51 . 1 0.00 
UKR Ukraine 88.83 78.10 72.60 75-35 52.63 
GBR United Kingdom 94.96 87.50 94.50 91 73.68 
USA United States 95.23 81.80 7530 78-55 68.42 
VEN Venezuela, R.B. 81.84 57.10 52.20 54.65 10.53 
VNM Vietnam 68.75 61.80 57.20 59-5 47-37 
YEM Yemen, Rep. 89.19 81.40 44.00 62.7 63.16 
ZMB Zambia 100.00 65.70 77.30 71-5 63.16 
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A N A L Y Z I N G T R A D E S U R V I V A L : W H Y D O S O M A N Y 
E X P O R T S D I E S O E A R L Y ? 
"Death comes with a crawl, or comes with a pounce. 
A n d whether he's slow or spry. 
It isn't the fact that you're dead that counts. 
But only how did you die?" 
- Edmund Vance Cooke, Impertinent Poems, 1903 
3 . 1 I N T R O D U C T I O N 
This paper examines the cross-national differences in the survival of exports 
through the lens of product, industry, and country characteristics. Most trade is 
based on comparative advantage derived from factor endowments, technological 
differences, or scale economies. If it is assumed that these attributes change slowly 
because structural transformations take time, a similar assumption should be made 
about the pattern of trade flows. Actual survival and pattern of exports, however, 
appear to be much more volatile than implied by traditional theories. In my pre-
l iminary analysis of manufactured exports between 1997 and 2008 from over 100 
developing countries in the world 's two largest destinations - United States and 
the European Union - the median time of survival is between one and two years. 
This is consistent with earlier f indings by Besedes and Prusa (2006fl & 2006b) and 
Nitsch (2009) w h o for different time periods and industry aggregates find the me-
dian survival of exports to be in the order of one to four years. 
A N A L Y Z I N G T R A D E S U R V I V A L : W H Y D O S O M A N Y E X P O R T S D I E S O E A R L Y ? 
Theories have been proposed to explain w h o is supposed to trade what wi th 
w h o m , but not as m u c h is k n o w n about how long trade relationships ought to last. 
This makes the nascent literature on trade duration of interest to policy makers 
in developing countries w h o want to boost trade-led economic growth for w h i c h 
expanding the extensive and intensive margins of exports is paramount.^ Indeed, 
countries that have rapidly diversified exports appear to outperform those that are 
diversifying s lowly not in introducing new exports, but in sustaining exports that 
have already been introduced (Brenton et al. 2009). 
There is great variation in export achievement among developing countries. 
A s shown in Figure 3.1, in just 20 years from 1990 to 2010, total merchandise 
exports of the nine largest developing countries that are members of the G r o u p 
of Twenty (G-20) increased by a factor of 17 from US$198 billion to US$3.3 trillion, 
whereas the poorest 48 L D C s only saw an eight-fold increase from US$19.3 billion 
to US$150 billion. The larger developing countries are not only experimenting with 
new products and new markets, but their export of existing products in existing 
markets is growing faster and lasting longer on average. 
To gain insights into the determinants of export survival, I adopt the follow-
ing approaches in this paper. First, I use a new methodology. Almost all papers 
that have studied the duration of exports to date use continuous-time models 
that make the assumption of proportional hazards, and/or do not fully control 
for unobserved heterogeneity.^ A s demonstrated by Hess & Persson (2011) this is 
problematic. I use discrete-time regression models that control for unobserved het-
erogeneity and do not assume proportional hazards. Second, I use novel indices of 
export diversification and product sophistication to examine the extent to w h i c h 
they are associated with export survival. Third, I analyze survival of exports by 
1 At the country-product level, the intensive margin is the export of old products to old markets, and 
the extensive margin is the export of old products to new markets, new products to old markets and 
new products to new markets. Narrower definitions at the country level only would not count new 
products to old markets as a change in the extensive margin. 
2 The assumption of proportional hazards is that explanatory variables are independent with respect 
to time. In other words, the hazard ratio between any two subjects is constant, and a subject's hazard 
function follows the same pattern throughout the period of study. 
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Figure 3.1: Merchandise Exports from Developing Countries, 1990-2010 
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COMTRADE 
BRICMATTS includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, Mexico, Argentina, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa 
LDCs are officially classified by the United Nations 
Export values are mirrored, hence inclusive of cost, insurance, and freight 
rarely explored product categories (and industries) such as manufactured compo-
nents3 and processed foods. Fourth, I discuss the efficacy of tariff preferences and 
relative real exchange rates in sustaining exports. 
I find evidence of information and network externalities from exports that 
aid survival. Products from countries with concentrated export industries or a nar-
row range of destination markets exhibit higher rates of death, whereas export 
concentration within some industries is positively associated with survival, sug-
gesting a synergistic network effect. The probability of export death decreases with 
proximity between the capital content of products and national factor endowment, 
competitive real exchange rate, and bilateral trade preferences. Further, death rates 
for fast-growing subsets of exports like manufactured components and processed 
food differ from other manufactured and primary products, respectively, belying 
the notion that short durations are necessarily a result of poor exporter capabilities. 
They are interchangeably referred to as parts and components. 
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I also find that exports that manage to survive the crucial first few years gener-
ally end up growing in value: 70 percent of exports that survived at least five years 
saw their final year 's earnings exceed that earned in the initial year; the compound 
average growth rate was highest for exports lasting eight years, at a remarkable 28 
percent per year. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the emerging empirical 
literature on export survival. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 describe the various theoretical 
and empirical models that could explain the duration of export flows. Section 
3.5 introduces the data and indices. Section 3.6 explains the empirical strategy 
of obtaining probabilities of export survival in discrete-time models. Sections 3.7 
and 3.8 discuss the main results and check for their robustness. The final section 
concludes. 
3 . 2 R E L A T E D L I T E R A T U R E 
In traditional theory, trade is caused by productivity differences among coun-
tries arising from factor endowments, technology, or economies of scale. Because 
endowments and technology, as well as the nature of increasing returns that are ex-
ternal or internal to industries evolve slowly, trade theories suggest that patterns of 
trade ought to be more durable than the recent research on export survival reveals. 
What explains this apparent incongruency? 
Survival analysis is a long established method of inquiry in fields as diverse as 
political science, industrial engineering, and bio-statistics. In economics, the study 
of duration data on unemployment goes back to Nickell (1979). The credit for 
introducing the technique to study durations of trade, however, goes to Besedes 
and Prusa (20060 & 2006b). They found that an overwhelming share of imports 
into the US between 1972 and 2001 failed within the first two years. 
Others have since extended the evidence to new countries. Nitsch (2009) shows 
that German imports have short spells at the 8-digit Combined Nomenclature of 
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EU trade statistics. Hess & Persson (2010) analyze survival ir\to the European 
Union (EU) from 1962 to 2006 and find median survival to be only one year. 
Fugazza & Molina (2009) study bilateral flov^ s^ among 96 countries and confirm 
earlier findings on hazard rates differing by income, initial export values, product 
type, and fixed trade costs. Jaud et al. (2009) find that modern financial systems 
help export survival by giving firms access to external credit so that they can ac-
commodate shocks and survive longer. Obashi (2010) examines machinery trade 
within East Asia to find that parts and components are traded through longer-lived 
and more stable relationships than finished goods. 
The papers cited so far use data at the product level. New literature has started 
to explore export survival by using firm-level data. Volpe & Carballo (2009) study 
Peruvian firms between 2000 and 2006 to find the median length of an export spell 
to be just one year. They show evidence in favor of both geographical and product 
diversification; firms focusing on a larger number of markets manage risk better 
than those selling a larger number of products. 
Cadot, lacovone, Rauch & Pierola (2011) use firm-level data from four Sub-
Saharan African countries to find nation-wide positive spillovers due to the ex-
istence of other firms exporting the same product to the same destination. They 
show that the market and product experience a firm possesses when launching 
a new product-market combination matters for its survival.^ An important policy 
conclusion that Cadot, lacovone, Rauch & Pierola (2011) reach is that the presence 
of same-country same-product competitors enables each exporter to amortize mar-
ket entry costs over a longer run; but because these economies of scale may not 
be visible enough to induce incumbent exporters to provide assistance to entrants, 
there arises a market failure which can be corrected with government funds to 
promote national exports. 
4 Market experience of a firm is proxied by the number of products it exports to a particular market. 
Product experience of the firm is the number of destinations to which it exports that product. 
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Gorg et al. (2007) use Hungarian firm-level data of over 2000 firms from 1992 
to 2003 and find that the more experience a firm has in exporting a product the 
higher is the chance that the product will survive. Murakozy & Bekes (2009) use 
the same Hungarian data set to argue that short trade relationships may simply be 
noise, representing one-off sales of assets and inventories, and that the nature of 
such temporary trade is different from permanent trade. 
lacovone & Javorcik (2010) use Mexican firm-level data from 1994 to 2003 with 
sales of over 3000 products to show that many newly introduced exports do not 
survive for more than one year. They find that i) intense variety churning (turnover) 
at the firm level is systematically related to exogenous trade reforms and ii) new 
exporters break into export markets with up to two varieties and a small volume.5 
lacovone & Javorcik (2010) also show that nearly 80 percent of firms enter new 
export markets with products that they have recently sold at home. This mitigates 
risks because if exports fail, unsold goods will still have the domestic market. 
The presence of uncertainty causing export volatility is also found in Buono 
et al. (2008). They inveshgate the dynamics of export relations using a panel of 
almost 19,000 French exporters between 1995 and 1999 to find that around 27 per-
cent of all export relations are newly created and 21 percent are destroyed in a 
typical year. 
In terms of methodology, almost all studies (both at the country-product and 
firm-level) run continuous-time models that make the assumption of proportional 
hazards. Brenton et al. (2010) were the first to test and reject the assumption of 
proportional hazards. They use an alternative technique - the Prentice & Gloeckler 
(1978) estimator^ - to analyze the duration of export flows from 82 exporters to 53 
importers between 1985 and 2005. They find evidence of what they call learning-by-
doing: the experience of exporting the same product to other markets or different 
5 They find the distribution of export values in the first year, normalized by the total sales of a product 
by a given firm, to be skewed to the left indicating that most export relationships start small 
6 This is a discrete-time equivalent of the Cox model, that is, a complementary log-log (cloglog) model. 
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products to the same market enhances the probability of export survival. Brenton 
et al. (2010) argue that their methodology is superior because they control for un-
observed heterogeneity. Hovk^ever, Hess & Persson (2011) point out that while a 
discrete-time proportional hazards model incorporating random effects does con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity, the model used by Brenton et al. (2010) is still 
f lawed because it does not allow for intrinsic non-proportionality. 
This criticism by Hess & Persson (2011) deserves elaboration. There are two 
reasons w h y the assumption of proportional hazards fails: i) unaccounted unob-
served heterogeneity could force an otherwise proportional effect of a covariate to 
depend on duration time, or ii) the effect of covariates on hazard could be intrin-
sically non-proportional. Brenton et al. (2010) argue, rightly, that not accounting 
for unobserved heterogeneity could cause Cox-based tests to reject the assump-
tion of proportional hazards. They then incorporate random effects to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity. However, they do not distinguish between intrinsic non-
proportionality and non-proportionality caused by heterogeneity. Hess & Persson 
(2011) conclude that because the assumption of proportional hazards may fail even 
when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, discrete-choice models like probit 
and logit are better in analyzing trade durahon. 
3 . 3 T H E O R E T I C A L F R A M E W O R K 
Besedes and Prusa (2006a & 2006b) relate their findings to the theory of trade 
and search costs developed by Rauch & Watson (2003). In their model, developed 
country importers search for developing country exporters. To attenuate uncer-
tainty about suppliers' reliability, importers start with small orders. After investing 
in training and establishing trust they expand their relationship by placing larger 
orders, or give up on the relationship altogether and undertake a new search for 
exporters elsewhere. This reliance on incremental trust-building and reputation is 
one way to redress the low level of contract enforcement in developing countries. 
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Segura-Cayuela & Vilarrubia (2008) extend the Melitz modeF to formally in-
corporate uncertainty in a model of export flows. Firms seek survival of their 
exports by lowering uncertainty and informational asymmetry from externalities 
generated by peer firms who are already exporting to foreign markets. In their 
framework, it is uncertainty surrounding per-period fixed costs that vary with 
time that helps explain short trade durations.® Firms experiment, face unantici-
pated hurdles, and quit, releasing information to peers. If the actions of firms that 
are already exporting reveal enough information, the new exporter does not need 
to start small. 
The basic model is one where firms pay three kinds of costs to enter a foreign 
market: transport costs (xij), sunk costs that are known (ctj) and an unknown 
fixed cost (fij) that varies per-period. Sunk costs involve a firm re-orienting its 
production structure to ready itself for a foreign market; the fixed cost captures 
the servicing of continued presence after entering (for example, distribution, and 
adaption to the local market situation). After entering, firms' per-period revenue 
should meet per-period costs to keep exporting, irrespechve of the sunk cost. It is 
the uncertainty surrounding per-period fixed costs that vary with time that helps 
explain short trade durations. 
In Segura-Cayuela & Vilarrubia (2008), aspiring new exporters observe the 
actions of previous entrants (from the same industry and country) to derive in-
formation on their expected revenue stream.9 Productivity of firms is assumed to 
be known, and the more productive firms enter first. A new firm looks to iden-
tify the firm with the lowest productivity that ever exported prior to time t. This 
establishes the upper bound for f i j . A firm with the lowest productivity still ac-
7 In Melitz (2003), only firms whose producHvity exceeds an endogenously determined threshold level 
export. Exporting firms face a higher sunk cost than firms that only serve the domestic market While 
Melitz (2003) predicts entry and exit of firms from exporting, such churning is often in response to 
mfrequent trade shocks. In reality, however, firms' profits are subject to uncertainty and likely to 
vary per period. Because of such variance, there is a constant possibility of old firms exiting and new 
firms entering at a frequency much higher than that predicted by Melitz. 
8 Besedes & Prusa (2010b) use this framework as well. 
9 The model does not take into account strategic considerations on payoffs, that is, how one's decision 
to enter might affect other firms' decision to enter by affecting their revenue. 
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tive at t gives the information that its per-period revenue is at least as high as the 
per-period fixed cost. Specifically, if the last entrant is not the same as the last re-
maining active firm, and the latter is more productive than the last entrant, it can 
be concluded that the last entrant had negative net per-period revenue forcing its 
exit. Mistakes of prior entrants, therefore, inform a new entrant about the costs of 
its own entry. 
In the model, a firm has to decide whether to enter at time t or wait until 
t -I- 1 by weighing two different values. If it enters at t, it gets the period's gross 
revenue minus the sunk cost and the expected fixed cost for a given f . If at t -I-1, 
its fixed costs are higher than its per-period revenue, the firm quits the export 
market; if it is lower, it continues to derive a finite stream of profits. If a firm waits 
until t -I- 1 to enter, it gets nothing at t, and its payoff is partly conditioned by 
what information is revealed between t and t -I-1. With probability p, this waiting 
firm can become perfectly informed about the true fixed cost by looking at which 
firm exited and which least-productive firm remains active. It can then enter with 
certainty that its net per-period revenue will be non-negative at t -I-1. In this model 
informational externality is about firm viability captured, for reasons of tractability, 
by per-period fixed costs. Such informational externalities can take form of tangible 
facts to intangible tidbits of intelligence. 
The corollary of the above framework is that the more diverse the range of 
firms a country has, or sells to diverse markets, the more information is available 
to potential new exporters about their viability.'" 
The second strand of theoretical work is on how survival rates vary with 
product type. Rauch (1996, 1999) discusses the role of trading networks in the 
10 Diversification and survival are also discussed in the industrial organization literature, although the 
determining channel is not informational externality. Bernard & Jensen (2002) find in their study 
of plant shutdowns in the United States between 1977 and 1997 that the probability of plant death 
is decreasing in the number of products produced. Single-product plants are much more likely to 
fail in any five-year period than establishments producing multiple goods. One reason, the authors 
suggest, why diversification aids survival is related to the finding that the probability of plant death 
is decreasing in industry sunk costs of entry To the extent that introducing new products or going 
into new markets require sunk costs, firms in a position to meet those costs are more productive, 
and therefore plants that produce multiple products face lower probabilities of shut-down. 
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presence of uncertainty by dividing goods into "homogeneous," "reference-priced" 
and "differentiated." The first two groups include commodities that are traded in 
organized exchanges or whose reference prices can be obtained from trade pubH-
cations without knowing the name of the manufacturer. The examples of products 
in this category are agricultural commodities, metals, and chemicals. The price of 
differentiated goods, on the other hand, varies with the brand of the manufacturer. 
Because entry of firms that produce differentiated goods reveals more information, 
duration of trade is expected to be associated with product characteristics. N o pa-
per has, however, looked at whether this holds true when products are subject to 
a detailed classification of sophistication in terms of their factor-content measured 
by Revealed Factor Intensity (RFI) or income-content measured by PRODY. 
From the theoretical discussions so far, two testable characteristics of diversifi-
cation and sophistication for export survival emerge. The first is whether product 
and market diversification (at the country level as well as at the industry level) 
affect survival of exports. The hypothesis is that if a country has i) a large number 
of export-oriented sectors, or ii) a large number of exports within specific indus-
tries, or (iii) a diversified portfolio of export markets, the information externality 
is likely to be larger and useful in reducing hazard rates. 
The second testable characteristic is whether export survival varies with the 
sophistication of individual products, and not just when they are grouped into 
broad aggregates as in Rauch (1999). If only a selective subset of firms within 
developing countries attempts to export "rich-country" products, then the infor-
mational externalities they generate may not be enough for aspiring exporters to 
redress uncertainty. This suggests the higher the sophistication, the higher the mor-
tality of exports. On the other hand, it can be assumed that producers of more 
sophisticated goods are more productive and better informed about the prospects 
of their exports in specific markets to reduce their risk of dying. It is also possi-
ble that measures of product sophistication are misleading because they generally 
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capture the factor or income content of the final stage of production which may 
not meaningfully convey the survival chance of products. 
3 4 M O D E L 
Duration data can be in continuous or discrete time. Exports could die on any 
day of the year, but because cross-country trade data are reported annually, they 
essentially take the form of discrete grouped duration data. However, almost all 
papers on trade duration have used continuous time models where the dependent 
variable is the length of an export spell. An export spell is defined as the number 
of years a product i from Country A is exported continuously (without cessation 
or death) to Country B. The same product to the same country if revived after a 
gap of one or more years is treated as another export spell ." 
In discrete-time models, which I explain later in this section to be my pre-
ferred approach, the dependent variable (Yu) is a binary number of either i or 
o indicating death or survival of an export i in year t between each country pair. 
This is used to compute the probability ( 9 0 of an export dying conditional on a 
matrix of explanatory variables X and their coefficients |3 as in equation 3.1. 
Pr(Yu = l|X(3) = Gi (3.1) 
The first set of explanatory variables comprises measures of export diversi-
fication. The diversification indices proxy for informational externality, and ask 
whether countries with more concentrated export portfolios see less information 
passed on to fellow exporters about the viability of exports across industries and 
foreign destinations. All else being equal, survival of exports from countries that 
11 This assumption of independence of export spells is defensible because they could represent different 
firms (later, I control for country-product pairs that have multiple spells, and also treat exports that 
revive after a gap of only one year as a continuous spell). 
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rely on a narrow range of export markets or concentrate on few exports could be 
expected to be lower than from countries with a more diversified export portfolio. 
The second set of explanatory variables comprises of measures of sophistica-
tion. These measures help answer the question whether exports from developing 
countries that are more sophisticated than what their existing levels of income and 
factor endowments suggest die early. If a nation's endowment point is represented 
by the intersection of the average stock of physical and human capital, the dis-
tance between that point and the factor intensities of each export can be calculated. 
Cadot, Carrere & Strauss-Kahn (2011) and Jaud et al. (2011) hypothesize that, all 
else being equal, products which defy a country's comparative advantage by em-
bodying human and physical contents that are " far" from the country's point of 
human and physical capital endowment have a higher rate of failure. ^ ^ 
The third set of explanatory variables controls for export experience and com-
petitiveness. In the model of Rauch & Watson (2003), initial value of exports indi-
cates a degree of trust, and an investment already made in the supplier. So relation-
ships that begin with a large order are expected to last longer than those that start 
small. One explanatory variable is therefore the US dollar value of exports in the 
year the spell begins. Real GDP and real GDP per capita of exporting countries proxy 
for the capacity and reliability of exporters. All else being equal, richer countries 
should expect to have longer spells of export flows. The existence of a Preferential 
Trade Agreement (PTA) gives a tariff edge to exports from beneficiary countries 
and attracts foreign investors, increasing the prospect for export longevity. 
The fourth set of explanatory variables affects trade and search costs for ex-
porters, best captured by "gravity" variables: all else being equal, export spells 
between countries that share a language, border, past colonial relationship, and 
are geographically proximate can be longer. Variable definitions and data sources 
are elaborated in Table 3.14. 
12 I illustrate the concept of factor distance with a country example from Pakistan in Figure 3.5. 
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In addition to the use of a new empirical technique and indices (described 
later), novel features of this paper include the way export survival is analyzed 
by industry and two distinct product categories: manufactured components and 
processed foods. It also assesses whether bilateral trade agreements between the 
exporting and importing countries, and unilateral trade preferences granted by the 
importing to the exporting country, are associated with longer survival of exports. 
A defining trait of the current era of globalization is that unprecedented 
technological advances in communications and transportation coupled with lib-
eral trade and investment policies have made possible the splitting of production 
processes into multiple stages across national borders. This phenomenon is inter-
changeably known as international product fragmentation, off-shoring, outsourc-
ing, multi-stage production, or vertical specialization. Over the past two decades, 
the volume of trade in intermediate inputs (parts and components) has risen dra-
matically, and been likened to the "Third Industrial Revolution" with cheap flow 
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of information and technology augmenting tradability of goods and services in 
new ways (Blinder 2006). 
Trade in parts and components increased from US$1.2 trillion in 1992-93 to 
US$4.5 trillion (45.5 percent of total exports) in 2006-07, accounting for over a half 
of the total increment in world manufacturing exports during this period (Athuko-
rala & Menon 2010). This phenomenon has major policy impl icat ions .Within 
networks, production units located in different countries specialize in specific 
tasks which are not directly substitutable for tasks undertaken elsewhere. They 
are, therefore, likely to behave differently to finished or final-assembled products. 
For example, Obashi (2010) finds parts and components to be more robust to long 
distances or high trading cost, and exchange rate fluctuations. 
The other category of distinct products analyzed in this paper is that of agro-
based processed foods. It includes fresh fruits and vegetables, poultry, fish and 
dairy products, which are exported after being subjected to technologically so-
phisticated processes. As explained by Athukorala & Sen (1998), these exports are 
typically high value and subject to stringent food safety standards. While they have 
always been traded, their expansion has been rapid in recent years, and they are 
distinct from traditional beverages (such as tea and coffee) and cereal grains (such 
as wheat, maze, rice) which are generally exported in bulk. I hypothesize that 
the survival rate of processed food exports is different from that of other primary 
products. 
13 First, in the presence of heavy trade in parts and components, relying on final h-ade data could 
mislead the direction and magnitude of bilateral trade deficit and surplus. In the famous case of the 
iPhone, for example, because China assembles and exports the final product, trade data records each 
iPhone as an export from China to the United States worth US$178.96. However, workers in China's 
Hon Hai Precision Industry who assemble the iPhone are eshmated to conh-ibute only about 3.6 
percent (US$6.5) of the wholesale value (Xing & Detert 2010). The rest is accounted for by imported 
parts and components from several countries. The second implication is for development: product 
fragmentahon makes a finer division of labor possible, and poor countries can leap-frog into pro-
ducing sophisticated components without waiting to be rich enough to be capable of hosting a fully 
integrated production chain. Third, parts and components are less sensitive to changes in relative 
prices, restraining the efficacy of exchange rates in adjusting balance of payments (Athukorala & 
Menon 2010). 
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With the data reorganized to indicate the identity of an export spell, its length 
of survival (in years), and whether the spell is dead or alive at the end of the 
observation period, two sets of inquiries are conducted in trade duration analysis. 
The first is the computation of summary statistics on survival rates by region, 
income groups, and product categories. The second involves regression analysis to 
test which explanatory variables reduce or increase the risk of export death. Two 
approaches to regression analysis are described next. 
3.4.1 Continuous-time PH Model 
The probability of export death is formally measured by the hazard rate. It is 
a function of the baseline hazard Kq at time t, and a set of explanatory variables X. 
Baseline hazard is the hazard function where all explanatory variables have been 
set or recentered to zero. 
A rising baseline hazard over time implies a positive duration dependence, and 
a falling baseline hazard indicates that the chance of an event occurring decreases 
over time {negative duration dependence). Duration dependence can arise either 
because there is "true" dependence - it is natural, for example, to expect the risk 
of fashion-sensitive exports dying to increase with time - or there is unobserved 
heterogeneity. The existence of unobserved heterogeneity overestimates negative 
duration dependence and underestimates positive duration dependence. If export 
categories from different industries have specific unobserved factors that affect 
their hazard, high-risk exports die sooner leaving low-risk exports to last longer. 
As time increases, the exit of high-risk exports depletes their population leading 
to under-estimation of the true population hazard. 
The assumption of proportional hazard complicates the use of continuous-
time models. The assumption that the effect of a covariate on hazard is constant 
over time is problematic if we fail to control for unobserved heterogeneity Even 
if the model conforms to proportional hazards, the presence of unobserved het-
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erogeneity will cause some covariates to depend on duration time. Before using 
continuous-time models, the assumption of proportional hazard in the data has to 
be tested. This step is crucial because research that studies trade duration rarely 
tests for the proportional hazards assumption before settling on an appropriate 
model. Indeed, none of the seminal papers that started this body of literature tests 
for this assumption, with recent exceptions like Brenton et al. (2010) and Hess & 
Persson (2011). 
h(t) = Prob(T = t|T > t) = f(X|3) (3.2) 
When the baseline hazard fimction is not specified, equation 3.2 is the Cox 
model of the form h(t) = hoexp{X(3). Cox is semi-parametric and one form of 
a proportional hazards model. Because the probability distribution of the time-to-
event variables need not be known, the Cox model is popular. Yet, the assump-
tion of constant hazard often proves restrictive in application to cover several phe-
nomena of duration. Hazards could decrease or increase, and therefore converge, 
diverge or even cross the baseline hazard over time. Parametric models such as 
exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz are appropriate when survival times follow 
distributions represented by them. For example, constant hazard means the sub-
jects are no more likely to fail at an earlier period than later; in Weibull, failure 
rates may increase or decrease with time. If proportional hazards models are used 
to characterize data that have non-proportional hazards, the coefficients are biased 
and the power of the tests of significance decreases. In such situations, the relative 
risk of covariates whose hazard ratios are increasing over time is overestimated 
and the relative risk of covariates with converging hazards underestimated (Box-
Steffensmeier & Zorn 2001). 
Hess & Persson (2011) articulate a strong case against the use of a Cox pro-
portional hazards model to study the duration of export survival. They offer three 
reasons, as follows. First, cross-country trade data are available in a comparable 
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format generally in discrete units (of years). Trade data consist of a substantial 
share of "t ied" durations: exports that die in the month of January are recorded 
to have died the same year as ones that die in December. While there are methods 
(for example, Breslow and Efron approximations) to deal with tied duration in 
continuous-time models, biased parameter estimation is inevitable in the presence 
of heavy ties.^'' 
Second, unobserved heterogeneity (also known as frailty) is better dealt with 
using discrete-time models. Stratified Cox models can address, to some extent, 
aspects of unobserved heterogeneity by allowing baseline hazards to vary between 
observations, or by including country dummies. However, in trade data it is likely 
that heterogeneity is at the level of country and industry. This can be addressed 
more straightforwardly in discrete-time models with random effects. 
And third, the Cox model imposes the assumption of proportional hazards, 
with explanatory variables expected to have a constant effect on the hazard rate. 
This is untenable, because several variables that affect export survival (for example, 
initial value of exports, GDP of exporter countries, or trade agreements) are likely 
to be much more important in the earlier phase of exporting than when exports 
are sustained for multiple years and hysteresis is observed. In discrete-time models, 
this assumption can be b y p a s s e d . 
3.4.2 Discrete-time Model 
Discrete-time models use an identical likelihood function of binary response, 
which can be eshmated using probit, logit, or complementary log-log (cloglog) 
14 In the data set used in this paper, nearly 50 percent of export spells last only one year (excluding 
right-censored spells). 
15 Hess & Persson (2011) support their methodological recommendation by comparing results from a 
discrete-time probit model with random effects and the Cox proportional hazards model using the 
same data set used in Besedes & Prusa (2006b). They find significant differences in both the predicted 
hazard rates and the eshmated coefficient of covariates on the hazard. 
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models/^ If the probability of an export dying conditional on a set of all covariates 
is 0i, then the probability of an export not dying is 1 — 0i. In this set-up, the logit, 
probit and cloglog models are expressed as follows: 
logit 0i 
L i - 0 i J 
= Xb = b o + b i X i + b 2 X 2 + b 3 X 3 + .... + b n X n (3-3) 
where Gi = 
Similarly for probit. 
o - ^ e i ) = x b (34) 
And cloglog: 
l o g [ - l o g ( l - e O ] = Xb (3-5) 
where P(Yu = 1) = Bi = 1 - e"^ 
Logit and probit may be expected to produce similar results, and cloglog to 
produce different results because of the asymmetry of its density function. This 
is, however, not the case. As shown by Sueyoshi (1995), the similarity between 
probit and logit does not extend to the evaluation of the proportional changes in 
discrete hazard. Changes in the covariates produce different predictions of propor-
honate change depending on whether the model is probit, or logit and cloglog. 
For subjects with high exit probability (as is the case in export data), probit is most 
sensitive to changes in the explanatory variables. 
16 The cloglog model is a discrete-time approximation to the Cox proportional hazards model - the co-
efficients obtained from cloglog are directly comparable to those obtained from Cox. Indeed, exports 
die in continuous time, but they are only observed in discrete time intervals. Probit and logit both 
have symmetrical distribution functions aroimd zero (logit tails are fatter), but cloglog has a skewed 
distribution. 
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For a non-parametric baseline I create 1 1 duration-interval-specific dummy 
variables for the maximum number of years between 1997 and 2008 (with left-
censored data excluded, that is, all exports beginning in 1997 dropped). From the 
1 1 year dummies, I create 4 period dummies corresponding to Year 1 , Years 2 and 
3, Years 4, 5 and 6, and Years 6 and beyond. The probit model is my first choice. 
Although computationally time-consuming, I contrast results obtained from the 
three models with and without frailty (a latent random effect). The random effects 
model is fit via maximum likelihood in equation 3.6 for i = 1, n panels, where 
t = 1, n; Vi are identically and independently distributed, and O is the standard 
normal cumulative distributive function. 
P ( y u / 0 | x u ) = 0(xu|3+Vi) (3.6) 
Unobserved heterogeneity is expected to be a major problem in trade data. 
Even if two export spells Ptx and Pjy had identical explanatory variables, the prod-
uct characteristics specific to two different industries (i and j) in two separate 
countries (X and Y) could result in different hazard rates for export spells. The 
core set of explanatory variables related to trade and search costs, and informa-
tional externalities, are unlikely to account for all the sources of variation in the 
hazard rate. To address unobserved heterogeneity, I use a model of shared frai lty,^^ 
where export spells belonging to specific industries in each developing country are 
assumed to share common risks, for example, apparel exports from Kenya face dif-
ferent risks from electrical exports from Kenya. In linear regressions, there are stan-
dard techniques to address such heterogeneity, through fixed or random effects. In 
non-linear models there is no standard methodology (Deb 2001). 
Finally, the presence of multiple spells needs to be dealt with. Data on trade 
duration are replete with exports of identical products from the same country 
17 Fixed effects are not generally used in duration models. Instead random effects models are used, 
which introduce a random parameter into the hazard rate. Export spells share a common intercept. 
The random frailty terms must be independent of the covariates. 
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that last one or more consecutive years, stop, and then revive. When data are 
aggregated by country, it is not known if exports are from the same firm. A priori, 
it also cannot be knov^ ^n whether export spells that experienced a prior spell are 
more or less likely to survive on subsequent attempts. The first failure can suggest 
that the intrinsic hazard rate of a certain product is such that a second failure is 
more likely. On the other hand, mistakes of the past can be avoided and chances 
of survival improved the second time. I treat multiple spells as independent, but 
as in Besedes & Prusa (2006?;), a dummy controls for any impact of export spells 
that reappear the second or subsequent time. 
It should also be noted that a gap of one year between two export spells could 
simply be a measurement error. When checking for robustness of results, I treat 
two export spells separated by a gap of only one year as a single continuous spell 
to see whether results change when spells are adjusted this way. 
3 . 5 D A T A A N D V A R I A B L E C O N S T R U C T I O N 
In a data set involving more than 4000 exports from 1 1 2 developing countries 
into the United States over 12 years, there is a maximum possibility of nearly six 
million units of observations.^® However, not all countries export all products in all 
years. I further exclude all exports worth less than US$1000, so in the actual data 
set, there are 564,956 observations which are converted into 170,088 export spells. 
I use mirrored data at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized Commodity De-
scription and Coding System (HS) and concord them with the Standard Interna-
tional Trade Classification (SITC) nomenclature of COMTRADE. Although trade data 
at the 8-digit, or even lo-digit level, are available from national trade databases 
of some individual countries, HS 6-digit level is the most disaggregated product 
classification available in the COMTRADE database for cross-country comparison 
18 Developing countries in this paper are those defined by World Bank (2011b) as belonging to either 
low or middle income categories, with population in 2008 of at least one million. The population cut-
off is important to exclude micro-states that do not have the manufacturing base or export structure 
of larger countries. 
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There is, of course, an unavoidable risk that disaggregation at the 6-digit level may 
not adequately capture the uniqueness of some products and hence the survival 
record is analyzed for highly similar products, not the same product. Hov^^ever, a 
close inspection of the data suggests that cases of such possible overlap among 
commodities are few and far between at the 6-digit level compared to the 4-digit 
level. 
SITC is used to group and define commodities into eight manufacturing and 
four primary industries (Table 3.12). Manufactured goods are those that belong to 
SITC Sections 5 to 8, net of SITC Division 68. The International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) counts processed foods as part of the manufacturing industry. 
I therefore extract processed food products from the SITC category of food, bever-
ages, tobacco, and live animals (Sections o, 1 , 4 and Division 22, net of Division 43 
and Group 12 1 ) following the classification of Athukorala & Sen (1998). 
I follow the classification of Athukorala (2010) to define 522 products at the 
HS 6-digit level as parts and components. The share of parts and components is 
highest, at around 25 percent, among manufactured goods belonging to SITC 7 
and 8, and lowest (in fact, almost non-existent) in the chemical industry (SITC 5). 
Data for gravity variables that affect trade and search costs are obtained from 
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et dTnformations Internationales (CEPII). Real GDP 
and real GDP per capita are obtained from WDI. Data on US bilateral and unilat-
eral preferential arrangements are obtained from USTR (2oiifl) and USTR (2oiiii), 
respectively. 
An important issue to deal with in survival analysis is the treatment of cen-
sored data. They are those without complete information about their duration. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates hypothetical export spells during the observation period: the 
bottom two spells are left-and right-censored, respectively, because it is not known 
when the spell began and when it will end. The longest spell is both left- and right-
censored. Only two spells began and ended during the period of observation. 
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Right-censored data give useful information about the length of time the ex-
port flow^ survived. In other words, an export spell beginning in 2006 and not 
dead until 2008 is known for certain to have survived for at least three years. Left-
censored data pose a bigger problem because observations that end in 1997 are 
given a duration of one year, when in fact they would have lasted for at least one 
but possibly more years. When spells are recorded as having lasted for fewer num-
ber of years than the true length, the hazard rate is underestimated at all durations 
(Hess & Persson 2011) . Next, I describe in detail the construction of indices that 
are not standard, yet are the main explanatory variables in this paper. 
3.5.1 Measures of Export Sophistication 
The first measure of export sophistication is the "income content" of products 
(PRODY), calculated by combining the methods of Hausmann et al. (2007) and Lall 
et al. (2006). The premise is that products largely exported by rich countries are 
"revealed" as sophisticated. I divide 148 countries into ten income groups, sorted 
by their level of real GDP per capita in 2007-2008. The income content of each prod-
uct is the sum of the average GDP per capita income of these ten groups weighted 
by the ratio of the share of the product in a group's basket to the sum of shares 
of the product in the overall export basket of all income groups. The weights sum 
to unity, and are a variant of the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index. 
Treating these ten groups as hypothetical countries, I attach the weighted mean 
per capita income of each group proportionately to the products they export. This 
assigns implicit productivity numbers to products based on the income character 
of their exporters. 
In equation 3.1 , the PRODY of product k is the weighted average of the per 
capita income (Yi) of ten income groups producing k with weights calculated as a 
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ratio of the share of k in group i ' s overall exports to the sum of such shares across 
all income g r o u p s . 
The second measure of sophistication is the Revealed Factory Intensity (RFI) 
of products. It is computed in a similar manner to PRODY, but has a stronger theo-
retical linkage to comparative advantage derived from factor endowments. Goods 
that are predominantly exported by countries rich in human and physical capital 
are revealed to be intensive in human and physical capital, respectively. The RFI is 
computed as follows for revealed human capital intensity of products where Hi is 
the human capital estimated by the average years of schooling. Analogously, the 
revealed (per capita) physical capital intensity is measured by The physical cap-
ital stock (K] is estimated by the perpetual inventory method which reconstructs 
capital stock estimates from investment flows by recursively adding up current 
investments to previous period's capital stock with appropriate depreciation. 
DTIT V ( ' ' I K / X I ) 
The updated database of factor intensities (human and physical, as well as 
land and natural resources) of all products at the HS 6-digit level is prepared by 
Shirotori et al. (2010) and made available by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). I standardize the human and physical capital 
intensities of each product and calculate the average to capture an overall factor 
intensity (see Table 3.16 for RFI scores of selected products). 
19 I follow the approach of Lall et al. (2006) to cluster countries into 10 groups sorted by income per 
capita. Lall et al., however, do not develop an RCA-based weighting system like Hausmann et al. 
(2007). M y approach combines the innovations in the two methodologies. 
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3.5.2 Measures of Export Diversification 
I use two measures to compute three different types of export diversification. 
The first measure of diversification is the Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) Index. It 
assesses the overall concentration of exports both at the country level (using aggre-
gated exports at the sectoral level) and within each industry (aggregated exports at 
the SITC 4-digit level within each of the 1 2 industries listed in Table 3.12). The HH 
is also computed for export markets to assess the breadth of foreign destinations 
for a country's exports. A country with a perfectly diversified export portfolio 
has an index close to 1 , whereas a country which exports only one export has a 
value of o (least diversified). A s shown by Jacquemin & Berry (1979), HH cannot 
be decomposed directly into additive elements which define the contribution of 
diversification at each level of product aggregation to the total. It also does not 
capture products with very small trade shares.^" 
Because of these shortcomings, I use Theil's entropy as my second - and pre-
ferred - measure of diversification (Theil 1967). Entropy weights the share of each 
product by the log of the inverse of the share (whereas HH weights the share of 
each product by itself). High entropy values indicate a diversified export portfolio. 
If one good is all that a country exports, the entropy is zero. If n. goods have an 
equal share, the maximum value is the log of n. Theil's entropy can be computed 
for subgroups of exports, and decomposed additively to measure concentration 
within and among groups of exports. The most concentrated sub-groups have the 
highest weights. In equations 3.3 and 3.4 Stj is the share of export j in the total 
exports of country i. 
20 If two products at the SITC-4 digit level have shares of 80 and 20 percent within a SITC-2 category, 
the entropy is 0.217 the HH is 0.32 (subtracted from 1 to show that increase in the scores in both 
measures indicates increased diversification). Now, assume that the 20 percent share of the second 
product was distributed equally among 10 products, but the first product still dominated with an 
80 percent share - the entropy jumps to 0.417 whereas HH only increases to 0.356. The entropy is, 
therefore, much more responsive to changes in small product shares, whereas HH is more responsive 
to small differences in large product shares. 
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Entropy = - S i j ln (S i j ) (3.3) 
) 
HH = l - ^ ( S i j ) ^ (3.4) 
1 
3.5.3 Distance from National Endowment Point 
From the UNCTAD data set on RFI, I compute the distance between the capital 
content of each product p and the national endowment of each country i as fol-
lows. Following Jaud et al. (2011) , equation 3.5 is the Euclidean distance computed 
by first standardizing (to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one) the 
difference in the logged values of the revealed physical capital (kip) and human 
capital (hip) contents and the national endowment (ki hi). A n alternative measure 
in equation 3.6 is the absolute distance of product p f rom the point of comparative 
advantage. 
E u c l i d e a n D i s t a n c c k = { s t d ( k i - k j p ) } ^ + { s t d ( h i - h i p ) } ^ ^^ ^ (3.5) 
A b s o l u t e D i s t a n c e k = |std(ki - kip)| + |std(hi - hip)| (3.6) 
3.5.4 Relative Real Exchange Rate 
The real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate adjusted for price levels in 
more than one currency. It is often used as an indicator of export competitiveness. 
I compute relative real exchange rate of each country vis-a-vis the U S in all years 
as fol lows. First, all nominal exchange rates between a country 's currency against 
the US dollar are converted into indices with 2005 as the base year. Second, the 
nominal exchange rate indices are multiplied by the ratio of the consumer price 
indices in the importing and exporting countries. Third, the real exchange rate thus 
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obtained is divided by the real exchange rate of all other developing countries 
exporting to the US, weighted by each country's share of manufactured exports. 
The movement of real exchange rate reflects the change in a country's international 
competitiveness: a decrease in the relative real exchange rate index between two 
years implies that the country's exchange rate has become less competitive relative 
to that of other countries.^^ 
3 . 6 E S T I M A T I O N M E T H O D 
Taking time-to-event (T) to be a random variable, the two important concepts 
in duration analysis are the hazard and survival functions. The hazard function is 
defined in equation 3.1, where P(.) is the probability that an event occurs instantly 
after t given that no event has occurred until t. For example, if 100 subjects enter 
period t, and 20 die ("an event occurs") before t -I-1, the hazard, H(t), is 0.2. 
H t = hra ^ (3.1) 
' dt^o dt ^^  ' 
m ^ n 
i l t j^t ^ ' ^ 
The survival function is the condihonal probability that an event has not oc-
curred before time t. The Kaplan-Meier (KM) survival rate is a non-parametric 
estimate of the Survivor function S(t) which is estimated by equation 3.2, where 
Uj is the number of exports at risk at time, and dj is the number of failures or 
deaths at time tj. The product is over all time periods with failures until tj. In Ta-
21 Take Nepal as an example. According to World Bank (2010b), in 2002, Nepal's nominal exchange rate 
was Rs. 77.9 per US dollar. Converted into an index with the nominal exchange rate in 2005 (Rs. 71.4 
per US dollar) set to 100, the 2002 index is 109.1. This is multiplied by the ratio of US and Nepali 
consumer price indices in 2002 (92.1/86.1) to obtain a real exchange rate of 116.7. This is then divided 
by the weighted average of real exchange rates of all countries that export to the US (109.26) to give 
Nepal its relative real exchange rate in 2002 of 1.068. This increased to 1.075 2003, indicating real 
depreciation of Nepal's exchange rate relative to other countries. This makes Nepali exports more 
competitive and reduces the share of export deaths to a level lower than would otherwise have been 
the case. 
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Figure 3.3: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of Exports to the US 
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ble 3 . 1 1 , the probability that an export from Sub-Saharan Africa to the US survives 
until the 1 1 th year, S( 1 1 ) , is about 1 1 percent; the probability that an export from 
East Asia to the US survives until the sixth year, S(6), is 40 percent. 
Figure 3.3 depicts the Kaplan-Meier ( K M ) estimates graphically for all export 
spells to the US. The probability that an export survives beyond the first year 
is 0.56 for upper-middle-income countries, 0.52 for lower-middle-class countries 
and 0.4 for low-income countries. The downside of the Kaplan-Meier estimate is 
that it cannot control for covariates, for which regression results are required, as 
described next. 
It was argued earlier that the use of the Cox proportional hazards model is 
unsuitable to study the duration of exports. I, therefore, formally check for the 
assumption of proportional hazards based on a generalization by Grambsch & 
Therneau (1994). At their core, tests of non-proportionality involve testing whether 
Y in an augmented version of equation 3.3 is zero where covariates are allowed to 
vary according to some function q(.) of time. 
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h ( t ) = h o e x p ( X ( 3 + q ( t ) X Y ) (3-3) 
This is a test of non-zero slope in a generalized linear regression of the scaled 
Schoenfeld (n.d.) residuals on functions of time. The test retrieves the residuals, 
fits a smooth function of time to residuals and examines if there is a relationship 
(Cleves et al. 2008). Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn (2001) summarize the technique 
as one of rescaling the residuals for the kth covariate as in equation 3.4 where 
V^^ represents the contribution to the information matrix. If the assumption of 
constant hazard holds, Schoenfeld residuals should be a random walk over a range 
of survival times showing no relationship between a spell's residual for a particular 
covariate and the length of survival.^^ 
5 u = Pk + S k t V j (3.4) 
A s shown in Table 3 . 13 , the assumption of proportional hazards is rejected for 
all variables. There is no justification for using a proportional hazards model be-
cause the null hypothesis of a constant effect of all covariates on the hazard rate 
is rejected at the 1 percent level. This is not surprising because it is plausible to 
think of several covariates (such as trade preferences, or bilateral distance) that 
can influence the hazard rate (relative risks) of an export spell from one region 
(say, apparel exports from Bangladesh) to not be proportional to another export 
spell from elsewhere (say, semiconductor exports from Costa Rica). 
I reorganize the continuous-time data as in Table 3. 1 to suit a discrete-time 
model. A s shown in Table 3.2, each export spell is expanded so that for every spell 
there are as many observations as there are time periods. A n export spell that is 
22 A smoothed plot of s^j against survival time gives a direct estimate of y in equation 3.3. To then 
test the null hypothesis that the log hazard-ratio function is constant over time, the Stata command 
<estat phtest> is used which automates the process of regressing Schoenfeld and scaled Schoenfeld 
residuals on time. 
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Table 3.1: Data Structure for Continuous-Time Survival Analysis 
Spell ID Spell Length Censor 1st Year Last Year Exporter HS Code Product 
1 2 1 2007 2008 Brazil 293791 Insulin 
28 3 0 1999 2001 China 481620 Paper 
Table 3.2: Data Structure for Discrete-Time Survival Analysis 
Spell ID Death 1st Year Last Year Exporter HS Code Product Covariates 
1 0 2007 2008 Brazil 293791 Insulin X 
1 0 2007 2008 Brazil 293791 Insulin X 
28 0 1999 2001 China 481620 Paper X 
28 0 1999 2001 China 481620 Paper X 
28 I 1999 2001 China 481620 Paper X 
three years long is accorded three rows of data with binary dependent variable 
equaling zero for all years when the export is active or is censored - and unity 
for the last year of the spell when the flow ceases. I then create duration-interval 
specific dummy variables for each year the export is at risk (that is, 12 years during 
the period 1997 to 2008). 
For each unit of more than 420,000 observations, the binary dependent vari-
able on the left hand side is matched on the right hand side by explanatory vari-
ables corresponding to either the first year of the export spell or one year prior. The 
diversification measures and the real exchange rate are lagged one year because 
they are expected to affect the probability of survival the following year. In other 
words, entropy measures for 1997 appear as possible determinants of export sur-
vival in 1998. The unique sophistication scores of products and gravity variables 
are assumed to be time-invariant. GDP, GDP per capita and the dummy for BTA 
vary with time. 
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Following the convention in the literature, I drop all observations with left-
censored spells. This affects 23.3 percent of the spells in the data set.^3 xhe results 
are derived from three discrete-time models (probit, logit, and cloglog). They con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity at the country-industry level by fitting a random 
effects model via maximum likelihood. In a commonly-used statistical software 
like Stata (version 11 .2) this is a highly time-consuming technique because the 
likelihood function is calculated by adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature, and the 
computation time is proportional to the size of the data set. 
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Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the main results with product sophistication measured 
by RFI and PRODY, respectively, in models where diversification is measured by 
both Entropy and HH. Table 3.5 includes as an additional explanatory variable 
the indices of distance between the capital content of products and the national 
endowment point. Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 examine survival probabilities separately 
by manufacturing industries, parts and components, and processed food. Table 3.9 
shows whether the African Growth and Opportunity Act ( A G O A ) has influenced 
the survival performance of African exports in the United States. Tables 3.17 and 
3.18 show results from discrete-time and continuous-time models that do not con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity. Tables 3.19 and 3.20 report results for different 
tests of robustness of results. 
To comment first on the main results, the overall entropy and the market 
entropy coefficients are both highly significant and negatively signed across all 
specifications (Tables 3.3 and 3.4). Increase in the value of entropy indicates de-
23 When observation began in 1997, 39,634 export spells had commenced prior to 1997 (left-censored) 
for which it is impossible to ascertain the time-to-failure as we do not know how long the f low 
existed before w e began to observe. Similarly, 49,982 export spells do not die when our observation 
ends in 2008 (right-censored), and it is unknown for how much longer they survive. 
24 Chapter 19 of Greene (1997) and chapter 1 5 of Wooldridge (2002) explain the random effects probit 
estimator. If u^ is a group specific disturbance in the error term, = v^^ -t- u^, the joint density of 
e u can be obtained by integrating Ui out of the joint density. After much algebraic manipulation, 
the final likelihood function lends itself to be computed using Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
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creased concentration (or increased diversification) which is associated with de-
creased probability of export death. The industry entropy coefficient, however, is 
not statistically significant. This is in contrast to the evidence of Cadot et al. (2011). 
Using firm-level data from four Sub-Saharan African countries, they find that the 
existence of other firms exporting the same product to the same destination raises 
survival p r o b a b i l i t y . ^ ? i fi^d that the coefficient of industry entropy is sensitive to 
the aggregation of industries. When industries are defined more tightly - at the 
SITC 2-digit level instead of the way I do in Table 3.12 - I also find that high indus-
try entropy is positively associated with higher probabilities of export death (that 
is, diversification at the industry level does not aid survival). 
The coefficient of the measures of product sophistication (RFI and PRODY) 
are positive and highly significant across all three discrete-choice specifications 
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The greater the sophistication of exports, the higher the 
probability of export death, suggesting that not all countries are able to achieve 
a successful export of products that require a different mix of factor endowments 
than that supported by the economy. 
Other variables that significantly affect survival include i) prior export expe-
rience; ii) the value of exports in the first year of a spell; and iii) relative real 
exchange rate. If there exists a prior export spell (of the same product from the 
same country) the survivor probability improves significantly on subsequent occa-
sions. Similarly, the higher the initial value of the exports, the more likely is the 
probability that they last long. Initial value partly proxies for the trust, relation-
ships, and networks already established between trading firms. And the negative 
coefficient on the relative real exchange rate suggests that depreciation of an ex-
25 Their conjecture is that this could be because of financial dependence. An increase in the share of 
a particular export product at the SITC 4-digit level (which increases the industry entropy) could 
reflect an increasing number of firms entering the export market. If this is a mark of proven success 
of that particular product, banks are likely to lend more easily, erJiancing chances of survival. Cadot, 
lacovone, Rauch & Pierola (2011) call this a positive synergy/network effect which should help those 
products that are dependent on external (bank) finance. They find support for this conjecture when 
they interact the network effect with a measure of financial dependence adapted from Rajan & 
Zingales (1998). 
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porting country's currency relative to the weighted average of all other competing 
countries aids survival. 
Among the gravity variables, increased physical distance between trading 
countries increases the probability of an export dying. The coefficient of common 
language is barely significant for only one of the models (cloglog). Real GDP of the 
exporting country is a highly significant determinant of export survival, but real 
GDP per capita is not. 
The coefficient of BTA is statistically significant in equations using the entropy 
as a measure of diversification. This suggests that having a BTA in place with the 
United States does help prolong export survival. The evidence on the unilateral 
trade preferences offered by the US is also clear. In Table 3.9,1 include a dummy for 
the presence of trade preferences under AGOA. In the probit model, the coefficient 
of the AGOA variable is negative and significant at the 1 1 percent level and in the 
logit model it is significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that AGOA trade 
preferences are weakly associated with reduced probability of death for exports. 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.9, I look at preferences applicable to the tex-
tile and clothing sector only. This category of manufactured exports from Africa 
saw one of the fastest growth rates in the 2000s. In both the probit and logit mod-
els, I find the coefficient on the dummy for AGOA in T&C products to be highly 
negative and significant, suggesting that unilateral trade preferences are associated 
with increased probability of survival of African exports from the apparel industry. 
However, until the end of 2004, world trade in textile and clothing was restrained 
by quotas. Because many Asian countries invested in Africa to avail themselves of 
the latter's under-utilized quotas, the positive effect on the export of textiles and 
clothing cannot be solely attributed to unilateral trade preferences granted by the 
United States. 
In Table 3.5, I test the comparative advantage hypothesis. Products that em-
body "revealed" capital contents that are farther away from national endowment 
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exhibit a higher probability of death. This is reflected in the high significance of 
coefficients of both measures of distance (Euclidean and Absolute) in the probit 
and logit models. The sign and significance of coefficients of all other variables are 
similar to those in Table 3.3, except for market entropy, BTA, and language. 
So far, only the sign and significance of key covariates are reported, but it 
is not asserted by how much the probability of an export dying changes when co-
variates increase or decrease. This cannot be done just by looking at the probit 
and logit coefficients. Unlike an OLS model that assumes constant marginal effects, 
the parfial effect of a unit increase in one of the covariates depends on all other 
covariates in non-linear models. This is more perilous when interacfion terms are 
involved, as explained in the appendix to this chapter. 
In Table 3.6, I examine the survival probabilities of products disaggregated 
by industry. As in the main results, higher entropy (increased diversification at 
the economy-wide level) is associated with increased survival of exports belong-
ing to all industries except the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
industry, which also appears to benefit more from within-industry concentration of 
products. Market diversification is not an important determinant of survival, ex-
cept for the textile and clothing and ICT industries. For the electrical industry, this 
coefficient is positive, suggesting that concentration of exports in fewer markets is 
associated with longer survival of exports. 
On product sophistication, in the material-based and miscellaneous manufac-
turing (such as scienfific and photographic equipment), higher sophistication is 
associated with lower survival. However, this is not the case in the electrical and 
ICT industries. In chemicals and the machinery/vehicles industries, there is no sys-
tematic association between product sophisfication and survival probability. 
Higher inifial value, presence of a prior spell, and real GDP are all associ-
ated with increased survival probability, as shown in the main results of Table 3.3. 
While relative real exchange rate is not an important determinant for electrical, ma-
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chinery/vehicles, and miscellaneous manufacturing, it aids survival significantly 
in textile/clothing, chemicals, material-based manufacturing and ICT industries. 
Longer bilateral distance lowers survival probability only in the heavy machin-
ery/ vehicles industries, which is as would be expected. The coefficient of Bilateral 
Trade Agreement (BTA) is not significant, except weakly, for the chemicals industry. 
T a b l e 3 . 3 : E x p o r t S u r v i v a l ( R F I , 1 9 9 8 - 2 0 0 8 ) 
( 1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Probit L o g i t C l o g l o g Probit L o g i t C l o g l o g 
E n t r o p y O v e r a l l - . 2 1 1 " * - . 3 3 7 - » - . 2 0 0 " * 
( .019) ( 0 3 3 ) (.023) 
E n t r o p y I n d u s t r y .004 .0 15 . 0 1 1 
( .010) ( .017) ( .012) 
E n t r o p y M a r k e t - . 0 5 6 * " - . 1 2 1 * * * - . 0 8 3 " * 
( .016) (.028) (.020) 
R F I . 2 7 2 " * .218*** • 1 4 5 * " .2.70*** .217*** 
(.009) ( .015) ( .012) (.009) ( .015) ( .0 12) 
Initial V a l u e -.ZJO*** - . 2 1 9 * " - , 1 4 5 " * - . 2 6 9 * " - .2 19*** 
( .001) (.003) (.002) ( .001) (.003) (.002) 
M u l t i p l e Spel l - . 2 2 3 " * - . 4 1 6 " * - • 3 4 3 " * - . 2 2 4 * " - . 4 1 9 - * - • 3 4 5 " * 
(.006) ( .010) (.008) (.006) ( .010) (.008) 
Rea l G D P - . 0 9 5 " * - . 167*** - . 1 2 8 " * - . 1 0 3 " * - . 182*** - . 1 3 7 * -
(.007) ( .0 13) (.009) (.007) ( .012) (.009) 
Real G D P Per C a p i t a .004 -.006 - .0 10 .005 -.004 - . 0 1 0 
( .010) ( .018) ( .0 13) ( .010) ( .018) ( .0 13 ) 
N o r m a l i z e d R E R - .001*** - . 0 0 2 " * - .001*** - .001*** - . 0 0 2 " * - . 0 0 1 " * 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
B T A -.036** - . 0 6 6 " -.075*** - .022 -.042 - .063" '^ 
( .017) (.029) (.022) ( .017) (.029) (.022) 
Dis tance . 0 4 5 - * . 0 8 1 * " •045** .069*** . 1 1 9 * " .O63»" 
( .015) (.027) ( .019) ( .016) (.028) (.020) 
L a n g u a g e .007 .031 .048'^ .026 .058 . 0 6 3 " 
(.022) ( 0 3 9 ) (.027) (.022) (•039) (.027) 
H H O v e r a l l -.502*** - .818*** - • 4 7 5 " * 
(.046) (.080) (•056) 
H H I n d u s t r y -.004 .025 .009 
(•045) (•077) (•053) 
H H M a r k e t - . 3 8 9 * - - . 4 4 1 " - " 
(.065) ( . 1 1 4 ) (•079) 
N o . 4 2 3 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 1 
N o t e 1 : s t a n d a r d er rors in parenthes i s 
N o t e 2: statistical s ign i f i cance ind ica ted a s * for p < o . i , 
N o t e 3: m o d e l s i n c l u d e r a n d o m e f fec t s at the country-
** for p<0 .05 , a n d for p < o . o i 
i n d u s t r y level 
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Table 3.4: Export Survival (PRODY, 1998-2008) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Probit Logit Cloglog Probit Logit Cloglog 
Entropy Overall - . 204*" - . 324-* -.190*** 
(.018) (.032) (.023) 
Entropy Industry -.001 .006 .005 
(.010) (.017) (.012) 
Entropy Market -.054»» - . 1 2 1 " * - .083*" 
(.015) (.027) (.019) 
PRODY .064"* . 1 2 2 * " . 1 0 0 * " .064*** . 1 2 1 * " . 1 0 0 " » 
(.004) (.007) (.006) (.004) (.007) (.006) 
Initial Value -.140*** -.261*** - . 2 1 3 * " -.140*** -.261*** - . 2 1 2 * " 
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Multiple Spell -.219*** - 4 0 7 * " -•337*** - .220"» - . 4 1 0 " * -•339*** 
(.006) (.010) (.008) (.006) (.010) (.008) 
Real G D P - .093*" - . 1 6 3 " * - . 1 2 4 " * - . 1 0 2 * " - . 1 7 9 " * -.134*** 
(.007) (.013) (.009) (.007) (.012) (.009) 
Real G D P Per Capita .003 -.010 -.013 .003 -.009 -.013 
(.010) (.018) (.013) (.010) (.018) (.013) 
Normalized RER -.001*** - .002"» - . 0 0 1 " * - . 0 0 1 * " - .002*" -.001*** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
BTA - . 0 4 1 " - .082*" -.027 -.050* -.069*** 
(.016) (.028) (.021) (.016) (.029) (.021) 
Distance .045*" .080**'^ . 0 4 3 " .069*" .119*** .061*** 
(.015) (.026) (.019) (.016) (.028) (.019) 
Language .002 .023 .042 .020 .049 .056** 
(.022) (.038) (.027) (.022) (.038) (.027) 
H H Overall - .483*" -.781*** -•450*** 
(045) (.078) (•054) 
H H Industry -.014 .007 .002 
(043) (•075) (.052) 
H H Market - . 3 9 1 " * - . 750"* -.442*** 
(.063) ( . 1 1 1 ) (.076) 
No. 447812 447812 447812 447812 447812 447812 
Note i : standard errors in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o. i , for p<0.05, and ' 
Note 3: models include random effects at the country-industry level 
' for p<o.oi 
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Table 3.5: Export Survival (Factor Endowment, 1998-2008) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Euc. Distance (ED) ED*GDP Abs. Distance (AD) AD*GDP 
Probit 
Euc. Distance .053*" .111*** 
(.007) (.040) 
Entropy Overall -•345"* -.342*** -.346*** -.344*** 
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) 
Entropy Industry -.016 -.016 -.016 -.016 
(o i l ) (.011) (Oil) ( o i l ) 
Entropy Market .063"* .061*** .063*** .061*** 
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
RFI .200*" .191*** .200*** .192*** 
(.010) (.012) (.010) (.012) 
Initial Value -.146"* -.146*** -.146*** -.146*** 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Multiple Spell -.206"* -.206*** -.206*** -.206*** 
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Real GDP -.102"-** -.101*** -.102*** -.101*** 
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Real GDP Per Capita .112*** .127*** .111*** .123*** 
(.012) (.016) (.012) (.016) 
Normalized RER -.002*** -.002*** -.002*** -.002*** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
BTA .030 .030 .030 .030 
(.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) 
Distance .039** .039** .040** .040** 
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
Language -.041* -.039* -.042* -.040* 
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) 
Dist*GDP per cap. -.008 
(.006) 
Abs. Distance .038*** •074" 
(.005) (.029) 
Disf^GDP per cap. -.005 
(.004) 
No. 362329 362329 362329 362329 
Note i: standard errors in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i, ** for p<o.o5, and 
Note 3: models include random effects at the country-industry level 
• for p<o.oi 
Table 3.6: Export Survival (Manufactured Exports by Sector, 1998-2008) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Miscellaneous Material-based Textile/Clothing Chemicals Machinery / Vehicles Electricals ICT 
Entropy Overall - . 2 5 4 - - -.170*** -.302*** -.253*** -.149*** -.209** -.370*** 
(.036) (•045) (.049) {.060) (.048) (.083) (•053) 
Entropy Industry .090*** .002 -.032 .064 .014 . 1 14* -.037 
(.023) (.024) (•035) (•046) (.018) (.067) (.041) 
Entropy Market -.002 .001 -.122*** -.003 -.089** .003 .092** 
{.031) (.038) (.038) (.048) (.042) (.072) (.042) 
RFI •275*** .103*** .204*** .002 -.079 .060 -.376*** 
(.019) (.021) (.016) (.027) (.050) (.084) (097) 
Initial Value -.158*** -.146'^** -.149*** -.124*** -.127*** -.139*** -.152*** 
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.007) 
Multiple Spell -.225*** .212*** -.173*** -.257*** -.285*** -.275*** -.243*** 
(.014) (.014) (.012) (,018) (.016) (.031) (.031) 
Real GDP - . 1 10*"* -.121**"' -.050* - .110*** - . 1 16*** -.176*** -.104*** 
(.013) (.016) (.027) (.021) (.017) (.029) (.014) 
Normalized RER -.000 -.001** -.003*** -.002*** -.001 .000 -.000 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
BTA -.025 -.120*** .009 -.097* -.058 .040 - . 1 1 1 
(•039) (.042) (•033) (•057) (.048) (•079) (.071) 
Distance .008 -.006 .021 .043 .034 .097* .031 
(.028) (•033) (•055) (043) (.036) (.058) (.032) 
Language -.047 .000 -.074 -.064 .015 .139* .077* 
(.040) (•047) (.082) (.063) (.052) (•084) (•045) 
No. 77290 70990 1 14855 42635 51038 15238 14675 
Note 1: standard errors in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i , ** for p<0.05, and ^ 
Note 3: models include random effects at the country-industry level 
• for p<o.oi 
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Table 3.7: Export Survival (Parts and Components, 1998-2008) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All Parts Non-Parts All Parts Non-Parts 
Probit Logit 
Entropy Overall -.220»** -.260*** -.217*** -.350*" -•434"* - . 3 4 6 * " 
(.021) (.032) (.023) (.036) (•055) (.040) 
Entropy Industry -.008 -.020 -.009 -.004 -.029 -.006 
( o n ) (.014) (.012) (.018) (.025) (.021) 
Entropy Market -.064''" .051* -.071**'^  -.141*** .084* - . 1 5 1 * " 
(.017) (.027) (.019) (.031) ( 0 4 7 ) ( 0 3 4 ) 
Parts 1 . 0 4 5 - * 
(•159) 
1 . 7 8 5 * " 
(.282) 
RFI .208*** •074* . 1 9 4 - . 3 8 3 " * •159" •357*" 
(.009) (.041) (.010) (.017) ( 0 7 3 ) (.017) 
Parts*RFI -.302*** 
(039) 
- . 5 1 7 * " 
(.069) 
Initial Value - . 1 4 4 - * - . 1 6 0 * " - . 1 4 2 * " -.267*** -.300*** -.262*** 
(.001) (.004) (.002) (.003) (.008) (.003) 
Multiple Spell - . 2 2 1 " * -.279"^ - . 2 1 3 * " - . 4 1 0 * " -.509*** -•397*" 
(.006) (.015) (.007) (.011) (.027) (.012) 
Real GDP - . 0 9 8 " * - . 1 4 1 * " - .O83"» - . 1 7 4 " * - . 2 4 9 " * -.146*** 
(.008) (.010) (.009) (.015) (.017) (.016) 
Real GDP Per Capita .001 .005 .012 - .015 .011 .004 
(.012) (.014) (.013) (.021) (.025) (.023) 
Normalized RER - . 0 0 1 * " -.001 - . 0 0 1 " * -.002*** -.001 -.002*** 
(.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) 
BTA -.038** -.093** -034* -.067** -.153** -.066* 
(.018) (.038) (.020) (.031) (.066) (•034) 
Distance . 0 4 2 " .017 •035* .075** .029 .065* 
(.017) (.021) (.019) (.031) ( 0 3 7 ) (•034) 
Language .007 .047 .008 .033 .091* .035 
(.025) (.030) (.028) (•045) (.052) (•049) 
No. 386721 63534 323187 386721 63534 323187 
Note 1: standard errors in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i, ** for p<0.05, and ^ 
Note 3: models include random effects at the country-industry level 
for p<o.oi 
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Table 3.8: E x p o r t S u r v i v a l ( P r o c e s s e d F o o d , 1998-2008) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All Food Processed Non-Processed All Food Processed Non-P roces sed 
Probi t Logit 
E n t r o p y Overa l l -.095*** - . 1 12** - . 0 8 3 " - . 1 5 5 - - . 1 7 7 - -.138** 
(035) (.047) (039) (059) (.081) (.068) 
Ent ropy I n d u s t r y -.027 .013 -.036 -.050 .016 -.064 
(.022) (034) (.024) (.038) (.058) (.042) 
E n t r o p y M a r k e t -.048» -.067* -.023 -.084* - . 12 1» -.041 
(.029) (039) (•033) (.050) (.067) (.058) 
Processed Food . 167 
(.106) 
.283 
(.188) 
RFl .04i*» -.033 . 0 4 1 " . 0 7 6 " -.048 .075** 
(.018) (.023) (.019) (033) (.041) (.033) 
Processed*RFl -.070** 
(.029) 
- . 1 19** 
(.052) 
Initial Value -.166*** -•174"* - . 1 5 7 * " -.305*** - .322"* -.286*** 
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.007) (.010) (.009) 
Mul t ip l e Spell - . 2 3 4 - * - . 2 3 2 * " - . 2 4 1 * " - . 4 3 1 " * -433*** -•433*" 
(.015) (.020) (.022) (.026) (035) (.038) 
Real G D P -.064*** - .062*" - .064"* - . 1 1 1 *** -.106*** -.110*** 
( o n ) (.015) (.012) (.019) (.025) (.020) 
Real G D P Per Cap i t a .022 .008 .037** .036 .0 1 1 .061** 
(.016) (.022) (.016) (.027) (•038) (.028) 
N o r m a l i z e d RER -.000 -.001 .000 -.000 -.001 .000 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
BTA -.058 -.063 -.090 -.106 - . 1 16 - 1 5 3 
(.038) (049) (055) (.067) (.087) (•097) 
Dis tance . 0 4 1 " * . 047"* .032*'^ .071*** .085"-** •053** 
(.013) (.018) (.015) (.023) (.030) (.025) 
L a n g u a g e -.019 .039 -.050 -.032 .069 -.090 
(.032) (.042) (033) (•054) (.071) (•057) 
N o . 64866 36530 28336 64866 36530 28336 
N o t e 1 : s t a n d a r d e r ro r s in pa r en the s i s 
N o t e 2: s tat ist ical s igni f icance ind ica ted as * for p<o . i , ** for p<0.05, a n d 
N o t e 3: m o d e l s i n c l u d e r a n d o m effects at the c o u n t r y - i n d u s t r y level 
for p<o.o i 
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Table 3.9: Export Survival (Trade Preferences, 1998-2008) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Probit Logit Probit Logit 
All Products Textile and Clothing 
Entropy Overall -.342"* -.311*** -.506*" 
(.019) (033) (049) (.086) 
Entropy Industry .005 .016 -.015 .004 
(.010) (.017) (035) (.061) 
Entropy Market - . 0 5 5 - -.120*** -.237*** 
(.016) (.028) (.038) (.067) 
RFI .272*** .205*" .378-* 
(.009) (.015) (.016) (.028) 
Initial Value -.146*** -.270*** -.150*" -.275*" 
(.001) (.003) (.003) (.005) 
Multiple Spell ... .*** -.414 -.168"* .^22*** 
(.006) (.010) (.012) (.021) 
Real GDP -.096*** -.168*** -.050* -•095** 
(.007) (.013) (.027) (.048) 
Real GDP Per Capita .002 -.010 -.026 -.083 
(.010) (.018) (.036) (.065) 
Normal ized RER -.001^" -.002*** -.003*** -.005*" 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) 
BTA -.036" -.067** .011 .011 
(.017) (.029) (033) (.060) 
A G O A -.028 -.053* 
(.017) (.030) 
Distance .048*" .087'^ ** .034 .054 
(.015) (.027) (.056) (.098) 
Language .012 .041 -.045 -.041 
(.022) (039) (.083) (•145) 
A G O A TC -.118*** -.213*** 
(.038) (.065) 
No. 423251 423251 114855 114855 
Note 1: s tandard errors in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i , ** for p<0.05, and ^  
Note 3: models include r andom effects at the country- industry level 
for p<o.oi 
T a b l e 3 .7 p a r s e s m a n u f a c t u r i n g d a t a a n o t h e r w a y . I c l a s s i f y m a n u f a c t u r e d e x -
p o r t s a s b e l o n g i n g to e i t h e r t h e c a t e g o r y of p a r t s a n d c o m p o n e n t s o r f i n i s h e d 
p r o d u c t s . F r o m c o l u m n 1 , it is c lear that p a r t s a n d c o m p o n e n t s , o n a v e r a g e , h a v e a 
l o w e r p r o b a b i l i t y of s u r v i v a l . T h e i n t e r a c t i o n t e r m b e t w e e n p a r t s a n d RFI, h o w e v e r . 
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is negative and suggests that the probability of death for sophisdcated products is 
lower if the product happens to be a part or a component. One possible reason is 
that the higher sophistication reflected by RFI (or PRODY) is deceptive in the case 
of fragmentation-friendly industries: the export could just embody value-added 
from the final assembly of (high-value) intermediate innards made elsewhere.^^ 
While parts and components behave similarly to non-parts and components 
in terms of variables such as overall diversification, sophistication (RFI), GDP, ini-
tial value, and presence of a prior spell, coefficients of some important variables 
between the two subgroups stand out. For parts and components, the coefficient 
on market entropy is the opposite of that seen for non-parts. This indicates that 
concentration of exports of parts to a narrow range of destinations helps increase 
the probability of survival, possibly through synergy and informational external-
ities emanating from peer exports to those few markets. Coefficients of bilateral 
distance and relative real exchange rate are both insignificant, suggesting that they 
play little or no role in determining how long the export of parts and components 
lasts, unlike their influence on non-parts. These differences would lead us to infer, 
as does Obashi (2010), that the stability of trade in parts and components is driven 
by a different set of c o v a r i a t e s . ^ 7 
In Table 3.8, I group non-fuel primary products into processed and non-
processed food categories. The two categories do not behave differently, except 
on the coefficient of RFI: increase in the sophistication of processed food is not 
associated with decreased probability of survival. Unlike parts and components, 
both processed and unprocessed food stuffs are highly sensitive to bilateral dis-
tance. This is not surprising because food items are perishable. Food items (both 
26 Koopman et al. (2008) esHmate the foreign content in China's exports to be about 50 percent overall, 
and 80 percent in sophisticated products like electronic devices. In 2006/07, nearly 75 percent of 
components imported for machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) by China were from the 
rest of East Asia (Athukorala & Menon 2010). In the iPhone example mentioned earlier, while the 
product is recorded as a sophisticated export from China, imported parts and components from four 
different countries account for 70 percent of the final cost. 
27 Obashi (2010), however, focuses only on machinery exports (SITC 7) within selected Asian countries. 
He also uses the Cox semi-parametric method which Hess & Persson (2011) have argued to be 
unsuitable for analyzing trade data. 
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processed and unprocessed) are also found not to be sensitive to movements in the 
relative exchange rate. 
Before concluding this section, I show in Tables 3.17 and 3.18 results from 
discrete-time and continuous-time models, respectively, that do not control for un-
observed heterogeneity. Standard errors are clustered by exporting country. The 
coefficients in Table 3.17 bear the same sign and significance as in Table 3.3 for 
many important variables such as overall and industry entropy, RFI, initial value of 
exports, multiple spell, and GDP. However, neither the coefficient of market entropy 
nor coefficients of bilateral distance, language, and the relative real exchange rate 
are significant. Curiously, real GDP per capita is positively significant, indicating 
that exports from countries with high income per capita do not last long when all 
other variables are controlled for. This is counter-intuitive and is different from the 
results in models that control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Table 3.18 shows results for Cox PH models. As explained earlier, continuous-
time is a flawed set-up for studying trade duration, but given its widespread use 
in the extant literature, I estimate the relative risks (hazard ratios) for all the main 
variables of interest to gauge the extent of bias. Compared with the main results, 
this specification that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity and assumes 
proportional hazard also confirms that many variables are similarly significant (co-
efficients above unity indicate increased hazard and those below unity reduced 
hazard).^® However, higher income per capita and the presence of the BTA increase 
the probability of export death; bilateral distance and language have no signifi-
cance, and the coefficient of market entropy has a different sign. These results, 
as presented in Tables 3.17 and 3.18, show that inferences differ depending on 
whether unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for or not. 
28 Note that unlike in discrete-time models where each export spell transforms itself into a number 
of observations equaling its duration in years, in a continuous-time model, each observaHon is an 
export spell, so the number of observations is fewer. 
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3 . 8 R O B U S T N E S S 
In this section, I conduct two sets of robustness checks on the results reported 
in Table 3.3. The first set of results in Table 3.19 uses an alternative measure of over-
all export diversification, the Zipf coefficient^? which is explained in Figure 3.6. The 
sign and significance of this alternative measure are similar to those of the overall 
entropy measure in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Here, I also define product sophistication 
as just one of three discrete categories, following Rauch (1999). The results suggest 
that differentiated products - assumed to be more sophisticated than the other two 
categories - have a lower probability of death. However, as already shown in Table 
3.3, when sophistication is measured by a continuous variable like RFI or PRODY, 
increased sophistication increases the probability of death. This finding, which is 
consistent with Besedes & Prusa {2006b), suggests that the association of product 
sophistication with export survival is sensitive to aggregation bias. 
In the second set of robustness tests I ask whether the results change when 
small values of initial exports are dropped. Column 2 in Table 3.20 shows results 
when initial export values below US$10,000 are excluded. Compared with the base-
line estimates in Column 1 of the same table, the sign and significance of all vari-
ables stay unchanged except three: the probability of survival for higher-valued 
exports increase if the exporting nation real GDP per person is higher; but the 
coefficients of BTA and market entropy no longer are. In column 3 , 1 only include 
export spells valued at US$ioo,ooo or more. The same pattern as in Column 2 is 
repeated, except that the market entropy coefficient is now positive and significant. 
Results in these two columns suggest that as export values increase, concentra-
tion in fewer markets appears to prolong the survival of exports. In other words, 
higher-valued exports are more sensitive to informational extenalities derived from 
specific markets. This is also in line with the model of Rauch (1999) where high-
29 This coefficient is obtained by regressing the log (of base 10) of the share in total exports against 
the log of rank of the top 30 exports of each country for each year. This is named after the linguist 
George Kingsley Zipf. Technically, Z ip f ' s law requires the coefficient to be - 1 . In my data set, the 
mean Zipf coefficient across the six regions varies between -0.9 (in South Asia and Eastern Europe) 
to a high of - 1 .73 in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Figure 3.4: Kernel Densities of Export Spells 
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Source: Computed by author from trade data in COMTRADE 
valued shipments reflect more established ties between importers and exporters, 
and they tend to be confined to a few big sourcers in select countries. 
Next, I test whether results are sensitive to the choice of the length of export 
spells. Spells lasting just one year are a dominant category (if not the majority) in 
all samples whether at the country-product or firm-level. Most papers explain very 
short spells as symptomatic of firm failure, or uncertainty and mis-match between 
suppliers and buyers. Murakozy & Bekes (2009) have shown that temporary trade 
(short export spells) is driven by different forces than permanent trade.3° Figure 
3.4 shows Kernel densities of export values in the US data set where the volume 
of transient trade (spell of only one year) is smaller than longer-living trade. 
To explore whether the coefficients of the determinants of export survival are 
different, column 4 of Table 3.20 reports results when the regression is run only on 
export spells that are at least two years long. This set of results, when compared 
30 Besedes & Prusa (20100) cite the example of Brazil where in 1999 the government implemented a 
simplified export procedure for goods valued less than $10,000 through postal or logisHcs operators. 
These low-valued exports tend to survive for very short duraHons. 
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with estimates in column i , shows that the overall and industry entropy are robust 
to alternative lengths of export spells. The market entropy coefficient, however, is 
no longer significant, indicating that as exports get traction in overseas markets 
after surviving the first few years, a country's focus on a narrow range of markets 
no longer becomes a concern. This conjecture is also buttressed by the fact that 
the coefficient of the multiple spell variable is not significant. When higher-valued 
export spells lasting two years or longer are analyzed, the fact that the same export 
spell existed before does not positively affect the chances of survival the second 
time. In such cases we can infer that the likelihood of death of such products is 
because of the product's intrinsic risks, not a lack of exporter experience. 
In column 5 of Table 3.20,1 test for the possibility that an export record that is 
kept in years n and n+2 but not in n+i is a measurement error. Assuming, therefore, 
that two spells of identical product and country separated by only one year are 
not distinct, I adjust trade data in a way that disregards such gaps of one year (to 
restore an otherwise continuous export series). This reduces the number of spells 
of duration modestly, and increases the median export spell to two years. This 
change, however, does not affect the significance of most variables in the original 
model except the coefficients of market entropy and BTA which are significant and 
positive (compare column 5 with column 1 in Table 3.20). This suggests that export 
diversification by destination and the availability of trade preferences matter more 
when countries are seeking a footing in world markets and have fragile export 
lines that are yet to establish durable ties with importers. 
In sum, five of the explanatory variables are consistently associated with in-
creased probability of export survival on average: overall diversification, product 
sophistication in line with comparative advantage, high value of initial exports, 
competitive real exchange rate, and GDP of the exporting country It has to be 
noted that a majority of developing countries that have posted high export growth 
between 1998 and 2008 tend to have a diversified export base (Figure 3.7). 
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Variables with more ambiguous results are as follows. Concentration (not di-
versification) aids survival at the industry-level for some industries (such as ICT). 
The evidence on the concentration of export destinations is mixed. BTAs and uni-
lateral trade preferences like AGOA are generally helpful to export survival, but 
not under scenarios where export spells are longer. Prior export experience is also 
generally helpful to exporters starting small, but not to high-valued exports. And 
unlike high GDP which proxies for the quality of infrastructure and economies 
of scale in the exporting country that aids survival, GDP per capita either has no 
impact, or affects survival probability negatively. In only one instance (export of 
machinery and road vehicles) is higher GDP per capita associated with reduced 
probability of export death. 
3 . 9 C O N C L U S I O N 
This paper sought to explain the cross-national differences in the survival of 
exports through characteristics embodied in products, industries, and countries. 
It improves upon a conventional econometric technique by using data-intensive 
discrete-time models that control for unobserved heterogeneity at the country-
industry level. The literature on trade duration analysis almost exclusively uses 
the continuous-time (Cox) proportional hazard model. I formally test the assump-
tion of proportional hazards and reject it. I show the importance of the choice of 
estimation technique by contrasting the differing statistical inferences drawn from 
continuous-time and discrete-time models. Using an improved methodology, this 
paper contributes to the emerging literature on export survival as follows. 
First, I use new measures of product sophistication to test whether survival 
chances vary by sophistication and distance from a country's "point of compara-
tive advantage." I find the result to be at odds with earlier studies that grouped 
products into only three categories of implied sophistication. My results lend cre-
dence to the hypothesis that countries that attempt to produce goods that are much 
more sophisticated than what their capital endowments support could experience 
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a higher rate of exit from foreign markets than those that rely on products that are 
better aligned with comparative advantage. I show this to be the case by comput-
ing Euclidean distances between each product's factor content and the country's 
point of comparative advantage. 
Second, I examine the role of information externality in export activity, and 
find that exports from countries with a narrow product base do not survive as long 
as countries that are more diversified in the range of products they manufacture. 
However, the evidence on the impact of diversification by export destination, or 
within industries, is mixed. When industries are grouped by broad sectoral levels, 
higher concentration within industry is not systematically associated with survival 
probability, except in a few manufacturing industries like ICT. When industries 
are defined at a more dis-aggregated level (SITC 2-digit), however, intra-industry 
concentration is associated with decreased probability of export death. This points 
towards a different kind of externality - from synergy and networks - among 
products at the intra-industry level. This latter finding at the country-product 
level needs to be probed further with firm-level data as Cadot, lacovone, Rauch 
& Pierola (2011) have done, offering a conjecture on how industry-level concentra-
tion could aid survival by facilitating access to finance for exporting firms. 
Third, I find that parts and components are less sensitive to bilateral distance 
and the relative real exchange rate; and unlike the survival of finished exports, 
concentration of destination markets appears to aid survival of parts and compo-
nents. In contrast, both processed and unprocessed food-stuffs are highly sensitive 
to bilateral distance because of their perishability. In fact, there is little difference 
in the determinants of survival of processed and unprocessed food, except that 
the sophistication of processed food is not associated with decreased probability 
of survival, whereas that of unprocessed food is. 
Fourth, the extent to which unilateral trade preferences and bilateral trade 
agreements, or movements in real exchange rates help export growth is an ongo-
ing issue of debate in development policy This paper shows that bilateral trade 
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agreements and relative real exchange rate policy choices are not trivial; they sig-
nificantly affect the survival probabilities of exports particularly from developing 
countries that are new to the world market and are seeking a foothold. 
A P P E N D I X 
3 .A I N T E R P R E T I N G A N I N T E R A C T I O N E F F E C T 
The partial effect of one particular covariate in probit and logit models depends 
upon all other covariates, evaluated at specific points (their mean, for example). 
From equation 3.6, a small increase in the value of the jth covariate affects the 
probability of an event occurring by 4)(Xb) * bj where 4)(.) is the probability density 
function derived from the cumulative standard normal (!)(.). Because the relation-
ship between the covariates and the dependent variable is not linear, the coefficient 
|3j is not constant. 
a P r ( Y = 1 ) a(D(Xb) ^^  , . , 
^^ = = ci)(Xb)*bj (3.A.1) oXj oXj 
The interpretation of coefficients on interaction terms is even less straightforward. 
In linear regression, the sign of the interaction term is obvious, and the significance 
of the coefficient can be t-tested. This is not so in non-linear regression models.3^ 
In this paper, I ask whether products deemed sophisticated (Soph) have differ-
ent survival rates depending on whether they are a part/component (Part) or a 
finished good. This distinction is important because of the rising importance of 
production networks in world trade. Because the coefficients and standard errors 
for the interaction terms that appear in regression outputs do not tell us defini-
tively about the sign, magnitude, and significance of the interaction effect, they 
have to be calculated separately for specific values of the variables that interest us. 
3 1 Norton et al. (2004) reviewed 72 articles in 13 economics journals published between 1980 and 1999 
that used interaction terms in non-linear models to find that none interpreted the coefficient on the 
interaction term correctly. 
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In fact, an interaction term with a positive coefficient could still lead to an effect 
that is negative. 
9Pr(Y = 1) _ 8 0 (Xb + bsSoph + brPart + b s f S o p h * Part) 
9Soph 9Soph 
= (bs+bsFPart)(D'(.] 
a 2 p r ( Y = 1; 
= (bsF)® ) aSoph aParts 
+ (bF + bsFSoph)(bs + bsFPart)0"( .) (3.A.2) 
Using the formulation in equation 3.A.2 for probit results, I test the signifi-
cance of the interaction term between sophistication and fragmentation at the mean 
values of all continuous covariates (that is, entropy indices, distance, initial value, 
GDP and exchange rate) for countries not party to a bilateral trade agreement 
with the United States. Sophistication, measured by standardized RFI, is a contin-
uous variable and Parts is a dummy. Interaction between the two is the discrete 
difference of the single derivative (with respect to sophistication), as explained in 
Norton et al. (2004). 
A 3 0 ( . ) 
^ ^ = ( b s + b s f ) ® ' { ( ( b s + b s f ) S o p h + Part + X b ) } 
- bsCD'(bsSoph + Xb) (3.A.3) 
This results in a negative and highly significant coefficient for the interaction 
term that shows that the probability of export death for sophisticated products is 
lower if they are a part/component (Table 3.10). 
Table 3.10: Statistical Significance of an Interaction Effect 
Interaction Term Coefficient St. Error z P > Izl 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Parts*RFI -0.0498 0.019 -2.67 0.008 -0.086 to -0.013 
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of Export Sophistication and Survival 
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S o u r c e : C o m p u t e d b y a u t h o r u s i n g t rade d a t a f r o m C O M T R A D E 
a n d RFI d a t a f r o m S h i r o t o r i et al. ( 2010) 
T h e first two graphs in the top panel plot exports from Pakistan with their h u m a n capital content on 
the x-axis and physical capital content on the y-axis. T h e bubble size represents the U S dollar a m o i m t 
of exports in 1997 and 2007. T h e dashed reference lines are median values of revealed h u m a n and 
physical capital for exports (above US$io,ooo) . In both t ime periods, Pakistan biggest export earners 
uti l ized capital way be low util ized by median exports on either dimension. In 2007, the median 
values of capital content increased, and s o m e major exports used more than the median capital. The 
two graphs on the bo t tom panel reflect exports relative to the national e n d o w m e n t points. Between 
1997 and 2007, Pakistan 's h u m a n capital increased from 2.97 to 4.66, but physical capital (per worker) 
d r o p p e d from 12838 to 11614.5. There are several big export earners that existed in 1997 but not in 
2007 that e m b o d y m u c h more capital than the national endowment . At the s a m e time, the majori ty 
of " n e w " exports that were active in 2007, but not a decade earlier, are moderate ly capital-intensive. 
1 3 8 A N A L Y Z I N G T R A D E S U R V I V A L : W H Y DO SO M A N Y E X P O R T S D I E SO E A R L Y ? 
Figure 3.6: Relationship Between Export Rank and Shares 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
.75 
Log of Rank 
East Asia & Pacific 
Latin America & Caribbean Middle East & North Afr ica 
1.5 .75 
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1.5 
Source: Computed by author using C O M T R A D E 
Note 1 : Hollow circles (in green) indicate low-income countries; 
Filled circles (in navy) incficate lower-middle income countries; 
Crosses (in orange) indicate upper-middle income countries 
Each year, the shares of the top exports at the SITC 4-digit level are ranked from i to 30 by value. 
I then compute the Zipf coefficient (of overall export diversification) for each country by regressing 
the log (of base 10) of the export shares on the log of rank. The flatter the regression fit, the more 
diversified is the export portfolio. A perfect compliance with Zipf ' s law follows power law, and 
produces a regression coefficient of -1 (a straight line) where the second-ranked export is half the 
value of the first-ranked export, the third-ranked export is one-third the value of the first-ranked 
export and so on. The countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Middle East appear 
to have the lowest power law coefficient, that is, sharper regression fits and higher concentration of 
the top exports. In contrast. Eastern European countries appear to have the most diversified export 
portfolios, followed by East and South Asia. 
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Figure 3.7: Diversification and Export Performance 
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Note 1: Entropy computed by author from data in COMTRADE 
Note 2: 28 hign growers named 
There is a noticeable correlation between the export performance of countries and the diversification 
of their export base. 1 plot the Entropy measure of overall export diversification (in 2 0 0 6 ) against the 
log of export per capita in 2 0 0 6 - 0 8 . Twenty-eight developing countries (listed in Table 3.15) that I 
select as having met the following criteria of high export performance between 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 and 2 0 0 7 - 0 8 
are highlighted. First, total merchandise exports per person grew at an average annual compound 
rate of at least 10 percent during the lo-year period. Second, non-fuel exports of countries achieved 
an average growth of 10 percent per annum. And third, countries' share of manufactured exports 
relative to GDP did not fall during the period. The majority of the high export performers appear in 
the "preferable" first quadrant with above-median export-per-capita from a well diversified export 
base. The only country in the fourth quadrant - Iran - earns above average export income, but in an 
economy that is less diversified. 
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Table 3.11: Time-to-Death of Exports to the US, 1997-2008 
Region Spell Length (Year) 
Mean Median 
No. of spells KM Survival Rate 
Year 1 Year 6 Y e a r n 
East Asia and Pacific 4.492 1 32361 0.640 0.402 0-355 
Europe and Central Asia 2.705 1 28061 0.494 0.212 0.159 
Latin America 3-353 I 61000 0.541 0.269 0.222 
Middle East and N. Africa 2.526 1 11136 0.471 0.194 0.157 
South Asia 4.017 1 14869 0.607 0.356 0.315 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.212 1 22661 0.405 0.149 0.111 
World 3-315 I 170088 0-535 0.274 0.229 
Note: KM Survival Rate is the probability of survival beyond the specified year 
Table 3.12: Industries Classi f ied b y SITC 
Industry SITC 
1 Miscellaneous manufacturing 8, net of 84 
2 Material-based manufacturing 6, net of 65 
3 Textile and Clothing 65, 84 
4 Chemicals 5 
5 Machinery 7, net of 75, 76, 77, 78 
6 Electricals 77, net of 772 and 776 
7 ICT 75, 76, 772 776 
8 Road vehicles 78 
9 Food, beverages, live animals, tobacco 0, 1, 4, 22, net of 43, 121 
10 Agricultural raw material 121, 2, net of 22 
11 Ores and metals 27, 28, 68 
12 Fuel 3 
Note: Section (i-digit). Division (2-digit), Group (3-digit), Product (4-digit) 
Table 3.13: Test of the Proportional H a z a r d s A s s u m p t i o n 
Concept Explanatory Variable Rho Chi-Squared p-value 
Diversification and Entropy (Overall) -0.049 11521.92 0.000 
sophistication Entropy (Products) -0.033 2190.1 0.000 
Entropy (Markets) 0.041 7696.76 0.000 
RFI -0.035 3360.67 0.000 
Export experience and Initial value -0.019 1641.54 0.000 
competitiveness Multiple spell 0.003 19.2 0.000 
Real GDP -0.039 6908.51 0.000 
Real GDP per capita 0.055 14292.04 0.000 
Relative real exchange rate 0.039 4007.79 0.000 
Bilateral Trade Agreement -0.030 979.09 0.000 
Trade and search costs Distance -0.042 637737 0.000 
Contiguity 0.044 9328.63 0.000 
Common language -0.003 26.94 0.000 
Colony 0.047 8761.58 0.000 
Global test 22355.64 0.000 
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Table 3.14: Description and Source of Variables 
Variable 
(Log of) RFI 
Description 
Revealed Factor Intensity index of each product at the HS 
6-digit level. The index is an equal-weighted average of 
the standardized versions of the Revealed Human 
Capital Intensity index and the Revealed Physical Capital 
Intensity index which are computed as a sum of human 
or physical capital endowments weighted by the ratio of 
the share of the product in a coimtry's export basket to 
the sum of shares of the product in the overall export 
basket of all other countries. The weights add up to 1. 
The human capital endowment is estimated by the 
average years of schooling. The physical capital stock is 
estimated by the perpetual inventory method. Both the 
indices are standardized using the min-max rule to 
convert them onto a scale of o to 100 before being 
averaged to compute a single Revealed Factor Intensity 
index. The final index is then expressed in logarithms. 
Source 
Standardized 
by author 
from RFI data 
computed by 
UNCTAD 
(Log of) PRODY The income content of each product at the HS 6-digit 
level. The index is a weighted sum of the average GDP 
per capita income of ten groups of roughly 15 countries 
each weighted by the ratio of the share of the product in 
a group's export basket to the sum of shares of the 
product in the overall export basket of all income groups. 
The weights sum to 1 and are a variant of the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) index. 
Computed by 
author from 
COMTRADE 
data, 
combining 
methods of 
Lall et al. 
(2006) and 
Hausmann et 
al. (2007) 
Entropy and HH, 
Overall 
Concentration of overall exports by industry. 
Progressively higher values of the index indicate 
decreasing concentration. 
Computed by 
author from 
COMTRADE 
Entropy and HH, 
Industry 
Entropy and HH, 
Markets 
Concentration of exports at the SITC 4-digit level within 
each industry. Concentration of overall exports by 
industry. Progressively higher values of the index 
indicate decreasing concentration. 
Computed by 
author from 
COMTRADE 
Concentration of total exports from each country across 
all their destination markets. Concentration of overall 
exports by industry. Progressively higher values of the 
index indicate decreasing concentration. 
Computed by 
author from 
COMTRADE 
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Zipf Coefficient obtained by regressing log (base lo) of share 
of top 30 exports on the log (base 10) of their rank. A 
coefficient of -1 marks perfect compliance with Zipf 's 
Law which states that the second ranked product is 
worth half the first ranked product, the third ranked 
product is worth one-third the first-ranked product, and 
so on. Coefficients range from approx. -0.5 to -2, with the 
smaller values indicating great dominance of a few 
exports in the country's overall exports. 
Computed by 
author from 
C O M T R A D E 
Euclidean distance 
from comparative 
advantage 
Logged values of the revealed human and physical 
capital indices are subtracted from the national 
endowment to compute differences which are then 
squared and standardized to have mean zero and 
standard deviation of one. The two values for human and 
physical capital differences adjusted this way are then 
summed and square-rooted. 
Computed by 
author from 
U N C T A D 
data set on 
RFIand 
endowments 
Parts and 
components 
Parts are a subset of product categories that are not 
finished or final. Just over 500 of the nearly 4000 
manufactured products have been defined as 
parts/component. Industries at the SITC 2-digit level 
where trade in parts and components exceeds 50 percent 
of total indicates their amenability to global production 
fragmentation. The most conspicuous of these industries 
are ICT (SITC 75+76+772+776) and power generating 
machines (SITC 71). 
Athukorala 
and Menon 
(2010) 
Processed food Processed foods undergo substantial processing in the 
country of origin before being exporting. They are a 
subset of a broader SITC category of food, beverages, 
tobacco, and live animals (SITC Sections 0, 1, 4 and 
Division 22, net of Division 43 and Group 121). 
Athukorala 
and Sen 
(1998) 
Rauch Each product at the SITC 4-digit level (Rev. 2) grouped 
into one of three categories: "homogeneous," 
"reference-priced" and "differenhated." Homogeneous 
goods have generally uniform prices and are traded in 
organized exchanges. Reference prices can be obtained 
from trade publications without knowing the name of the 
manufacturer. Differentiated products vary widely in 
terms of quality and price. 
Rauch (1999) 
(Log of) Initial 
Value 
The value of each product in US dollars at the HS 6-digit 
level during the year an export spell begins. 
C O M T R A D E 
(Log of) Distance Distance in kilometers between two countries using the 
great circle formula which uses latitudes and longitudes 
of each country's most populated cities or official capital. 
CEPII 
Contiguity 1 for pairs of countries that share a border; 0 otherwise. CEPII 
Colony 1 for pairs of countries ever in a colonial relationship; 0 
otherwise. 
CEPII 
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Language 1 if a language is spoken by at least 9 percent of the 
population in both countries; 0 otherwise. 
CEPII 
(Log of) 
Real GDP 
Gross domestic product (constant 2000 US$) for each year 
of observation. 
WDI 
(Log of) 
Real GDP per 
capita 
Gross domestic product per person (constant 2000 US$). WDI 
BTA 1 for a bilateral preferential trade agreement in existence 
between the exporting and importing countries during a 
year of observation; 0 otherwise. 
United States 
Trade 
Representa-
Hve (USTR) 
A G O A 1 for all countries in Africa benefiting from trade 
preferences granted by the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) in the US; 0 otherwise. 
AGOA-TC 1 for all countries in Africa benefiting from the special 
apparel provision of the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) in the US; 0 otherwise. The provision 
accords lenient time-boimd rules-of-origin criteria. 
(Log of) 
Normalized Real 
Exchange Rate 
Each country's real exchange rate vis-a-vis the US Dollar 
and the Euro divided by the weighted average of real 
exchange rates of all other countries also exporting to the 
US and EU. The ratio when logged approximates the 
yearly differences as percentage change in the relative 
real exchange rate. Positive change implies increase in 
competitiveness relative to the currency of other 
countries. The base year for calculation of indices is 2005. 
Computed by 
author from 
CPI and 
nominal 
exchange rate 
data in WDI 
Table 3.15: Developing Countries with High Export Growth, 1998-2008 
Country All Goods (1) Non-fuel (2) Manufactured (3) 
KHM Cambodia 18.98 21.09 2.98 
CHN China 17.82 18.7 1.03 
THA Thailand 10.7 11-37 1.84 
VNM Vietnam 18.85 19.88 2.51 
ALB Albania 19.36 18.85 0.15 
BLR Belarus 15 . 19 12.09 0.28 
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina 17-37 18.23 0.51 
GEO Georgia 20.01 17.27 0.05 
LTU Lithuania 18.58 17.01 0.26 
MKD Macedonia, EYR 10.31 10.63 0-73 
TUR Turkey 15 . 14 16 . 17 0.52 
UKR Ukraine 18.06 16.94 0.78 
BRA Brazil 12.34 13 0.22 
CHL Chile 14 . 13 15-33 0.14 
COL Colombia 10.45 10.27 0.25 
CRI Costa Rica 10.46 12.59 2.26 
NIC Nicaragua 10.87 12.45 1.42 
PER Peru 1 5 . 12 16.43 0.13 
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. 1544 17.85 0-44 
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. 18.05 18.35 0.07 
JOR Jordan 1533 17.97 1.28 
LBN Lebanon 14-54 16 . 1 1 0.46 
TUN Tunisia 10.35 10,33 0.81 
BGD Bangladesh 10. 16 11 .94 0.9 
IND India 15.2 15-73 0.26 
MOZ Mozambique 21.98 23 0.1 
ZAF South Africa 1 1 . 1 4 12.84 0.78 
TGO Togo 1 1 .48 15.22 2,41 
Source: Computed by author from COMTRADE 
Note (1): Per capita average aiinual compound growth rate (%) 
Note (2): average annual compound growth rate (%) 
Note (3): percentage point change in manufactured exports/GDP 
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Table 3.16: Soph i s t i c a t i on Scores of Se lec ted P r o d u c t s 
HIGH SOPHISTICATION SCORES 
HS 6-digit Product Log of RFI 
291242 Aldehyde-ethers, aldehyde-phenols 4-5547 
30212 Salmon/ t rout , fresh 4-5415 
900120 Optical f ibres/plates 4.5050 
871150 Motorcycles, etc. > 8oocc 4.4846 
30263 Other fish, excluding livers 4.4839 
30551 Dried fish (cod) 4.4820 
291250 Cyclic polymers of aldehydes 4.4812 
290721 Polyphenols Resorcinol 4-4735 
681520 Articles of peat 4.4672 
910121 Watches nes prec metal 4.4671 
370241 Photo film roll unexposed 4-4653 
871140 Motorcycles et 500-800CC 4.4586 
370294 Photo film of a width exceeding 16m 4.4560 
370255 Other film, for colour photography 4-4533 
910221 Other wrist-watches 4-4514 
LOW SOPHISTICATION SCORES 
284410 Natural uranium and its compounds 0.1661 
560710 Twine /co rdage / rope /cab le 1.7570 
410612 Tanned goa t /k id leather 1.8341 
920600 Percussion musical instruments 1.8689 
570110 Carpet , knotted, wool /ha i r 1-9953 
460199 Plaits, plaited products 2.0196 
531010 Woven jute, etc., fabrics 2.0961 
30759 Oc topus / squ id , f r z / d r y / s a 2.1746 
70820 Legumes, fresh/chi l led 2.2079 
530710 Jute etc., yarn 2.3162 
630510 Jute etc., sacks /bags 2.3331 
30371 Her r ing / sa rd ine / sp ra t 2.3460 
530720 Multiple (folded) or cabled jute 2.3556 
621420 Shawl scarf of wool or fine animal hair 2.3671 
410620 Prepared goa t /k id leather 2.3872 
Source: Computed by author from the RFI database prepared by Shirotori et al. (2010) 
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Table 3.17: Export Survival (Without Frailty, 1998-2008) 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Probit L o g i t C l o g l o g Probit L o g i t C l o g l o g 
Entropy Overa l l -.201'^** -» « A*** -•344 - . 2 5 0 * " 
(•059) ( . 100) (.070) 
E n t r o p y I n d u s t r y .007 .0 17 . 0 1 1 
( . 0 1 1 ) ( .018) ( .014) 
E n t r o p y M a r k e t .071 . 1 1 8 .087 
(•049) (.084) (.060) 
R F I . 2 1 1 * " • 3 9 4 " * .322*** .209*** . 3 9 0 * " . 3 1 9 ' ^ " 
(.025) (.040) (.029) (.025) (.040) (.029) 
Initial Va lue - . 1 3 9 * " - .258*** - . 2 1 1 **» - • 139*** - . 2 5 9 " * - . 2 1 2 * * * 
(.004) (.009) (.009) (.004) (.009) (.009) 
M u l t i p l e spell - . 2 3 3 * - -•434 - . 3 5 6 * " - .232*** - . 4 3 2 " * -•355*** 
( .019) (.029) (.020) ( .019) (.029) (.020) 
Real G D P -.092*** - . 1 6 0 " * - . 1 2 3 » " -.088*** - . 1 5 3 - * - . 1 1 8 * " 
( .012) (.022) ( .018) ( .012) (.022) ( .017) 
Rea l G D P Per C a p i t a • 0 4 9 " .082** . 0 6 1 " .048** .081** .060** 
(.019) (•034) (•025) (.020) (•034) (.026) 
N o r m a l i z e d R E R - .001 -.001 -.000 - .001 -.002 -.000 
(.001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) 
B T A -.096** - . 1 6 8 " - . 1 3 3 - -.095** - . 166** -.132*'^* 
(.042) (•074) (.056) (•039) (.068) ( .051) 
Dis tance - .030 -.048 -.036 - .022 - .033 - .024 
(.028) (•047) (.033) (.032) (•053) (.036) 
L a n g u a g e .007 .021 .021 .026 .054 .047 
(.038) (.066) (.050) (.038) (.066) (.050) 
H H Overa l l - . 4 8 4 " * -.825»*» - . 5 8 9 - * 
( . 129) ( •217) ( • 147) 
H H I n d u s t r y -.024 - .021 -.020 
(•059) (•099) (.070) 
H H M a r k e t . 1 56 .246 . 1 8 1 
(•173) ( .291) (•199) 
N o . 4 2 3 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 1 4 2 3 2 5 1 
N o t e 1: s t a n d a r d errors in parenthes i s 
N o t e 2: statistical s igni f icance indicated as * for p < o . i , ** for p<0 .03 , a n d for p < o . o i 
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M o d e l , 1997-2008) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Entropy H H Ent ropy H H 
Censo red U n c e n s o r e d 
En t ropy Overa l l .867*** .811*** 
(037) (.046) 
Ent ropy I n d u s t r y 1.012 1.016 
(.010) (.012) 
Ent ropy M a r k e t 1.032 1 .108" 
(.040) (057) 
RFl 1 .173"* I.172**» 1 .323*" 1.319*** 
(.022) (.022) (.031) (.031) 
Initial Value .910*** .910*" .812*** .811*** 
(.003) (.003) (.009) (.009) 
Real G D P .938*" •939*" .897"* .902*** 
(.011) ( o i l ) (.013) (.013) 
Real G D P Per Cap i ta 1.030 1.030 1.062*** 1.063*** 
(.019) (.019) (.023) (.024) 
N o r m a l i z e d RER 1.001* 1.001* 1.003*** 1.003*** 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
BTA .879*- .881*** .898** .896** 
(.031) (.029) (049) (.044) 
Dis tance .978 .984 .963 .980 
(.022) (.024) (.026) (.029) 
L a n g u a g e 1.039 1.052 1.001 1.028 
(•037) (.036) (039) (.042) 
H H Overal l •705*" .623*** 
(.067) (.071) 
H H I n d u s t r y 1.022 1.029 
(045) (054) 
H H M a r k e t 1.045 1.208 
(•131) (193) 
No. 100293 100293 132088 132088 
N o t e 1: s t a n d a r d e r rors in pa ren thes i s 
N o t e 2: statistical s ignif icance ind ica ted as for p < o . i . ** for p<0.05, a n d *** for p<o .o i 
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Table 3.19: Export Survival (Robustness Tests I) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Probit Logit Cloglog Probit Logit Cloglog 
Zipf Coefficient -.141*** -.107*** -.121*** -.165*** -.081*** 
(.022) (.038) (.027) (.022) (.038) (.027) 
Entropy Industry -.002 .003 .004 -.007 -.005 -.001 
(.010) (.017) (.012) (.010) (.017) (.012) 
Entropy Market -.095-* -.187*** -.125*** -.106*** -.208*** -.141*** 
(.015) (.027) (.019) (.016) (.027) (.019) 
RFI .145"* 
(.009) 
.269*" 
(.015) 
.216*** 
(.012) 
Initial Value -.146*** -.270*** -.219"* -.145*- -.268"* -.218*" 
(.001) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Multiple spell -.223"* -.415"* -.341"* -.218*" -.404-* -.335*-
(.006) (.010) (.008) (.006) (.010) (.008) 
Real GDP -.088"'^ -.156"* -.122*** -.085*** -.152*** - .118*" 
(.007) (.013) (.009) (.008) (.014) (.010) 
Real GDP Per Capita -.011 -033* -.028** -.015 -.041" -.035** 
(.010) (.018) (.013) (•oil) (.019) (.014) 
Normal ized RER -.001*** -.002*** -.001"* -.002*"'* -.002*** -.001"* 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
BTA -.042" -.076"* -.080*** -.044*** -.077*** -.080*** 
(.017) (.029) (.022) (.016) (.028) (.021) 
Distance .044-* .o8o»" .046" .046*" .083*** •045" 
(.015) (.027) (.019) (.017) (.029) (.021) 
Language .020 .054 .064** .014 .045 .056* 
(.022) (039) (.028) (.024) (.042) (.030) 
Rauch -.154*** 
(.006) 
-.264*" 
(•oil) 
-.191*** 
(.008) 
No. 423251 423251 423251 447817 447817 447817 
Note 1: s tandard errors in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o. i , ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<o.oi 
Note 3: models include r andom effects at the country- industry level 
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; Tests II) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline Value>ioK Value>iooK Spell>2 yrs. Gap Adjusted 
Entropy Overall -.211*** -.283*** . .369-* -.261*** - .298"* 
(.019) (.023) (•035) (.024) (.019) 
Entropy Industry .004 -.001 -,013 -.003 -.002 
(.010) (.012) (.017) (.012) (.010) 
Entropy Market - .056"* .001 . 121*** .008 .047*** 
(.016) (.019) (.028) (.019) (.016) 
RFI . 1 4 7 * - . 1 3 2 * " .102*** . 1 3 5 - * . 1 54" ' ' 
(.009) (•oil) (.018) (•oil) (.009) 
Initial Value - . 1 4 5 - * - . 1 5 7 * " -.156*** - . 1 3 8 * " 
(.001) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.001) 
Multiple spell -.223*** -.156*** .070*** - .01 1 - . 1 6 5 " * 
(.006) (.008) (.015) (.008) (.007) 
Real GDP -.095"* -.095"* - . 106*" - .078"* - . 100"* 
(.007) (.008) ( o i l ) (.008) (.007) 
Real GDP Per Capita .004 .048*** .096"* .049"* .053*** 
(.010) (.012) (.016) (.012) (.010) 
Normalized RER - .001 "* -.002"» -.003*'^* -.003*** -.002*** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
BTA -.036»» .012 .050 .000 .039-
(•017) (.021) (.036) (.022) (.017) 
Distance .045-* •045*" .015 .022 .021 
(.015) (.017) (.023) (.017) (.015) 
Language .007 -.016 -.052 -.020 -.058*** 
(.022) (.024) (•033) (.024) (.022) 
No. 423251 317256 177037 362516 423217 
Note 1: standard errors in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i, ** for p<0.05, and ^ 
Note 3: models include random effects at the country-industry level 
• for p<o.oi 
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C O O R D I N A T I N G T A X R E F O R M S : C A N L O S T T A R I F F S B E 
R E C O U P E D ? 
"Import tariffs should generally be ranked between four and twenty 
percent ad valorem intended for [the monarch's] revenue rather than 
for trade limitation." 
- Kauti lya , Arthashastra, circa 300 BC^ 
"Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence 
from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable admin-
istration of justice." 
- A d a m Smith, quoted in the Collected Works ofDugald Stewart, 1755^ 
4 . 1 I N T R O D U C T I O N 
This paper analyzes the immediate revenue implications of trade and domes-
tic tax reforms. The emphasis on "immediate" is important because over the long 
run, a less distorted economy allocates resources better and is likely to contribute 
to economic growth that widens the tax base. Liberalization thereby pays for itself 
over time. Even in the short run it is not always the case that tariff cuts automat-
ically lead to revenue losses (Greenaway & Milner iggi).^ However, if the imme-
1 See Waldauer et al. (1996) 
2 See section IV of Stewart (1755), emphasis added. 
3 This depends on the price elasticity of imports and exports, as well as the ability of the economy and 
tax administrations to respond to altered incentives. Lowered tariffs reduce the incentive to smuggle 
and bring goods through the informal channels. Lower tariffs also stimulate increased imports. The 
nature of trade liberalization also matters: while a gradually reforming country with a moderate 
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diate cost of potential revenue loss is not addressed, trade reforms are not only 
unlikely to be undertaken, but they can be promptly reversed: Buffie (2001) cites at 
least 12 episodes where revenue shortfalls triggered partial or full policy reversals 
in recent decades.4 
The conventional wisdom imparted in tax policy advice to developing coun-
tries over the past 30 years has been that domestic consumption or income taxes 
are superior to trade taxes because the former can meet the government's revenue 
target with lower rates, a wider base, and without a protectionist bias. This is un-
derpinned by economic theory. Trade taxes introduce a wedge between foreign and 
national prices which distort the allocation of resources by encouraging activities 
in sectors that are viable only at prices above the world average. Dixit (1985) shows 
that small, open economies are better off reducing tariffs to zero and depending 
instead on destination-based consumption taxes. 
As countries build capacities to extract tax revenue from income and domes-
tic consumption, the importance of trade taxes as a source of government finance 
tends to decline.5 Figure 4.1 depicts this starkly with trade taxes being a substantial 
portion of total tax revenues relative to GDP in low-income countries, but negligible 
in high-income countries. In the 1950s, developing countries that are today classi-
fied as middle-income such as Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka 
and Thailand derived more than 40 percent of government revenue from trade 
taxes (Lewis 1963; Corden 1997). By 1989, import duties as a share of total tax rev-
enue in developing countries were nearly 25 percent, on average, but in developed 
range of tariffs may lose revenue when it cuts them below a certain threshold, others that are still in 
the process of converting quotas into tariffs could have a revenue windfall. 
4 Philippines (1991), Kenya (1983), Morocco (1987), Guinea (1990, 1992), Bangladesh (late 1980s), 
Malawi (1980s), Senegal (after 1989), Costa Rica (1995), Mexico (1995), Brazil (1995), Colombia (1996).' 
5 Corden (1997) offers reasons why trade taxes become a less important source of government revenue 
as countries become rich: i) collection costs of non-trade tax like income fall; ii) the capacity of man-
ufactured import-competing industries improve reducing the need for tariffs for either protection or 
revenue; iii) as imports evolve from being associated with luxury to becoming part of the general 
population's consumption basket, the progressive tax function played by tariffs diminishes; and iv) 
the pattern of imports shifts away from final consumer goods to intermediate and capital goods 
because tariffs on intermediate goods lower effective protection for final goods, and are therefore 
likely to be reduced. 
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Figure 4.1: Contribution of Trade Taxes to Total Tax Revenue 
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Source: Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) 
Note 1; Each dot is a five-yearly average between 1982 and 2006 
Note 2: The only high income country in the sample with the ratio of trade tax to 
total tax revenue exceeding 0.2 is Kuwait 
countries only 2.7 percent (Burgess & Stern 1993). In 2009, customs and other im-
port duties still accounted for more than 10 percent of tax revenue in at least 24 
countries. A majority of countries that rely excessively on trade taxes belong to 
the group of 48 poor nations classified by the United Nations as Least Developed 
C o u n t r i e s (LDC).^ 
However, if countries embark on a path of rapid trade liberalization without 
finding adequate sources of alternative domestic revenue, they can face hard fiscal 
constraints. Table 4.16 lists 40 low-income countries (studied in the next section) 
and compares the collection of both total and trade taxes relative to GDP across 
two decades. Of the 22 low-income countries that collected a lower tax revenue as a 
share of GDP in 2002-06 than in 1982-86, 21 (except Nigeria) also had a lower trade 
tax as a share of GDP in the most recent period7 Only 12 relied less on trade tax 
6 See United Nations (2011). This group includes 33 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, 14 from the 
Asia-Pacific and one from the Caribbean. Fifteen of them are landlocked and nine are small island 
states. 
7 For five countries indicated in Table 4.16, the most recent period is 1997-2001. 
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while increasing their overall tax revenue collection. The remaining six increased 
both their trade tax and total tax collection. 
Many low-income countries have not reached a development threshold where 
they can rely more on sophisticated tax instruments. They have weak tax adminis-
trations, as well as large informal sectors (with unrecorded or illicit transactions), 
narrowing the tax base.® Trade taxes also involve a lower cost of collection than 
other taxes. Such costs, as emphasized by Corden (1997), include i) administrative 
costs of the tax-collecting agency and ii) resource costs and distortions incurred by 
taxpayers to minimize or evade payments, which if substantial could render trade 
taxes part of a first-besi tax package. 
In this paper, I combine trade theory, cross-country evidence, and an in-depth 
case study of a low-income country, Nepal, using a unique data set on all import 
transactions at the border.^ I find that low-income countries have had a mixed 
record of achievement in offsetting reductions in trade tax revenue. This is partly 
because of their weak enforcement of domestic taxes like VAT. In principle, a strict 
enforcement of a positive, single-rated VAT with no exemptions is a highly effective 
form of modern taxation, and can negate substantial losses in tariff revenue. I 
confirm this by using a partial equilibrium model to simulate reforms using data 
from Nepal on tariffs and up to ten addihonal domestic taxes imposed on more 
than 400,000 import transactions between January 1 and December 31, 2008.^ ° 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 uses panel data from selected low-
income countries to assess whether they have succeeded in replacing trade taxes 
with domestic sources over a period of 25 years. Given the limitations for country-
specific policy inference from cross-country regressions, section 4.3 covers a coun-
8 B u e h n & Schneider (2007) est imated the size of the informal sector to be 35.5 percent of official G D P , 
o n average, in 76 d e v e l o p i n g countries, 36.7 percent in 19 transition countries, a n d 15.5 percent in 
25 O E C D countries in 2004-05. T h e b u r d e n of taxaHon is one of the factors that drives activittes to 
b e c o m e unoff ic ial and unreported. 
9 " B o r d e r " in this p a p e r refers to a generic port of enh-y. In m a n y countries, a substantial share of 
i m p o r t s arrives by air into cities that m a y not technically be on the border. 
10 In 2009-10, 22.5 percent of the government ' s tax revenue w a s generated f r o m tariffs o n i m p o r t s 
( G o v e r n m e n t of N e p a l 2011). 
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try case study. It begins by adapting conditions for welfare-enhancing tariff cuts to 
a revenue-enhancing result from a coordinated tariff and tax reform in the presence 
of an informal sector. Two sets of plausible policy reforms are then simulated: i) 
different tariff cutting approaches are matched by domestic tax reforms with and 
without the assumption of a large informal sector; and ii) tariffs and other discrim-
inatory charges on imports from members party to the Agreement on the South 
Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) are eliminated with and without Sensitive Lists that 
exempt a subset of products from tariff cuts . " I check for robustness of results with 
different parameter assumptions of elasticities for product substitution among ex-
porters, between exporters and domestic producers, and overall demand. Section 
4.4 highlights two additional aspects of tariff reform. Section 4.5 concludes. 
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To set the stage for a detailed country case study, I examine in this section the 
cross-national evidence from a sample of 40 low-income countries on their record 
of replacing trade taxes with domestic sources over time. As trade taxes as a share 
of GDP have altered, how have poor countries fared in terms of domestic tax col-
lection? In other words, for every dollar "lost" in trade taxes, how many cents 
have they recouped through domestic sources? A cross-national estimation of this 
nature requires a dynamic panel regression involving detailed tax data that are 
not always publicly available. I, therefore, use internally compiled IMF data and 
the estimation strategy of Baunsgaard & Keen (2010). I make three major changes 
to their data and specification (explained later) to derive results for revenue re-
covery by low-income countries that are comparable to, if not stronger than the 
estimations in Baunsgaard and Keen (2005, 2010). 
1 1 Note that tariff cuts often take place as part of a broader package of trade policy reforms. Liber-
alizaHon of trade policy implies more than tariff cuts, for example, the conversion of quotas into 
tariffs, elimination of tariff exemptions and trade-related subsidies, reform of state-trading monop-
olies, raising of low tariffs, elimination of export taxes, removal of foreign exchange rationing and 
import licensing regimes, among others. Often these are coupled with macro-economic reforms to 
influence exchange rates, inflation, and incentives for investment. 
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4.2.1 Econometric Model 
The basic econometric specification is as in equation 4.1. The dependent vari-
able is total domestic tax revenue (net of trade taxes) as a share of G D P (DTit). 
Subscripts i and t indicate country and time, respectively. The main explanatory 
variable of interest is trade tax revenue relahve to G D P (TT^). If its coefficient |31 is 
significantly negative, it can be concluded that a fall in trade taxes has been associ-
ated with a rise in non-trade tax revenue. In the long term, the relevant coefficient 
(i~ p'o)- country-fixed effects are captured by ^t and a i . 
DTit = ai + (3oDTit-i + Pi TT^ + |3^Xi,-H Ht + Cit (4.1) 
The control variables (X^J are those that affect either the costliness of rais-
ing revenue from non-trade sources or the valuation of public expenditure. If the 
marginal value of public expenditures foregone with lost trade taxes is high, the 
urgency to seek alternative sources is greater. The control variabes are: 
• G D P per capita: demand for government expenditures increases as average 
incomes of citizens grow (Wagner's Law). G D P per capita also proxies for 
administrative and institutional capacity in the country to collect and manage 
taxes. (Institutional capacity is proxied better by measures of the quality of 
governance like the WGI, but their cross-national time-series does not g o as 
far back as the 1980s.) 
• Imports: it is the share of total imports relative to G D P It captures "openness" 
of the economy as well as the fact that imports are a substantial part of 
the domestic tax base in poor countries. Baunsgaard & Keen (2010) use for 
openness a slightly broader measure: the share of exports and imports in 
G D P citing Rodrik (1998) w h o finds this measure of openness to be closely 
associated wi th the size of government. 
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• Natural resources per capita: two measures are introduced as important con-
trols to capture the fact that states that derive a large share of revenues from 
natural resources do not need to tax their citizens highly (Ross 2001). 
• Foreign aid as a share of national income: this could have a perverse effect 
on the urgency of finding an alternative source of domestic revenue. 
• Share of agriculture in GDP: this measures the size of the economy that is 
hard to tax, as well as the degree of informality prevailing in the economy. 
• Inflation: reflects the extent to which revenue is generated from seigniorage, 
which needs to be controlled for. 
• VAT: a modern VAT regime that is strictly enforced is associated with in-
creased domestic revenue collection; however, a weakly enforced VAT system 
with widespread exemptions could be revenue-reducing compared to taxes 
collected at fixed border points. 
4.2.2 Data 
The IMF's Government Finance Statistics is the best publicly accessible source 
for cross-country data on tax revenue, but it is incomplete and suffers from mis-
measurement. I therefore use the same panel data as that used by Baunsgaard 
& Keen (2010) who adjust the GFS data by cross-checking numbers with internal 
IMF figures obtained through ("Article IV") consultations with individual coun-
tries. They try to correct a common flaw in many countries where tariff and VAT 
revenues are conflated if they are both collected at the border. This would be prob-
lematic for the exercise in this paper because the aim is to find out whether decline 
in tariff revenues are made up for by domestic sources like VAT and excise. 
I make three modifications to Baunsgaard and Keen's data set. First, their data 
on VAT is only a binary variable of whether the country had VAT in place in the 
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year concerned. I use in its place actual ad valorem rates, compiled from three 
different sources as follows: Krever (2008), Ernst & Young (2008) and World Bank 
201 ifl. Second, I confine my analysis to 40 low-income countries over a shorter 
time period of 25 years, from 1982 to 2006.^ ^ Third, I use two new measures for 
a country's abundance in natural resources as an additional explanatory variable. 
The first measure is the per capita natural resource-based exports (belonging to 
SITC Section 3 and Division 27, 28 and 6 8 ) . E x p o r t s , however, could be mislead-
ing as a measure of natural resource abundance because a country that is too poor 
to consume its own natural resources exports much of its output, compared with 
a richer country which exports less but produces just as much. Therefore, I also 
use a second measure - oil and gas rents per capita - taken from the World Bank's 
Adjusted Net Savings data center. 
4.2.3 Estimation Method 
I use four different estimation methods. The first method uses the fixed ef-
fects "within" estimator in equation 4.1 where the dependent variable - domestic 
taxes (net of trade taxes) - is regressed on a set of explanatory variables explained 
earlier. The fixed effects model removes the correlation between time-invariant un-
observed effects and the explanatory variables. The main explanatory variable -
tax revenue as a share of GDP - is, however, possibly endogenous. Both the col-
lection of non-trade tax and trade tax revenues could, for example, be driven by a 
reformed customs administration. 
The second method, therefore, addresses the potential endogeneity of trade 
tax by using instrumental variables which are its own first and second lags. De-
12 Five countries drop out of the regression because of incomplete data on inflation and per capita 
income, as follows: Comoros, Guinea, Myanmar, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Solomon Islands. 
13 These are primarily fuel, metals, and ores, whose total export values for the years 1982-2006 I ob-
tamed from partner country records in COMTRADE. Because the values are inclusive of cost, insur-
Z L 'heir f.o.b. 
14 See Bolt et al. (2002). 
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spite these corrections, a bigger problem in the first two models as specified in 
equation 4.1 is that the presence of the lagged dependent variable as one of the ex-
planatory variables regressor (DTit-i) renders the esHmates inconsistent because 
of its correlation with the fixed effect, causing a dynamic panel bias (Nickell 1981). 
There could also be serial correlation in the error term. Roodman (2009) offers a 
useful guide on the use of dynamic panel estimators in these s i t u a t i o n s . 
In the third method, I use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) esti-
mation method of Arellano & Bond (1991). Equation 4.1 is first-differenced as in 
equation 4.2 to control for unobserved effects; lagged dependent and explanatory 
variables are used as instruments. 
ADTu = | 3 o A D T u - i + | 3 i A T T u + |3^AXi, + A^t + A e u (4-2) 
The regression equation in differences (equation 4.2), however, is not satisfactory 
when the explanatory variables are persistent over time. In such situations, lagged 
levels of these variables are poor instruments, leading to biased coefficients (finite 
sample bias). An improved option is to use the linear GMM estimator of Arel-
lano & Bover (1995) which combines the regression equation in differences and 
the regression equation in levels into one system (System GMM). In this method, 
bias is reduced by including more informative moment conditions. As explained 
by Blundell & Bond (2000), the equation in levels uses lagged first differences as 
instruments and the equation in first differences uses lagged levels as instruments. 
Next, I report results obtained from all four estimation methods. 
1 5 Roodman (2009) states that dynamic panel estimators are suitable in the following sihiations: (i) 
panels that have a relatively small number of years but large number of countries; (ii) the depen-
dent variable is affected by its own past realization; (iii) some explanatory variables are not strictly 
exogenous; (iv) there are fixed (country) effects; and (v) there is heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion within countries. My data and model satisfy all these criteria, thus justifying the use of G M M 
estimators. This approach is also taken by Baunsgaard & Keen (2010). 
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4.2.4 Results 
C o l u m n 1 of Table 4.1 reports the fixed effects estimates of the m o d e l . T h e 
coefficient of trade taxes is not statistically significant, suggest ing that the sample 
of 35 low-income countries included in the regression w a s not able to recoup lost 
trade tariffs wi th increase in domestic taxes. The coefficient on long term replace-
ment (uj) is also not significant.^7 
C o l u m n 2 reports Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates from the Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) model on equation 4.1. The coefficient on trade tax is negative 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. A l t h o u g h both trade tax and 
domestic tax variables are expressed relative to GDP, for a clearer insight into the 
magnitude of this coefficient, it could be said that for every dollar lost on trade 
taxes, low-income countries have recouped nearly 25 cents in the short run. In the 
long run, as indicated by w, the recovery rate per dollar is nearly 74 cents. 
The estimates in column 3 (Difference GMM) show that there is a large recov-
ery of trade tax in the short run (nearly 79 cents for each dollar lost) but not in the 
long term. This coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level, but it is likely to 
be biased. This is generally detected if the size of the coefficient of the lagged de-
pendent variable obtained under a first-differenced G M M is smaller that obtained 
under the fixed effects model. 
In column 4 (System GMM), the coefficient on short-term recovery is statisti-
cally significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that low-income countries re-
couped nearly 46 cents in the dollar.^® Furthermore, the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable in System GMM lies between those obtained under fixed effects 
16 H a u s m a n specif ication test rejects the a s s u m p t i o n of r a n d o m effects. 
17 This is T h e statistical s ignif icance of such a combinat ion of coeff icients is ca lculated b y the 
"del ta m e t h o d " in Stata. 
18 T h e coeff icient for long-term replacement is v e r y high, at 2.18, but it is on ly s ignif icant at the 25 
percent level. 
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Table 4.1: Tax Recovery in Low-Income Countries, 1982-2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FE IV Diff. GMM System GMM 
Lagged Total Tax Revenue •694"* .665"* .830"* .758"* 
(034) (.041) ( 1 1 5 ) (.128) (.082) 
Trade Tax Revenue -.045 - . 249- -.789* - . 4 5 7 - * -.320** 
(•069) (.103) (•442) (155) (.126) 
Share of Imports in GDP .036** .044-* .078*** .066* .o66»" 
(.014) (.016) (.030) (037) (.019) 
Natural Resources Exports Per Capita -.070 -.067 -.061 .023 
(.080) (•073) (.108) (•504) 
Oil and Gas Rent Per Capita .010 
(.083) 
Share of Agriculture in GDP -.041* -.046** -.120*»' -.044 -.049* 
(.023) (.020) (.040) (•511) (.026) 
Share of Aid in GDP -.010 -.003 -.001 -.027 -.020 
(.009) (.010) (.022) (•132) (.014) 
Log of Inflation .017 .046 -.165 .035 .080 
( 125) (.114) (.160) (•733) ( 1 1 7 ) 
Log of Per Capita GDP -•371 -.071 1.705 -.822 -•545 
(.630) (.609) (2.699) (15-637) (•771) 
VAT .026* .027** .051*" .027 .006 
(.013) (.013) (.019) (135) (.019) 
Long term replacement (cu) 0.148 0 .74* " 2.31 2.69 1.32*** 
(0.225) (0.241) (1-43) (2.62) (0.638) 
Serial correlation (1st order) -3 .24*- -3.05»*» .J22*** 
Serial correlation (2nd order) 0.44 0.77 0.61 
No. of observations 645 643 567 645 672 
Adj. R-sq. .87 .86 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of countries 35 35 35 35 35 
No. of instruments 35 35 35 38 38 
Note 1: robust standard errors in parenthesis 
Note 2: statistical significance indicated as * for p<o.i, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<o.oi 
Note 3: coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in an OLS model (not shown) is 0.89 
I 6 2 C O O R D I N A T I N G T A X R E F O R M S : C A N L O S T T A R I F F S BE R E C O U P E D ? 
(0.69) and OLS estimations (not reported, but the coefficient is 0 . 8 9 ) . ^ ^ xhe tests 
of autocorrelation show that first order serial correlation is present but the second 
order serial correlation is not, as expected. These checks for the appropriateness of 
the model specification are in line with what Baunsgaard & Keen (2010) show. 
Finally, column 5 reports System G M M estimates with oil and gas rent per 
capita as a control for natural resource wealth instead of the export per capita of 
oil, gas, ores, and metals that was used in column 4. The coefficient of short-term 
recovery of 32 cents to the dollar is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In 
this regression, the coefficient of the long-term recovery (US$1.32 for every dollar) 
is also highly significant. 
In sum, the System G M M estimates of tax recovery - between 32 and 46 cents 
to the dollar in the short run, and 132 cents to the dollar in the long run - are 
higher than those found in two previous studies with different specifications and 
years under consideration. Baunsgaard & Keen (2010) found a recovery rate of 
between 20 and 25 cents for low-income countries, and Baunsgaard & Keen (2005) 
found for only one of the models a recovery estimate of about 30 cents for each 
dollar lost. 
The IV and the Difference G M M models also find the VAT coefficient to be 
statistically significant, that is, it was associated with fast positive tax recovery. The 
VAT coefficient, however, is not significant in the System G M M regressions. That 
the significance of coefficients of all VAT dummies is not consistently stronger 
leads to the inference that not all VAT regimes are alike. A n attempt to assess the 
role of VAT regimes in revenue recovery by just looking at the applied ad valorem 
rate is perhaps incomplete. Their efficacy depends crucially on how they have been 
introduced along the following dimensions: i) the number and level of the rates; 
ii) share of products that are exempted; iii) income threshold above which the tax 
19 This is reassuring because the OLS estimates are biased upwards and the fixed effects estimates are 
biased downwards. 
4 - 2 C R O S S - C O U N T R Y E V I D E N C E ON R E V E N U E R E C O V E R Y 1 6 3 
applies; iv) coverage of the retail sector and services; and v) effectiveness of the 
refund system (Keen & Lockwood 2010).^° 
Among other variables, total imports relative to GDP (a proxy for openness) 
are consistently associated with high rates of domestic tax collection. This is not 
surprising because imports are a significant part of the VAT base in low-income 
economies. Contrary to expectations, coefficients of variables measuring natural 
resource abundance are not significant in any of the estimations. Coefficients of 
inflation and overseas aid are not statistically significant, whereas those on per 
capita income and the share of agriculture have the expected signs in selected 
regressions. 
There are caveats to this analysis. In addition to the methodological complex-
ity in asserting a precise relationship between lost trade taxes and domestic taxes, 
all indirect effects through which control variables like GDP or openness may gen-
erate tax revenue over the long run are not analyzed. Indeed, this section of the 
paper should not be seen as a definitive analysis of the impact of trade liberaliza-
tion on revenue, but rather as shedding light on what has happened to the share 
of domestic taxes in GDP across an imperfect sample of poor countries when - for 
whatever reason - import duties change relative to GDP. 
Furthermore, to accurately assess and forecast the likely impact of reforms, 
there is greater need for nuanced country-specific case studies. The case for the 
use of in-depth country-specific case studies to understand policy regimes is best 
articulated by Bhagwati & Srinivasan (1999). They find several problems with cross-
country regressions as a method of policy evaluation. Even if the theoretical, data 
and methodological weaknesses inherent in most cross-country regressions were 
ignored, the cross-country results, after all, only indicate average effects. In view of 
these shortcomings, I focus next on a detailed country case, of Nepal, where tariffs 
20 As confirmed by policy simulations in subsequent sections of this paper, however, a basic rule of 
thumb is that a broad-based VAT that has a uniform rate and little or no exemptions raise more 
revenue. Exemptions generally have no investment-promotion effect, and merely offer conducive 
fiscal loopholes for tax evasion and avoidance (Tanzi et al. 2008). 
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still constitute more than one-fifth of total tax revenue, and the vast majority of its 
30 million people are employed in the largely untaxed agricultural and informal 
sectors. 
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My contribution in this section is to simulate the revenue consequences of 
coordinated tax reforms with actual data on import, tariffs, excise duty, value-
added tax and para-tariffs from Nepal. I also assess how these reforms change the 
price and production of domestic manufactures. Because it is often the perceived 
loss of immediate revenue that leads stakeholders to resist trade reforms in poor 
countries, the focus is on short-term impacts. 
The academic literature on coordinated trade and fiscal reforms in Nepal 
is scant. Khanal (2006) finds econometrically that trade reform in Nepal over 
the period 1990-2005 did not lower trade tax revenue. Cockburn (2006) uses a 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to study the poverty impact of tar-
iff elimination. His innovation is to incorporate household data in the model to 
capture complex income and consumption effects. When tariffs are eliminated but 
compensated by a uniform t.i percent increase in consumption tax, he shows that 
urban poverty falls and rural poverty increases because initial tariffs protected 
agriculture. 
The remainder of the case study is structured as follows. Subsection 4.3.1 
derives a theoretical condition required for revenue to improve following a coordi-
nated tariff and tax reform in the presence of an informal sector. The subsections 
that follow simulate policy reform scenarios with and without a large informal 
sector, and with and without a Sensitive List. 
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4.3.1 Theoretical Motivation 
In an economy with multiple distortions, reduction of one or a subset of dis-
tortions (such as tariffs) may not lead to Pareto welfare gains. This is the essence 
of the theory of second-best launched by Meade (1955) and Lipsey & Lancaster 
(1956). Welfare may also not be increasing in the number of reforms that are un-
dertaken because of second-best interactions, except when all distortions are si-
multaneously reduced. However, it is impossible to know all distortions and their 
cross-effects. The challenge in trade policy reform, therefore, is to "design small, 
feasible changes in the existing tariff structure that will result in a welfare im-
provement when the first-best policy of free trade is not feasible" (Turunen-Red 
and Woodland 1993, p. 145).^^ 
A more realistic objective of governments is to maximize revenue which can 
be used in ways to improve national welfare. When the condition that revenue 
should not fall when undertaking tariff reform is imposed, the welfare-enhancing 
result of a simple tariff cut is weakened (Falvey 1994). The policy challenge, then, is 
to undertake tariff reforms in ways that do not reduce welfare and revenue. Keen & 
Ligthart (1999) suggest that any trade tax (tariff) cut that is offset point-for-point by 
an increase in consumption (domestic) tax that leaves consumer prices unchanged 
can achieve this goal to some extent. 
This evolving consensus on the desirability of revenue-neutral reforms that 
involve replacing tariffs with value-added tax in developing countries is contested 
by Emran & Stiglitz (2005). They show that in the presence of an informal sec-
tor where economic activities normally go untaxed, such coordinated reforms can 
prove to be welfare reducing. They find that the threshold of the VAT base of a 
commodity below which welfare falls is low if the good whose tariff has been cut 
21 An example of such a feasible change is to remove the biggest distortions first ("Concertina" tariff 
reform rule). As shown by Bertrand & Vanek (1971), Hatta (1977) and Lloyd (1974)' if the highest 
tariff is reduced to the next highest level, welfare can improve if the good whose tariff is being cut is 
a gross substitute of all other goods. The other well-known rule is the "proporHonality rule" which 
shows that if all tariffs are reduced proportionally, welfare can be increased. 
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belongs to the informal sector. In other words, a reduction in tariff of good k re-
duces its consumer price and leads to expanded demand for good k. However, if 
the good is not produced in the formal sector, the government does not receive 
increased VAT receipts from the sale of good k.^ ^ 
The focus of Emran & Stiglitz (2005) is on the conditions required for welfare to 
increase in the presence of an informal sector. In what follows, I extend their frame-
work to identify conditions for revenue to increase in the presence of an informal 
sector, following a coordinated tax and tariff reform that keeps welfare intact. 
Assume a small open economy with a representative consumer that imports 
products at world price (p™) before imposing tariffs. There are no externalities. All 
(n -I-1) goods are produced using a convex, constant-returns-to-scale technology. 
There is an informal sector (s) which does not pay consumption tax (v), so price 
in this sector is q®. In the formal sector, domestic price (q*^ ) is inclusive of both 
the tariff (t) and the consumption tax (v). There are four subsets of commodities, 
importables and exportables, produced in the formal (f) and informal sectors as 
follows. Informal exportables that face no tariff or tax are the numeraire. 
qf = p"' + 1 ' -I- V : consuraer price in the formal sector 
qs = pw -I-1® : consumer price in the informal sector 
p ' = p"" -h t' : producer price in the formal sector 
Po = qo = 1 : numeraire 
The representative consumer is unsatiated, owns all the factors, and maxi-
mizes a quasi-concave utility function. The expenditure function minimizes her 
consumption expense to attain a given utility (u) facing a price vector (qo, q). 
22 The Diamond-Mirrlees theorem states that from the point of view of production efficiency, a small 
country should not discriminate between domestic and international supply of identical goods. 
Munk 2008 argues that when tax collection is administratively costly, this theorem fails to hold. 
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The function is twice differentiable, non-decreasing and concave in q, and homo-
geneous of degree one. 
E(qo, q, u) = min{p.c such that u(c) ^ uo) (4.1) 
Production is represented by a GNP function, G(po, p, y), which maximizes 
the value of output facing a price vector (po, p). The function is twice differentiable, 
non-decreasing and convex in p, and homogeneous of degree one in p. It is non-
decreasing and concave in y. 
G ( p o , p , y) = r a Q x { p . x such that x(y) is feasible} (4.2) 
{x} 
By Shephard's Lemma, Eq is the consumption vector. 
By Hotelling's Lemma, Gp is the net output vector. 
The net import vector,m, is Eq(q, u) — Gp(p, y). 
The government's revenue, R, is raised from tariffs (t'm) and VAT (v'Eqf): 
R(t,v) = t ' ( E q - G p ) + v ' E q , (4.3) 
Private budget constraint is: 
E(qo, q, u) = G(po, p, v) + R(t, v) (4.4) 
From equation 4.4, when tariff on good k is reduced and VAT on good 1 is 
increased: 
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dR = Eq^dqic + E u d u + E q f d v i - G p ^ d p i c 
E u d u 
. d u 
d R - ( E q , - G p J d t k - E ^ f d V i 
dR 
dtk dtk 
- (Eq^ - Gpi^) - E f 
q;-
dvi 
Di f ferent iat ing equat ion 4.3: 
(4-5) 
(tqk - Gp J d t k + t ' [Eqq^dqk + E q u d u + E q q f dVi - G p p . d p k ] + 
Eqf dvi + v'[Eqf qf dv^ + E g f ^ d u + Egf dtk] = q'u^ -q 'qk ' 
dR 
(Equ - Gp J + v 'Eqfq^ + t ' ( E q q , - Gpp j l dtk 
+ dVi + [ t 'Equ + v ' E , d u 
dR 
(4.6) 
(4-7) 
Definition 1. Let \\>i be the marginal ef fect of a c h a n g e in Vi on total indirect 
taxation; and let il^ k be the marginal revenue effect of a c h a n g e in tk- T h e n i^i = 
t 'Eqq[ + v 'EqfqJ + E^j and l^k = ( E q , - G p J + t ' ( E q q , - G p p J . 
Both a n d \|jk are a s s u m e d to be greater than zero. 
From equat ion 4.7 a n d Def ini t ion 1: 
dVi 
d t i (4.8) 
Subst i tut ing equat ion 4.8 in equat ion 4.5: 
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(^qk - G p J - E q f 
du dR 
dtk dtk 
Eu 
du 
dti 
{ t u - Eqj^i^r^ [ t ' E c u + v ' E . g } + ( E , , - G 
- 1 
'Pk 
dR 
^ d t k 
(4-9) 
( 4 . 1 0 ) 
In equation 4.10, Q = |Eu - Eqfil^ ^ ' [t'Equ + v'E^f^] } , and is assumed to be 
greater than zero for uniqueness and stability (Hatta Normality Condition). As-
sume further that the tax-tariff reform is welfare neutral (that is, ^ = 0). For 
revenue increase < 0, and E^fi^ri > 0. So, from equation 4.10, the condition 
for welfare-neutral revenue increase is: 
E q k - G p J < Eqfll;. 
(Eqt - Gp^ 
Assume that the cross-price effects are zero, that is, Eq^q. = 0. And let6k = 
(Eq,^  — Gpi^ ) > 0 as k is an importable. Then equation 4.11 simplifies to: 
(Vi + t[)Eq.q. 
"^ kEqi^ q^ -I-tk(Eq|^qi^  
< ( 4 . 1 2 ) 
For revenue to increase in response to a welfare-neutral fall in tariff of good 
k and an increase in VAT of good i, equation ( 4 . 1 2 ) requires the latter's VAT base 
to exceed a certain threshold. The threshold is higher if good k is in the infor-
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mal sector because when v^ = 0 the denominator becomes smaller. Note that the 
reduction in t^ decreases the consumption price q^ and increases the domestic 
consumption of good k, raising revenue through the VAT, v^. However, when the 
good is in the informal sector, there is no increase in revenue from increased con-
sumption. If the VAT base of formal goods is small (that is, the informal sector is 
large), revenue following a coordinated tariff and tax reform could decrease. This 
theoretical postulate guides the analysis of the revenue implications of tax policy 
reform in Nepal, a country with a large informal sector that is hard-to-tax.^3 
4.3.2 Model 
The empirical analysis in this section draws on simulations conducted using 
the Tariff Reform Impact Simulation Tool (TRIST) developed by the World Bank 
(Brenton et al. 2011) . It uses a partial equilibrium model that quantifies the ef-
fect of trade reform scenarios on imports, revenue and production (please refer 
to the appendix for the simulation model and an illustration). The model makes 
the following key assumptions: (1) it is derived from standard consumer theory 
and elasticities play a central role in determining the magnitude of demand re-
sponse to price change; (2) there is imperfect substitution between imports from 
different countries, following Armington (1969), and each product is modeled as a 
separate market; (3) the economy is small and open such that all changes in tariffs 
are passed on, but change in demand by consumers in the small country does not 
affect world prices. 
Percentage change in the price of good j from country i (Apij) when tariff 
and other domestic taxes are lowered is as follows: the prime indicates post-reform 
values of tariff (T), excise duty (e) and the VAT (v). 
23 Keen (2007) argues that the theoretical result of Emran & Stiglitz (2005) does not fully take into 
account the efficacy of VAT as a taxation device. It is not just a tax on final consumption, but a 
charge on all imports and sales at every stage of transaction (with credit or refund given to registered 
taxpayers of VAT). Thus, while the informal sector can evade income tax, it can only escape from 
VAT partially, for it acts like a tax on all purchases the informal sector makes from the formal sector 
This point is vahd, but does not alter the basic thesis that, all else being equal, domestic tax collection 
is decreasing in the size of the informal sector. 
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Apij = ) ( l + e i j ) ( l + V i j ) 
l + T i j ) ( l + e i j ) ( 1 + V i j ] ( 4 - 1 3 ) 
Demand responds to the relative price change in three steps, as explained 
by Lim & Saborowski (2010). First, shares of expenditure on imports of a product 
across different exporting countries change when a particular tariff is altered. Total 
imports remain the same, but if imports of Country A become cheaper, there will 
be substitution away from imports from other countries. The elasticity of substitu-
tion is calculated as follows: 
A ( M A / M B ] 
( M A / M B ) 
/ A ( P A / P B ) 
( P A / P B ) 
(4-14) 
where M a , Mb are the same imports from Countries A and B with prices Pa, Pb/ 
respectively. Second, the allocation of expenditure between imports and domes-
tically produced goods is calculated. Relative demand changes are derived from 
changes in the weighted average of the price of imports, adjusted by the elasticity 
of substitution between domestic and foreign products. If the average price of im-
ports falls, there will be substitution away from domestically produced goods, but 
total consumption stays the same. Third, when average domestic price changes, 
there will be an overall demand response. Consumers demand more of the good 
whose price has fallen irrespective of whether it is imported or procured locally. 
The partial equilibrium model of importing in TRIST permits a comparison of 
different policy scenarios with and without the base values changed. Simulations 
are easy to run by policymakers. However, this simplicity has a trade-off. Because 
demand for each product is treated in isolation, the partial equilibrium model 
has no economy-wide intra- or inter-sectoral linkages. It is silent on resource con-
straints and reallocations that inevitably result from all meaningful trade policy 
reforms (Brenton et al. 2011). The model, therefore, does not allow us to judge 
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whether policy changes are beneficial from an economy-wide perspective over the 
long run. 
The utility of TRIST is confined to analyzing the impact of tariff and tax 
changes on revenue in the short-term. Its results are more useful, for example, in 
forming trade negotiating positions than, say, crafting medium-term national de-
velopment s t r a t e g i e s . ^ 4 in other words, the partial equilibrium model is not as 
useful in projecting a medium-term growth rate of the economy than it is in identi-
fy ing the magnitude of immediate trade adjustment costs in sectors having to face 
import competition. 
4.3.3 Data 
The empirical analysis uses a new data set extracted from unpublished cus-
toms records from Nepal for the calendar year 2008 (Government of Nepal 2009b). 
It contains 4 17 ,7 15 import transactions. In addition to the date when the import 
shipment was processed, the data set lists the value of each import in Nepali Ru-
pees inclusive of cost, insurance and freight (c.i.f.) and tariffs levied on that import. 
Customs also raise a substantial share of additional revenue at ports of entry by 
levying a range of domestic taxes. The main ones in Nepal are the excise duty and 
VAT, as well as the Agricultural Reform Fee (ARF) imposed on agricultural imports 
from India only. A range of other charges and taxes (para tariffs) are levied as fol-
lows: demurrage, customs service fee, fine, special fee. Road Construction Fee, and 
the Local Development Tax.^5 The data set lists applied Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
and preferential tariff rates set for each import at the HS 8-digit level. 
24 For a longer run perspective, a CGE model would probably be more suitable. In contrast to the 
tractability of partial equilibrium models, however, C G E models require a complex data set, a large 
number of exogenously imposed parameters, and restrictive assumptions rendering the replicabil-
ity and falsifiability of results difficult. See Taylor & Von Arnim (2007) for a critique of the C G E 
methodology. 
25 As of 20 1 1 , the local development tax, road construction fee, and special fee have been phased out. 
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I check for the consistency of entries and adjust the data set as follows. All im-
port transactions worth Rs. 10,000 (approx. US$140) or less are dropped.^^ Goods 
entering the country under customs procedure codes which do not compete in the 
local market are dropped. These are mainly diplomatic and governmental imports 
that are tax-exempt. Next, I compute the applied tariff rate, applied excise duty, 
and applied VAT by dividing the actual amount of such taxes collected by their re-
spective base.^7 Those "applied" values that abnormally deviate from the statutory 
tax rates are dropped. The cleaned data set that is ready for simulation consists of 
265,194 import records spanning 4032 tariff lines from 133 economies.^® 
The paper also incorporates domestic production data extracted from the lat-
est quinquennial Census of Manufacturing Establishments that reports the domes-
tic sale of manufactured goods (Government of Nepal 2008). For 3,079 of the 4032 
import codes, there exists matching data for domestically sold products. This al-
lows for substitution of imports by domestically produced goods when the price 
of imports rises, adding to the richness of simulation results. There are, however, 
two limitations. First, the latest production data are available only up to the fiscal 
year 2006-07, whereas the import data straddles the fiscal years of 2007-08 and 
2008-09 (that is, calendar year 2008). Second, production data covers only manu-
facturing industries. For a little less than 25 percent of the tariff lines that belong 
to non-manufacturing industries, there are no data on domestic production. In the 
language of the model, for a subset of imports, the substitution between imports 
and domestically produced goods is perfectly inelastic. 
26 This excludes nearly 30 percent of the observations, which accounts for 3.2 percent of total import 
value. 
27 In Nepal, excise duty is levied as a percentage of import value. VAT is paid as a percentage of the 
base comprising of import value plus excise and other taxes. The Agricultural Reform Fee (ARF) is 
levied (in lieu of tariff) on the value of agricultural imports from India. If VAT is additionally levied 
on such agriculhiral goods from India, it is a fixed percentage of the import value, not import value 
plus the ARF. 
28 The term "economies" is used in lieu of "countries" because Nepal's customs data treat Tibet, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan as sources of imports that are distinct from the People's Republic of China even 
though the three economies are (politically) part of China. 
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The 133 import trading partners of Nepal in 2008 are organized in eight 
groups: (1) India; (2) China, including the Tibet Autonomous Region; (3) Rest of 
South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka); (4) 
Northeast Asia (Japan, Republic of Korea, Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion, and Taiwan); (5) Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam); (6) North America (Canada, Mexico, United States); (7) the Eu-
ropean Union; and (8) the Rest of the World (ROW). The baseline scenarios assume 
an export substitution elasticity of 1.5, domestic substitution elasticity of 1 , and 
import demand elasticity of 0.5.^^ 
4.3.3.1 Import-based Revenue in Nepal 
The structure of tariffs and tariff-based revenue in Nepal is described in this 
section. Columns 3 to 6 in Table 4.7 show that the collected tariff and VAT rates 
across all imports are just over 10.5 percent and 11 .0 percent, respectively. When 
imports are weighted by value, those rates drop to 7.0 and 9.9 percent, respectively. 
That the applied VAT rate of above 1 1 percent is nearly two percentage points be-
low the statutory rate of 13 percent indicates the scale of average exemptions, a 
proxy for discretion that the authorities exercise. For tariffs, the scale of average ex-
emptions is the difference between the weighted statutory tariff rate of 8.33 percent 
and the applied tariff rate of 7 percent.^" Compared to just 20 years ago, the height 
of trade protection has fallen considerably, although revenue generated by taxing 
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Figure 4.2: Share of Tax Revenue by Source 
Customs VAT Income Excise Other Taxes 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Source: Government of Nepal (2011) 
Note 1: Customs includes import tariffs, export duties, Indian Excise Refund 
imports through tariffs, VAT and excise continues to be the dominant source of tax 
revenue in Nepal. 
After the adjustments described in the preceding section are made, the total 
value of imports in 2008 is Rs. 222.19 billion.3^ Table 4.7 shows that in 2008, Nepal 
received Rs. 15.6 billion in tariff revenue, amounting to 34.3 percent of total rev-
enue derived from imports. VAT on these imports (Rs. 23.9 billion) accounted for 
52.7 percent of the total import-based revenue, and the remaining 13 percent was 
accounted for by excise and other taxes amounting to nearly Rs. 6 billion. 
29 I increase the value of these benchmark elasticities subsequently. They are, however, not as high as 
some of the empirical estimates of elasticity for export substituHon and domestic substitution by, 
for example, Hummels (2001) or Romalis (2007). I opt for smaller elashcities because of the model's 
focus on short-run outcomes. 
30 The extent of exemptions granted can only be assessed for products subject to ad valorem duties. 
Because the AVE for specific tariffs have been computed by the so-called income method of taking 
the (median) applied tariff rate, there is no difference between the statutory and collected tariff rates 
for the category of imports that face specific tariffs. 
31 This figure is for the calendar year 2008. Its comparison with total import figures for the fiscal year 
2008 deserves care. The reported total import by Nepal in the fiscal year (from July 2008 to July 2009) 
was Rs. 284.5 billion. In the fiscal year 2007-08 (from July 2007 to July 2008), total import was Rs. 
221.9 billion. The raw customs total for the calendar year 2008 is in between the figures for the two 
fiscal years, at Rs. 236.6 billion. After adjustment, this drops to Rs. 222.2 billion. 
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Figure 4.2 shows that VAT (on both imports and domestic consumption) sur-
passed customs-based revenue as the main source of tax revenue after 2004. How-
ever, as shown in Table 4.8, at least 62 percent of total VAT revenue is derived from 
imports. 
Table 4.9 shows the distribution of observations by tariff bands ranging from 
zero to 80 percent for SAFTA and non-SAFTA trading partners. There is an ad-
ditional row for products (such as fuel, tobacco, alcohol and cement) that face 
specific tariffs (that is, per quantity, not percentage of value). The first group com-
prises countries that generally pay a higher rate of applied MFN tariff. The second 
group of countries pays preferential tariff rate under SAFTA. This group accounts 
for nearly 64 percent of imports into Nepal, and is almost exclusively dominated 
by India. 
Several features stand out in Table 4.9. First, less than 15 percent of imports (by 
value) are free of statutory duty. Second, nearly 36 percent of imports are subject 
to "nuisance" tariffs between zero and five percent; the term indicates that at such 
low rates the cost of monitoring and collecting tariffs could outweigh the revenue 
collected. Third, there are 421 observations that are subject to specific tariffs, whose 
A d Valorem Equivalent (AVE) is 26 percent. The AVE of specific tariffs is calculated 
as the median applied tariff rate of all applicable imports at the HS 8-digit level 
(that is, customs tariff divided by import value). Almost all the goods on which 
specific tariffs are levied originate in India. These goods account for 19.2 percent 
of total import value and 22.6 percent of collected tariffs. 
32 Data from the Internal Revenue Department of the Ministry of Finance of the Government of Nepal 
as published in Government of Nepal (2004), Government of Nepal (20090) and Government of 
Nepal (2010) show that VAT revenue from imports has exceeded 60 percent over the past 10 years 
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4.3.4 Results 
4.3.4.1 Coordinated Tariff and Tax Reform with Small Informal Sector 
This section reports results of the impact of five reform scenarios of coordi-
nated tariff cuts and VAT consolidation. In the first scenario, statutory tariffs on all 
imports are cut by 50 percent, together with a full enforcement of the VAT at the 
existing 13 percent.33 Full implementation means that all imports and domestically 
produced goods are charged a non-discriminatory VAT rate of 13 percent with no 
exception. All "other" taxes and charges including the Agricultural Reform Fee, 
fines and demurrage are eliminated.34 
The essence of this reform is to reduce significantly the distortionary trade tax 
and recoup potential tariff losses by plugging exemptions on a much wider VAT 
base. In scenario 1 of Table 4.2, total imports increase by 0.3 percent in value. Note 
that this appears to be a small response to such a drastic cut in tariffs. However, 
cuts in tariff have been accompanied by an indiscriminate application of the VAT. 
This could, in some cases, raise the domestic price of the good even though the 
trade-weighted applied tariff rate drops from 7 to 4.3 percent. This suggests that 
there is substitution away from domestic production. 
The 50 percent cut would not "bite" if some imports were currently being 
charged less than the statutory tariff rate because of discretion exercised by cus-
toms authorities, corruption, or temporary government exemptions. In scenario 1, 
tariff revenues drop by 38.3 percent, as expected, from Rs. 15.6 billion to Rs. 9.6 
billion. The VAT compensates for the tariff loss even when other domestic tax-
es/charges are eliminated. VAT revenue on imports increases from Rs. 23.9 billion 
33 Note that the stahitory tariff rates are applied MFN or preferential rates. They are not bound MFN 
rates. 
34 Nepal has already announced that it would phase out the ARF. 
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to Rs. 30.6 billion, and VAT revenue on domestically produced goods increases 
from Rs. 10.7 billion to Rs. 13.6 billion (not shown in a disaggregated manner in 
the table). Overall, this reform that cuts tariffs by half and enforces the existing 
VAT ends up being more than revenue-neutral: total revenue goes up by 1 percent, 
while domestic production suffers a modest loss of 0.14 percent. 
In scenario 2, I apply a imiform tariff rate of five percent on all imports from 
all countries and match that, again, with full implementation of the existing VAT 
rate of 13 percent and elimination of all other taxes/charges. The tariff cuts are less 
biting than in scenario 1, because existing tariffs that are already less than 5 percent 
are increased to five percent. This affects nearly 17 percent of tariff lines, and 
tariff revenue from this subset increases. However, tariff revenue from products on 
which the existing tariff rate exceeds five percent is likely to decline. The net effect 
of this reform on tariff revenue is a loss of 28.9 percent. When the VAT is levied 
on all imports, the final decline of total tax revenue from imports is from Rs. 45.4 
billion to Rs. 44.1 billion. This modest loss is more than made up for by the VAT 
imposed on domestic products. Overall tax revenue from imports and domestic 
sales under the second scenario increases by 2.7 percent. 
In scenarios 3 and 4, the VAT rate is increased to 15 and 17 percent, respec-
tively. A s expected, total revenues increase by 13.3 and 23.7 percent. In scenario 5, 
I simulate another radical combination of complete full trade with no tariff on any 
import, matched by a flat VAT of 17 percent on all goods. This leads to a drop in 
tariff revenue from Rs. 15.6 billion to zero; however, total effect on revenue is a net 
increase of 4 percent. 
The message from the simulation results reported in Table 4.2 is that trade 
taxes can be reduced without adversely affecting total government revenues by 
implementing domestic taxes like VAT and excise duties effectively. In fact, if tariffs 
are used mainly for revenue-raising purposes (that is, not used to protect domestic 
industries) they could simply be replaced by excise taxes. Like VAT, excise taxes do 
not discriminate between domestic and international sources. They also do not fall 
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under the purview of trade agreements, so countries under pressure to cut tariffs 
can simply switch to excise. This would just be a semantic change in nomenclature. 
There is, however, a powerful assumption behind the advocacy of a switch in 
tax regime from tariffs to a broad-based consumption tax, namely, that countries 
have the capacity to enforce a complicated system like the VAT. One of the main 
arguments for reliance by poor countries on tariffs has always been that they are 
easier and less costly to collect at fixed border points. 
As postulated in section 2, we need a larger VAT base to raise the same level of 
revenue in the presence of an informal sector. Piggott & Whalley (2001) show that 
VAT expansion can reduce welfare if it encourages suppliers to go underground 
to evade new taxes. The presence of the informal sector, however, may not dent 
revenue collection to the extent that the theory suggests. This is because a substan-
tial share of revenue in poor countries is generated from VAT on imports which is 
usually collected at the border together with tariffs. In the Nepali data for 2008, for 
every rupee collected in tariff revenue, Rs. 1.7 was collected additionally in VAT 
and excise duty. This point is also made by Keen (2008) that the VAT (and withhold-
ing taxes) on imports actually acts as a tax on the informal sector. While the formal 
sector may claim tax credit on payments made at the border when they eventually 
pay income and other taxes, the informal sector does not, thereby minimizing loss 
to the exchequer. 
4.3.4.2 Coordinated Tariff and Tax Reform with Large Informal Sector 
In this subsection, I allow for an exogenous shrinking of the taxable produc-
tion base (Table 4.3), which is equivalent to the enlargement of the informal sector. 
In section 2 of this paper, it was shown that the presence of a large informal sector 
makes it difficult to raise revenue from domestic sources. To proxy for the informal 
sector, I run the same simulations as in Table 4.2, but with the assumption that the 
taxable domestic base has shrunk by 30 percent. 
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In scenario i presented in Table 4.3, the same policy simulation as in scenario 
1 in Table 4.2 leads to a drop in overall revenue by 0.6 percent. This is because the 
VAT is levied on a smaller production base (with activities going underground in 
response to the commodity tax hike). In scenarios 2, 3 and 4 with a uniform tariff 
of 5 percent matched by increasing rates of VAT, the net increase in total revenue 
is less than in Table 4.2 for identical simulations. While scenario 5 raised total tax 
revenue by 4 percent, as in Table 4.2, the increase in revenue is only 0.5 percent in 
the presence of an enlarged informal sector. 
Ideally, the size of the informal sector ought to respond endogenously to the 
tax system. However, discussion of this is beyond the scope of this section whose 
the goal is to illustrate that i) it is costly to raise taxes on a narrow base and ii) 
revenue loss from a switch in trade to domestic commodity taxes is minimized 
when imports form an important part of the domestic tax base. In extreme cases, 
such a coordinated tariff and tax reform could merely lead to a replacement of tariff 
by VAT and excise at the border. There will, however, be a substantial difference 
made to production efficiency in the formal sector by switching to VAT and excise. 
Furthermore, while the VAT generally only taxes the informal sector if it consumes 
inputs from the taxed formal sector, this is not the case when imports are a large 
part of the VAT base when it can tax informal sector sales, as well as profits of 
formal sector firms (Boadway & Sato 2009). 
4.3.4.3 Regional Free Trade without Sensitive Lists 
The second set of policy scenarios addresses the Tariff Liberalization Program, 
as spelled out in Article VII of SAFTA, launched in 2006 with the aim of establishing 
a free trade zone among the eight countries of South Asia (SAARC 2006).35 What 
is foreseen by SAFTA is a preferential area where most goods would be traded at 
tariff levels between zero and five percent by 2016. Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka 
are not Least Developed Countries (LDCs) according to a United Nations defini-
35 The members are Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
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Figure 4.3: Dispersion of Tariff Rates 
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C 01 
D 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 
A d V a l o r e m Preferent ia l Tar i f f Rates (%) 
Source: Government of Nepal (2009b) 
tion,3^ and they follow a faster schedule of tariff liberalization than the other five, 
with tariffs reduced to at most five percent by 2013. 
All members of SAFTA are permitted to maintain a Sensitive List (SL) of ex-
ports that are exempt from tariff cuts. This is often at odds with the WTO's GATT 
that sets out rules for the negotiation of customs unions and free trade areas. Ar-
ticle XXIV of GATT allows regional trading arrangements to be set up as a special 
exception to the MFN rule if tariffs and other barriers are eliminated for substan-
tially all the trade. There is, however, no agreement on what numerical share of 
trade constitutes "substantially all." 
Table 4.4 shows impacts on Nepali imports, tariff revenue, and total tax rev-
enue from implementing various tariff and VAT changes in relation to trade in 
the South Asia region. India accounts for over 63 percent of imports and the six 
other South Asian countries collectively account for less than 0.5 percent (Table 
36 See United Nations (2011). 
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4.12). Thus, from the perspective of Nepali imports, free trade in South Asia is 
equivalent to free trade with India. 
Scenario 1 in Table 4.4 applies tariffs at the agreed preferential rates with 
no exemption while eliminating the Agricultural Reform Fee, and other charges 
like fines and demurrage. VAT and excise are not adjusted, and tariffs on countries 
outside South Asia are not changed. This modest incremental reform appears to be 
roughly revenue-neutral. In other words, simply applying agreed statutory rates 
on imports and eliminating tariff exemptions on imports from South Asia can 
pay for the elimination of the Agricultural Reform Fee currently levied on Indian 
agricultural imports. This would require no further change to the domestic tax 
regime. 
Scenario 2 simulates complete free trade with South Asia while keeping tariffs 
on imports from the rest of the world unchanged. Further, the existing VAT rate of 
13 percent is enforced strongly on all imports and domestically produced goods. 
This scenario is unfavorable to Nepal as total tax revenue drops from Rs. 60 billion 
to Rs. 56.4 billion (by more than six percent). This indicates that even the full force 
of a perfectly implemented VAT at the existing rate is not sufficient to recoup tariff 
revenue loss of more than 62 percent (from Rs. 15.6 billion to Rs. 5.9 billion) as a 
consequence of free trade with the rest of South Asia. Scenario 3 shows, however, 
that a VAT of 15 percent is adequate to make up for the revenue cost of free trade 
with South Asia. Net tax revenues increase by 4.5 percent. 
In scenario 4, I foresee complete free trade within South Asia, enforcement 
of the VAT at 15 percent, elimination of ARF and other charges, and application 
of a uniform tariff of eight percent on imports from the rest of the world. This is 
almost equivalent to scenario 3, except that under this scenario, applied weighted 
tariff increases from 2.6 percent to 2.8 percent. In other words, scenario 3 is slightly 
more protectionist, but administratively simpler because there are only two tariff 
rates to enforce: zero percent for South Asian imports and eight percent for the 
rest. 
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Scenario 5 extends SAFTA to include China, envisioning a free trade area 
around Nepal that is peopled by 2.5 billion consumers. Interestingly, zero tariffs on 
all Indian and Chinese imports can be compensated by the full application of the 
VAT at 15 percent. Because China and India accounted for three-quarters of Nepali 
imports in 2008, reducing all tariffs on them to zero reduces the trade-weighted 
collected tariff (rate of protection) from seven to under two percent. 
4.3.4.4 Regional Free Trade with Sensitive Lists 
The Sensitive List shields products from tariff cut commitments on the basis 
of self-defined national interest. Among the members of SAFTA, Nepal maintains 
the longest list of sensitive products that are exempt from progressive tariff cuts 
(Table 4.13). By 2016, only products that are not on the Sensitive List whose tariffs 
will be confined to between zero and five percent.37 Of the 1295 products (at the 
HS 6-digit level) on Nepal's Sensitive List of imports from the larger South Asian 
economies (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), more than 250 were not even imported 
into the country in 2008. The average tariff level of products on the Sensitive List 
is higher than those not on the list, as shown in Figure 4.3. For products on the 
list, there is a noticeable "bunching" around the rates of 15, 20, 25 and 40 percent, 
whereas for products not on the list, the densities are higher at lower tariff rates of 
five and 10 percent. 
Scenario 1 in Table 4.5 presents the revenue baseline when there is free trade 
with South Asia (with tariffs and other taxes, but not excise, eliminated). The exist-
ing pattern of VAT is unchanged, as are tariffs on the rest of the world. Predictably, 
with 63 percent of total imports rendered duty-free, tariff revenues collapse by 
nearly 62 percent, and overall government revenues are reduced by 22.4 percent. 
Trade-weighted average applied tariff rate also drops from seven to 2.6 percent. 
The difference with scenario 2 in Table 4.2 is that in the latter, tariff cuts are accom-
37 In South Asia, Bhutan has the shortest list, followed by India's list for LDCs. India's list for Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka is much longer (SAARC 2011). 
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panied by full enforcement of the existing VAT rate, leading to an overall revenue 
decline of only 6.1 percent. 
Scenario 2 repeats the previous simulation, but allows no tariff cuts on prod-
ucts on the government's existing Sensitive List. Tariff is not reduced to zero on 
1092 products (but other taxes including the ARF are eliminated). This limits rev-
enue loss from imports to only about 10 percent, and when revenue from domestic 
production is allowed for, the government revenue drops by only 7.9 percent. The 
existing Sensitive List, therefore, protects revenue by nearly 15 percentage points. 
The down-side of this is that the trade-weighted average applied tariff rate has 
only dropped by 0.9 percentage points, from the pre-reform seven percent to the 
post-reform 6.1 percent. This suggests that while Nepal has signed up for freer 
trade, it is exhibiting anxiety about the consequences by using a lengthy Sensitive 
List that is legally sanctioned but operationally detrimental to the ethos of freer 
trade. 
In scenario 3, I prepare an alternative Sensitive List with 1096 products at the 
HS 8-digit level (same number as the government's existing list) with the sole ob-
jective of minimizing revenue loss from intra-regional free trade. The alternative 
Sensitive List is prepared in two steps. First, I simulate a policy scenario corre-
sponding to unconditional free trade. Second, I look at the final revenue changes 
at the product level subsequent to the three channels of adjustment described in 
Section 3, and sort products by the amount of tariff revenue loss. The top 1096 prod-
ucts with the highest losses are then put on the Sensitive List. The list prepared 
in this manner preserves revenues by an additional 3.4 percentage points over and 
above the government's list. Indeed, tariff revenues increase under this scenario; it 
is only after accounting for the loss of other taxes that total revenue falls from Rs. 
60 billion to Rs. 57.3 billion. The consequence of applying such a conservative Sen-
sitive List is that there is no meaningful reduction in distortion from trade taxes as 
a result of intra-regional free trade. The trade-weighted average applied tariff rate 
stays unchanged at seven percent. 
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Scenarios 2 and 3 do not lead to as big a revenue loss as under complete 
intra-regional free trade because the Sensitive Lists are devised by counting the 
number of tariff lines. This approach is irrespective of the magnitude of the share 
of individual imports, and all high value tariff lines can be shielded from cuts. 
Indeed, the government's Sensitive List covers 50 percent of all imports, and my 
alternative list covers 84 percent of imports. This suggests that if the purpose of a 
regional free trade agreement is to foster regional trade, either the Sensitive Lists 
ought to be scrapped, or capped by value, in line with Article XXIV of GATT that 
permits an exception to the WTO's sacrosanct MFN principle (GATT Article I) only 
if regional trade blocs cover substantially all the trade among members. 
Next, I examine the revenue consequences of free trade with South Asia when 
Nepal is permitted to design a Sensitive List that cumulatively accounts for 5, 
10, and 20 percent of trade value. In other words, "substantially all the trade" is 
interpreted as 95, 90, and 80 percent of total imports, respectively. 
Scenario 4 caps the cumulative import value of products in the Sensitive List 
at 20 percent. This list was created by adding the share of revenue changes normal-
ized by the import value of each product from the South Asia region. Although this 
list is longer, in terms of the number of tariff lines shielded, than in the preceding 
two scenarios, capping the value at 20 percent frees up many high-value import 
categories that are now subject to tariff cuts. Overall revenue in this case decreases 
by 10.4 percent. Scenario 5 caps import value at 10 percent, leading to overall rev-
enue loss of 13.8 percent. Scenario 6 caps the Sensitive List at five percent of import 
value, leading to a loss in revenue of 18.1 percent (Rs. 1 1 billion), which is more 
than under complete intra-regional free trade (scenario 1). In these simulations, the 
weighted average rate of collected tariffs halve, from 7 to 3.5 percent. 
The simulation results reported in Table 4.5 illustrate that the design of Sen-
sitive Lists is crucial, with potential for either fostering or frustrating the objective 
of regional free trade. Sensitive Lists that are carved out by counting tariff lines ap-
pear to undermine the objective of intra-regional free trade more than when such 
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lists shield products by value. In all cases, revenue losses are big, but as shown in 
Table 4.4, these can be recouped through reforms to the domestic tax regime, espe-
cially a full and effective implementation of the VAT at existing or slightly higher 
rates. 
4.3.5 Robustness 
In this section, two major simulations from Tables 4.2 and 4.4 are re-run al-
lowing for higher elasticities. Scenario 1 of Table 4.10 uses default elasticities and 
is identical to scenario 1 of Table 4.2 where the reform consists of a 50 percent 
cut in statutory tariffs on all imports from all countries matched by an effective 13 
percent VAT on all goods. Scenario 2 repeats this simulation with higher elastici-
ties: three for export substitution and two for domestic substitution, with demand 
elasticity applied at the disaggregated product level using the estimates of Kee et al. 
(2008). Scenario 3 repeats scenario 2, with an additional increase in only the ex-
porter substitutability parameter from three to six. 
The results in scenarios 2 and 3 of Table In Table 4.10, compared to scenario 1 , 
confirm that the responsiveness of imports to relative price changes is increasing in 
substitutability. Compared to the default case, imports increase by two percentage 
points, which reduces the loss in tariff revenue by 5.8 percentage points. Overall 
tax revenue increases by 3.3 percentage points when elasticities increase. 
Scenarios 4 to 6 simulate the revenue consequences - under varying sets of 
elasticities - for free trade under SAFTA with a Sensitive List that I create to cap 
imports under exemption to not exceed 10 percent of total import value from South 
Asia. This reform is closer to the spirit of freer regional trade, but it leads to greater 
revenue losses. Consistent with the previous set of simulations, revenue losses are 
decreasing in elasticity: the higher the degree of substitution allowed in response 
to import and domestic prices, the smaller the decline in revenue. 
Table 4.2; R e v e n u e Impact of Tariff and Tax R e f o r m 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
Reforms Tariff cut 50% Uniform tariff Uniform tariff Uniform tariff No tariff 
Full VAT 1 3% Full VAT 13% Full VAT is% Full VAT 1 7% Full VAT 77% 
Impact on Imports 
Imports pre 222.1 222.1 222.1 222.1 222.1 
Imports post 222.8 221.3 219.0 216.7 223.1 
% change in imports 0.3% -0.4% -1.4% -2.5% 0.4% 
Impact on Revenue 
Tariff revenue pre 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 
Tariff revenue post 9.6 1 1 . 1 10.9 10.8 0.0 
% change in tariff revenue -38.3% -28.9% -29.6% -30.4% -100.0% 
Total Tax Revenues on Imports 
Total revenue pre 454 454 454 45 4 454 
Total revenue post 43,0 44.1 48.3 5 2 4 40.8 
% change in total revenue -5.2% -2.7% 6.5% 15.6% - 10 . 1% 
Total Tax Revenues on Imports and Domestic Production 
Total tax revenue pre 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Total tax revenue post 60.6 61.6 68.0 74.2 62.4 
% change in total tax revenue 1.0% 2.7% 13.3% 23.7% 4.0% 
Collected Tariff Rate 
Collected applied tariff rate pre 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 
Collected applied tariff rate post 4.3% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
Note: All values in billions of Rupees 
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Table 4.3: R e v e n u e Impact of Tariff and Tax R e f o r m (Informal Sector) 
Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10 
Reforms Tariff cut 50% Uniform tariff Uniform tariff Uniform tariff No tariff 
Full VAT 13% Full VAT 13% Full VAT 15% Full VAT 17% Full VAT 17% 
Impact on Imports 
Imports pre 222.1 222.1 222.1 222.1 222.1 
Imports post 222.8 221.3 219.1 216.8 223.1 
% change in imports 0.3% -0.4% -1.4% -2.4% 0.4% 
Impact on Revenue 
Tariff revenue pre 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 
Tariff revenue post 9.6 1 1 . 1 1 1 .0 10.8 0.0 
% change in tariff revenue -38.3% -28.9% -29.6% -30.3% -100.0% 
Total Tax Revenues on Imports 
Total revenue pre 454 454 454 454 454 
Total revenue post 43.0 44.1 48.4 52.5 40.8 
% change in total revenue -5.2% -2.7% 6.6% 15.6% -10.2% 
Total Tax Revenues on Imports and Domestic Production 
Total tax revenue pre 55.6 55.6 55.6 55.6 55.6 
Total tax revenue post 55-3 56.4 62.1 67.7 55-9 
% change in total tax revenue -0.6% 1.4% 1 1 .7% 21.8% 0.5% 
Collected Tariff Rate 
Collected applied tariff rate pre 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 
Collected applied tariff rate post 4.3% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
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Note: All values in billions of Rupees 
Table 4.4: Revenue Impact of Regional Free Trade 
Scenario i Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
Reforms Stat, tariff Zero tariff Zero tariff Zero tariff SAFTA and China zero tariff 
No ART No ART No ART Uniform 8% on ROW Uniform 8% on ROW 
Existing VAT Full VAT 1 3 % Full VAT 1 5 % Full VAT 1 5 % Full VAT 15% 
Impact on Imports 
Imports pre 222.1 222.1 222.1 222.1 222.1 
Imports post 222.4 224.5 222.3 221.6 222.7 
% change in imports 0.1% 1.1% 0.1% -0.2% 0.2% 
Impact on Revenue 
Tariff revenue pre 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 
Tariff revenue post 18.0 5-9 5.8 6.1 4-3 
% change in tariff revenue 15.7% -62.1% -62.5% -60.5% -72.3% 
Total Tax Revenues on Imports 
Total revenue pre 454 45-4 454 454 45 4 
Total revenue post 45-3 38.9 4 3 1 43.2 41.2 
% change in total revenue -0.1% -14.3% -5.0% -4.8% -9.2% 
Total Tax Revenues on Imports and Domestic Production 
Total tax revenue pre 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Total tax revenue post 60.1 56.4 62.7 62.8 60.8 
% change in total tax revenue 0.2% -6.1% 4.5% 4.6% 1.3% 
Collected Tariff Rate 
Collected applied tariff rate pre 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 
Collected applied tariff rate post 8.1% 2.6% 2.6% 2.8% 1.9% 
Note: All values in billions of Rupees 
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Table 4.5 : R e v e n u e I m p a c t of R e g i o n a l F r e e T r a d e (Sens i t ive Lis t ) H 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 n 
Reforms NoSL Existing Govt. SL Alternative SL 20% shielded in SL 1 0 % shielded in SL 5 % shielded in SL H > 
Existing VAT Existing VAT Existing VAT Existing VAT Existing VAT Existing VAT X 
No ART NoARF NoARF NoARF NoARF NoARF W 
Impact on Imports 0 
Imports pre 2 2 2 . 1 2 2 2 . 1 2 2 2 . 1 2 2 2 . 1 2 2 2 . 1 2 2 2 . 1 S 
Imports post 2 2 8 . 5 2 2 4 . 9 2 2 3 . 9 2 2 5 . 7 2 2 6 . 7 2 2 7 . 8 
% change in imports 2 . 9 % 1 . 2 % 0 . 8 % 1 . 6 % 2 . 1 % 2 . 5 % n > 
Impact on Revenue z 
Tariff revenue pre 1 5 . 6 1 5 . 6 1 5 . 6 1 5 . 6 1 5 . 6 1 5 . 6 r 0 
Tariff revenue post 5-9 1 3 . 6 1 5 . 6 1 2 . 2 1 0 . 4 8 . 0 
or 
H 
% change in tariff revenue - 6 1 . 9 % - 1 2 . 4 % 0 . 2 % - 2 1 . 6 % - 3 3 4 % - 4 8 . 8 % H 
Total Tax Revenues on Imports 
Total revenue pre 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 •tI 
Total revenue post 3 2 . 1 4 0 . 6 42-7 3 9 . 2 3 7 , 2 3 4 . 6 
on 
03 
% change in total revenue - 2 9 . 4 % - 1 0 . 4 % - 5 . 9 % - 1 3 . 7 % - 1 8 . 0 % - 2 3 . 7 % w 
Total Tax Revenues on Imports and Domestic Production w w 
Total tax revenue pre 6 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 n 0 
Total tax revenue post 4 6 . 6 55-2 57-3 53-7 5 1 7 4 9 . 1 d •a 
% change in total tax revenue - 2 2 . 4 % - 7 . 9 % - 4 . 5 % - 1 0 . 4 % - 1 3 . 8 % - 1 8 . 1 % w 
Collected Tariff Rate 
Collected applied tariff rate pre 7 . 0 % 7 . 0 % 7 . 0 % 7 . 0 % 7 . 0 % 7 . 0 % 
Collected applied tariff rate post 2 . 6 % 6 . 1 % 7 . 0 % 5 4 % 4 . 6 % 3 . 5 % 
Note: All values in billions of Rupees 
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Note that the difference between scenarios 2 and 3 and between 5 and 6 lies 
only in the exporter substitution elasticity. In the case of coordinated tax and tariff 
reform, all tariffs are cut and domestic tax is enforced on all goods. If there was 
no exemption on any good, this reform would not have triggered any substitu-
tion among exporters. Any increase in imports would be a result of final domestic 
price changes leading to increased demand for all products irrespective of origin. 
Because the existing VAT is not applied uniformly, the reform does lead to rela-
tive price changes, permitting some substitutability in imports by destination. The 
overall effect is that higher exporter substitutability (everything else being equal) 
leads to greater import response, tariff revenue, and total tax collection. 
In scenarios 4, 5, and 6, however, the reform entails a radical cut in tariffs 
on imports from South Asia only. When all elasticities increase in tandem, the 
net loss of revenue is less than under the default case. This is consistent with 
previous simulations where higher elasticities led to greater substitutability and 
import demand in response to overall price fall. However, when I increase only 
the exporter substitutability elasticity in scenario 6, overall tariff and tax revenues 
decrease by more than in scenario 5. The reason for this is that as a result of tariff 
elimination within South Asia, there is substitution of imports away from the rest 
of the world. But there is no tariff earned on South Asian imports under free trade. 
Because tariffs are part of the VAT base, elimination of tariffs leads to a further fall 
in revenue from VAT. 
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4.4.1 Change in Domestic Prices and Production 
Together with the revenue consequences, TRIST simulations indicate the extent 
to which domestic production is substituted for by imports when the latter become 
cheaper as a result of tariff cuts. Products are clustered by sector at the ISIC 3-digit 
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level. In my data set, domestic production figures are only available for broadly-
defined manufacturing industries. Because inter-sectoral cross-linkages are not in-
corporated in this model, the projected change in average prices and production 
apply to each sector only. 
Table 4.11 shows the value of domestic sales before and after Nepal applies 
zero tariff on all imports from South Asia without and with exemptions (as in 
scenarios 1 and 2 of Table 4.5). Predictably, the transport and motor vehicle sectors 
undergo the biggest change as a result of reforms because these products attract 
some of the highest rates of tariff at present. Note that because high rates of excise 
duty and VAT are still applied on some of these products, average prices do not 
fall dramatically. For example, the rate of protection of the motor vehicle sector 
falls by 16 percentage points, but still remains at over 12 percent, unlike several 
other sectors where the rate of protection falls below three percent. 
Table 4.11 disaggregates tariff revenue at the sectoral level. Among the top 10 
sectors listed, the loss of tariff revenue is least pronounced in apparel and animal 
rearing sectors (ISIC 12 and 181). In the remaining sectors, tariff revenues fall by 
between 46 and 99 percent. If the government's highly liberal Sensitive List shields 
some of the products which are anticipated to experience big revenue changes (for 
example, motor vehicles), the picture of domeshc price and production change 
would alter. This is shown in the bottom half of the same table. Transport equip-
ment and motor vehicles are protected from tariff cuts in the government's existing 
Sensitive List, so modest changes in domestic sales occur in primary sectors (ani-
mal rearing, mining, forestry) and basic manufacturing industries. Change in the 
level of protection as well as tariff revenues is also less severe than in the case when 
no product is shielded from tariff cuts. 
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Figure 4.4: Statutory and Collected Tariff Rates 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
Collected Tariff Rate (%) 
Source: Government of Nepal (2009b) 
Note 1: Number of total observations is 256971 
Note 2: 58421 observations where statutory rate > collected rate 
Note 3: 36 observations where statutory rate < collected rate 
4.4.2 Collected and Statutory Rates 
Pritchett & Sethi (1994) found for some developing countries^® that collected 
(applied) tariff rates are only weakly correlated with statutory rates and that the 
former decrease non-linearly as the latter rise. This reflects the problem of granting 
tariff exemptions discretionarily, and opening up opportunities for graft. Revisit-
ing Nepal ' s import data for 2008, I f ind that the issue of a discrepancy between 
statutory and collected tariff rates is less important for Nepal. This is perhaps the 
effect of the sustained tariff reforms over the past 20 years that have focused on 
lowering the average rates as well as reducing the number of tariff bands through 
policy reforms supported by international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, 
and the WTO. 
Table 4.14 lists the mean rate of collected tariff and its dispersion at selected 
statutory rates. However, except at the highest rate of 80 percent, applied tariff 
38 Their data are for Jamaica (1991), Kenya (1987) and Pakistan (1991). 
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rates are only marginally less than statutory rates, indicating a high degree of 
compliance on average. When individual import transactions are parsed, however, 
the degree of discrepancy appears wider. Figure 4.4 depicts this graphically where 
23 percent of import transactions (out of 256,971) paid tariffs that did not match the 
statutory tariff rate. If the collected tariff rate is less than the statutory rate, it could 
mean either of the following: i) tariffs were legally sacrificed as part of a conscious 
government decision, such as import duty rebates as part of an export promotion 
strategy, ii) other para-tariffs have been introduced in lieu of, or on top of, tariffs, 
such as the Agricultural Reform Fee, or iii) there is malpractice in the customs 
administration where authorities exercise improper discretion and exempt certain 
imports from tariffs and taxes. In a negligible number of cases, collected tariff rates 
are actually higher than the ad valorem statutory rates.39 
If all importers paid the statutory rate, it would be a perfect predictor of the 
collected tariff rate in a simple regression of applied tariff on statutory tariff. In 
Nepal, the explanatory power (R^) of the latter on the former is higher (0.82) than 
that found by Pritchett & Sethi (1994). Further, a spline regression that allows 
for different slopes for two subsets of tariff rates (below and above 25 percent), 
and a quadratic regression of applied rate on statutory rate and its squared value 
demonstrate a high explanatory power, confirming that the correlation between 
statutory and collected tariff rates for Nepal is strong, but collected tariff rates do 
decline as statutory rates rise. 
Related to this is the issue of smuggling and under-invoicing. If statutory tariff 
rates and other border taxes are higher than the cost of smuggling, they provide 
incentives for smugglers to evade high tariffs. Since smuggling is not costless (it 
takes resources to arrange for successful smuggling, and face the law if caught), 
lowering of ad valorem tariffs decreases the incentives for smuggling. 
39 This could be a result of specific decrees, or that these imports could be akin to personal effects 
that are generally charged a high tariff but no VAT. In 2008, there were 36 such items, 30 of which 
belonged to HS 3706 (Cinematography film). Note also that records corresponding to the high statu-
tory rate of 80 percent applying largely to motor vehicles show that a number of exempHons were 
granted to parties that were neither government nor diplomatic establishments. 
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Importers also have an incentive to collude with exporters to under-invoice 
their import value in order to pay less tariffs when duties are ad valorem. A n 
intuitive solution for this is to levy specific tariffs, and not ad valorem, but specific 
tariffs have their own complications. The more important point is that both the 
problem of under-invoicing and smuggling are partly triggered by a cascading 
tariff structure where final goods attract high tariffs and intermediate goods attract 
low tariffs. Across-the-board lowering of tariffs could therefore encourage more 
goods to flow through formal channels, increasing tariff revenue. 
4 . 5 C O N C L U S I O N 
Tariffs have historically served the dual purpose of raising government rev-
enue and protecting domestic producers. This was clearly seen in many developing 
countries when they experimented with import substitution policies behind high 
tariff walls in the post-war period."*® In recent decades, the economic paradigm has 
shifted decisively towards greater liberalization, diminishing the protective func-
tion of tariffs. In the poorest countries, however, the revenue-raising role of tariffs 
remains important. The short-term concern over loss of revenue, therefore, has 
often stymied necessary trade and fiscal reforms. 
A n ideal tax system raises revenue to fund socially sanctioned government 
expenditures in ways that are administratively and politically feasible while pro-
moting equity and efficiency (Burgess & Stern 1993). As countries become richer, 
they move towards this ideal by relying more on direct sources of taxation on per-
sonal income. Because of capacity constraints and high enforcement costs, however, 
developing countries focus on narrow tax bases that not only distort incentives and 
40 In the 19th century, tariffs w e r e a major issue in the rich c o u n t i e s of the day as well . With no income 
taxes, and the p o p u l a r l y k n o w n Export C l a u s e of the Const i tut ion banning the l e v y i n g of export 
duty, the United States relied h e a v i l y o n tariffs. From South Carol ina 's Ordinance of Null i f icat ion 
(of tariffs) in 1832 that h-iggered a crisis over federal authority under President Jackson to the Great 
Tariff Debate of 1888, tariffs w e r e a d iv i s ive political issue (Irwin 1997). In Britain, the repeal ing of 
tariffs on i m p o r t e d grain ( C o r n Laws) in 1846 b y Pr ime Minister Robert Peel split the Tory Party and 
b e g a n a brief era of freer trade. 
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resource allocation, but also raise revenue that is inadequate to fund development 
needs 
This paper contributes to the debate on ways to reform trade practices with-
out adversely affecting the revenue base of poor countries. Cross-country evidence 
from 35 low-income countries shows that as countries move away from trade-based 
taxes, they manage to partially offset trade-based revenue losses with domestic 
sources of taxes. That the presence of VAT is not more strongly associated with rev-
enue recovery is a surprise because this is not what the simulations suggest. This 
can only be resolved if we acknowledge the great heterogeneity in VAT regimes 
across countries, with efficacy dependent on factors beyond the ad valorem rate, 
such as the size of the informal sector, product coverage of the value-added tax, 
systems of tax refund, and the capacity of tax administrations. 
Using actual data on import value, tariffs, and up to ten domestic taxes on 
more than 400,000 import transactions from Nepal, I develop scenarios in which 
tariffs can be cut with the least impact on total revenue. This requires eliminating 
widespread exemptions and an effective implementation of domestic taxes such as 
VAT and excise spanning a widened base. The degree of informality and the hard-
to-tax sectors complicate tax replacement, but a measured approach to reducing 
tariffs and expanding consumption taxes could minimize adjustment costs. In the 
case of regional free trade. Sensitive Lists can be crafted judiciously to minimize 
the strain on revenue. 
The overarching policy lesson is that in countries undertaking trade reform, 
it is necessary to identify alternative sources of revenue ex ante. This steers de-
veloping countries towards strengthening their domestic tax system rather than 
resisting reforms. The use of partial (or general) equilibrium models, under sensi-
ble assumptions, produces estimates that assuage fears about the scale of loss of 
41 Consider a hypothetical scenario where a typical poor country raises taxes of around 12 percent of 
GDP. It raises another 3 percent of GDP in non-tax revenue. Add to it a fiscal deficit of 5 percent of 
GDP. It then has to meet its immense development challenges like poverty alleviation with a resource 
envelope of around 20 percent of GDP. (Note that the interest burden on annual borrowing alone, at 
8 percent, would add 0.4 percent of GDP in subsequent years.) 
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revenue and production. The models contribute to evidence-based policy making 
on the parameters of reform such as tariff-cutting formulae, schedules of prod-
ucts to exempt, and sectors to help temporarily. This is a period unprecedented in 
world history when countries at all income levels are engaged in simultaneous trade 
negotiations at the multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels. The utility of swift, 
time-sensitive analyses of trade adjustment costs, as attempted in this paper, could 
therefore be high. 

A P P E N D I X 
4.A H O W T H E M O D E L I N T R I S T W O R K S 
This illustration simplifies Brenton et al. (2011) to a case where there are only 
three exporting countries (a, b, c), one exportable product (j), and an importing 
home country (h). (The real world simulations in this paper involved 133 exporting 
economies and 4032 products.) Existing imports from each country are multiplied 
by the price change (Apij) from equation 4.13, and adjusted by the elasticity of 
substitution (CT^ )^ between imports. Total imports ^ ^ qij = (qaj + qbj + qcj) are 
held constant to isolate the substitution effect. Total import from each country after 
price change and substitution is: 
Second, price change in imports relative to domestic price affects the allo-
cation of expenditure between imports and domestically produced goods. A s a 
result of the reform, the change in the weighted average price of imports (APj) is 
the change in each price multiplied by that import's share in total imports: 
A P j = Z (4.A.2) 
Total consumption ( Q ° ) at home consists of imports from the three countries 
and domestic production. So, = qhj + L n qij- Given that the elashcity of 
substitution between imports and domestic good is the import of each good 
after domestic substitution is: 
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Third, the weighted average price of imports is adjusted by the share of im-
ports in total consumption. Because the price of domestically produced import-
competing product has not altered, the average change in the domestic price of 
good j is deflated by the share of imports in total domestic consumption. If there is 
no domestic production, the whole change in price as a result of tariff cut is passed 
on to domestic consumers. 
AP~ = 
Q D (4.A.4) 
In response to domestic price change (APj) , consumers now allocate their 
budget to imports and home products. Given the price elasticity of demand (CT''), 
total demand for good j supplied by each of the three exporting nations and 
domestic producers is: 
= ( l + c T P A P j ) * q P S (4.A.5) 
These steps are shown numerically in Table 4.6 with a hypothetical example, 
as follows. 
A product is imported from Countries A and B valued at 100 and 200 units, 
respectively The importing country levies a tariff of 30 percent, VAT of 10 percent, 
and an excise duty of 5 percent (not shown). Suppose, as a result of a free trade 
agreement with Country B, the tariff on imports from that country is dropped to 
zero percent. The ratio of old domestic to world price for the same product from 
Country B drops from 1.50 to 1.16. The import from Country A sees no change 
in price because neither its tariff nor domestic taxes have altered. Because the 
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price of the good from Country B has dropped by 23.1 percent, imports from that 
country rise. By how much depends on the exporter substitutability elasticity. At 
the default value of 1.5, imports from Country B rise from 200 to 218.8, and those 
from Country A fall from 100 to 81.3, keeping the pre-reform import volume intact. 
Because Country B's share in the home country's import of the product is 
two-thirds, the weighted drop in the import price is 15.4 percent. Now, there is 
substitution away from domestically produced goods towards imports from Coun-
try B as well as Country A. The exact magnitude of this shift depends, again, on 
the elasticity of domestic substitution. At the default value of 1 , the value of im-
ports from Country B rises to 228.9 ^rid from Country A rises to 85 whereas home 
production falls from 150 to 136. 
Finally, because domestically produced goods meet only one-third of total 
consumption needs at home, the weighted average domestic price of the good 
falls by 10.3 percent as a result of the 23.1 percent drop in the price of the import 
from a country that contributes to 45 percent of demand at home. In response, at 
the assumed price elasticity of 0.5, demand for imports from all three suppliers 
increases, from 228.9 to 240.7 in Country B, from 85 to 89.4 in Country A, and 
from 136 to 143 at home. After the reform, total consumption increases from 450 to 
473.1. Among the suppliers. Country B (on whose product tariff was cut) benefits 
the most. 
Table 4.6: Illustration of Price and D e m a n d Response in T R I S T 
Import from Country A Import from Country B Domestic Production 
Price change 
Initial tariff (%) 30 30 
New tariff (%) 30 0 
VAT (%) 10 10 
Initial domestic to world price ratio 1.50 1.50 
New domestic to world price ratio 1.50 1 . 16 
Change in import price (%) 0.0 -23.1 
Import response in three steps 
1. Exporter substitution 
Initial product value 100 200 
Price change (%) 0.0 -23.1 
Intermediate step 100.0 269.2 
Value after exporter substitution 81.3 218.8 
2. Domestic substitution 
New product value 81.3 218.8 150 
Price change (%) 0.0 -23.1 
Average domestic price change of imports -15.4 -15.4 0 
Intermediate step 93.8 252.4 150.0 
Value after domestic substitution 85.0 228.9 136.0 
3. Demand 
Latest product value 85.0 228.9 136.0 
Average domestic price change of imports (%) -15.4 -15.4 
Average domestic price change (%) -10.3 -10.3 -10.3 
Final demand at home 89.4 240.7 143.0 
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Note: This is a hypothetical example prepared by the author 
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Table 4.7; Tariff Rates and Import-based Revenue in Nepal, 2008 
Collected Excise Value-added Other 
tariff duty tax taxes 
Revenue (billions of Rupees) 1 5 .6 3.0 23.9 2.9 
Share of total tax revenue (%) 34.28 6.58 52.73 6.41 
Simple average of tariff/tax rates (%) 10.54 0.58 1 1 .03 1.89 
Weighted average of tariff/tax rates (%) 7.00 1.26 9-94 1 . 3 1 
Source: Government of Nepal (2009b) 
Table 4.8: VAT Collected on Imports, 2005-2010 
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
Revenue from VAT (billions of Rupees) 2 1 . 6 1 26 . 10 29.82 39.70 54-92 
Collected on imports 13.46 16.46 19.01 25.78 34-54 
Collected on domestic consumption 8.15 9.63 10.81 13.92 20.38 
VAT Revenue from imports (%) 62.29 63.09 6 3 7 5 64.94 62.89 
Source: Government of Nepal (2010) 
Table 4.9: Tariff Revenue by Band, 2008 
Non-SAFTA 
Band Obs. Import Value Share Collected Tariff Statutory Tariff 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
a. Zero 1397 16.2 7-3 0.1 0.1 
b. 0 to 5 3795 34.0 15-3 6.5 5.6 
c. 5 to 15 4990 21 .2 9-5 15-7 13.8 
d. 15 to 30 1689 5.8 2.6 8.2 7-1 
e. 30 to 80 447 1.9 0.9 7-2 6.5 
f. Specific (AVE) 162 1 .2 0.6 0.9 1-3 
SAFTA 
a. Zero 609 15.8 7-1 0.0 0.0 
b. 0 to 5 3491 45-9 20.7 10.9 9-5 
c. 5 to 15 5690 25.2 1 1 . 3 9-7 14.1 
d. 1 5 to 30 1424 7-5 3 4 6.1 9-5 
e. 30 to 80 376 6.2 2.8 13.0 15 . 1 
f. Specific (AVE) 259 41.3 18.6 21 .7 17-5 
Total 24329 222.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: Import (in billions of Rupees) from 133 partners across 4032 tariff lines 
M 
Table 4.10: R e v e n u e I m p a c t of Tariff a n d Tax R e f o r m ( R o b u s t n e s s Tests) 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 
C O O R D I N A T E D TARIFF A N D TAX REFORM SAFTA WITH SENSITIVE LIST (10% VALUE) 
Parameters 
Exporter and Dom. Elasticity 1.5 and 1 3 and 2 6 and 2 1.5 and 1 3 and 2 6 and 2 
Demand Elasticity 0.5 Kee et al (2008) Kee et al. (2008) O-S Kee et al. (2008) Kee et al. (2008) 
Tariff cut 50% on all 50% on all 50% on all SAFTA duty-free SAFTA duty-free SAFTA duty-free 
VAT 13% on all 13% on all 13% on all Existing VAT Existing VAT Existing VAT 
Impact on Imports 
Imports pre 222.1 222.1 222.1 222.1 222.1 222.1 
Imports post 222.8 227.0 227.2 226.7 2394 2395 
% change in imports 0.3% 2.2% 2.3% 2.1% 7,8% 7.8% 
Impact on Revenue 
Tariff revenue pre 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 
Tariff revenue post 9.6 10.4 10.5 10.4 10.5 10.4 
% change in tariff revenue -38.3% -32.9% -32.5% -334% -32.4% -33.2% 
Total Tax Revenues on Imports 
Total revenue pre 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 
Total revenue post 43.0 44.8 45.0 37.2 38.9 38.7 
% change in total revenue -5.2% -1.2% -0.9% -18.0% -14.4% -14.7% 
Total Tax Revenues on Imports and Domestic Production 
Total tax revenue pre 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Total tax revenue post 60.6 62.6 62.8 5 1 7 53.6 534 
% change in total tax revenue 1.0% 4.4% 4.6% -13.8% -10.8% -11.0% 
Collected Tariff Rate 
Collected applied tariff rate pre 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 
Collected applied tariff rate post 4.3% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4 4 % 4.3% 
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Note: All values in billions of Rupees 
T a b l e 4 . 1 1 : C h a n g e i n P r i c e , P r o d u c t i o n , R e v e n u e , a n d P r o t e c t i o n 
P R I C E D O M E S T I C P R O D U C T I O N T A R I F F R E V E N U E P R O T E C T I O N 
I S I C D e s c r i p t i o n Change Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
With No Sensitive List 
3 5 9 T r a n s p o r t e q u i p m e n t n . e . c . - 1 9 . 7 3 % 3 4 , 1 5 3 , 0 0 0 3 1 . 3 9 9 4 3 3 9 9 4 , 5 6 7 , 8 0 6 3 8 , 6 7 6 , 0 0 5 2 4 . 2 0 % 0 . 9 0 % 
3 4 1 M o t o r v e h i c l e s - 1 2 . 9 9 % 4 1 , 4 6 4 , 0 0 0 3 9 , 2 0 4 , 2 1 3 2 , 1 3 8 , 2 4 4 , 3 3 5 9 1 8 , 6 6 7 , 0 6 9 2 8 . 3 0 % 1 2 . 2 0 % 
1 4 1 Q u a r r y i n g o f s t o n e , s a n d a n d c l a y - 1 2 . 4 3 % 4 7 , 4 2 1 , 0 0 0 4 5 , 0 9 1 , 8 9 7 8 2 , 4 6 4 , 0 0 5 2 . 5 8 3 . 2 3 5 1 3 . 9 0 % 0 . 4 0 % 
1 4 2 M i n i n g a n d q u a r r y i n g n . e . c . - 1 7 . 5 1 % 3 3 9 , 0 2 0 , 0 0 0 3 2 3 , 6 2 6 , 8 8 6 1 8 4 , 3 7 9 , 2 0 4 1 1 3 . 6 5 3 2 8 . 0 0 % 0 . 0 0 % 
2 6 1 G l a s s a n d g l a s s p r o d u c t s - 8 . 9 9 % 2 0 , 5 8 6 , 0 0 0 1 9 , 7 7 4 , 8 4 9 1 2 4 , 3 2 8 , 3 8 9 3 0 . 6 5 5 . 9 3 9 1 1 . 5 0 % 2 . 8 0 % 
12 F a r m i n g o f a n i m a l s - 7 . 5 3 % 1 8 , 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 1 8 , 0 9 3 , 2 0 3 3 9 7 . 6 3 5 3 2 8 , 8 9 6 0 . 2 0 % 0 . 1 0 % 
2 0 F o r e s t r y , l o g g i n g - 6 . 6 1 % 1 4 0 , 0 0 0 1 3 5 . 7 1 5 4 . 3 2 1 . 5 0 1 1 , 6 1 2 , 8 3 1 7 . 3 0 % 2 . 7 0 % 
2 6 9 N o n - m e t a l l i c m i n e r a l p r o d u c t s - 1 4 . 6 6 % 1 0 , 9 9 5 , 2 9 4 , 0 0 0 1 0 , 7 0 4 , 4 4 5 , 2 1 9 1 , 1 4 4 , 8 7 8 , 1 4 6 5 9 . 8 7 7 . 9 7 5 1 7 . 9 0 % 0 . 9 0 % 
3 4 3 P a r t s a n d a c c e s s o r i e s f o r v e h i c l e s - 5 . 5 2 % 3 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 2 9 , 2 4 6 , 0 6 9 5 3 . 9 8 5 . 5 5 5 2 4 , 7 1 4 , 0 7 2 7 . 5 0 % 3 . 4 0 % 
2 2 2 P r i n t i n g - 5 . 9 1 % 1 8 , 8 2 6 , 0 0 0 1 8 , 3 9 4 , 3 2 1 1 2 , 1 9 0 , 9 6 1 6 , 5 6 9 , 0 1 6 1 1 . 0 0 % 5 . 9 0 % 
With Sensitive List 
1 4 2 M i n i n g a n d q u a r r y i n g n . e . c . - 1 7 . 5 1 % 3 3 9 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 6 2 6 8 8 6 1 8 4 3 7 9 2 0 4 1 1 3 6 5 3 2 8 . 0 0 % 0 . 0 0 % 
2 6 1 G l a s s a n d g l a s s p r o d u c t s - 8 . 2 6 % 2 0 5 8 6 0 0 0 1 9 8 4 1 3 7 9 1 2 4 3 2 8 3 8 9 4 0 5 8 7 9 4 4 1 1 . 5 0 % 3 . 8 0 % 
12 F a r m i n g o f a n i m a l s - 7 . 5 3 % 1 8 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 9 3 2 0 3 3 9 7 6 3 5 3 2 8 8 9 6 0 . 2 0 % 0 . 1 0 % 
2 0 F o r e s t r y - 6 . 6 1 % 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 7 1 5 4 3 2 1 5 0 1 1 6 1 2 8 3 1 7 . 3 0 % 2 . 7 0 % 
2 9 1 G e n e r a l p u r p o s e m a c h i n e r y - 3 . 8 0 % 1 7 6 6 3 9 0 0 0 1 7 3 6 0 3 0 9 5 1 9 1 9 7 2 4 0 6 1 1 6 4 7 4 3 9 1 6 . 2 0 % 3 . 7 0 % 
3 4 2 V e h i c l e b o d i e s , t r a i l e r s - 5 . 9 1 % 1 3 7 4 5 0 0 0 1 3 5 1 6 4 7 3 2 3 2 0 1 2 3 1 3 8 0 2 9 0 1 2 . 0 0 % 7 . 2 0 % 
3 1 5 E l e c t r i c l a m p s a n d l i g h t i n g e q u i p m e n t - 3 . 1 7 % 4 1 9 0 7 0 0 0 4 1 3 1 4 2 2 5 5 1 9 8 0 4 5 3 4 3 3 7 7 6 6 1 9 . 8 0 % 8 . 2 0 % 
2 7 1 B a s i c i r o n a n d s t e e l - 3 . 6 3 % 6 4 1 4 8 4 2 0 0 0 6 3 2 5 0 5 3 3 2 3 9 5 7 9 5 1 5 7 1 2 8 7 1 3 6 3 1 1 3 . 8 0 % 1 . 1 0 % 
3 1 2 E l e c t r i c i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n a p p a r a t u s - 2 . 9 2 % 1 1 2 2 8 0 0 0 1 1 0 7 2 0 7 1 2 9 2 0 1 0 5 5 1 2 8 6 4 6 3 1 3 . 5 0 % 1 . 6 0 % 
2 8 9 F a b r i c a t e d m e t a l p r o d u c t s - 5 . 2 1 % 1 4 9 6 4 3 8 0 0 0 1 4 7 5 9 6 0 0 2 1 1 5 4 0 1 3 4 3 5 7 9 4 5 8 1 3 1 8 . 6 0 % 4 . 4 0 % 
N o t e : T o p 1 0 s e c t o r s s o r t e d b y c h a n g e i n d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t i o n ; v a l u e s i n R u p e e s ba 
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Table 4.12: Major Exporters to N e p a l , 2008 & 2010 
Partners 2010 (Source: COMTRADE) Partners 2008 (Source: Government of Nepal) 
Economy Value (US$m) Economy Value (US$m) 
India 2900.0 India 2064.2 
China 5364 China 365-9 
United Arab Emirates 456.8 Indonesia 104.8 
Indonesia 110.7 Japan 76.6 
Thailand 102.6 Singapore 76.5 
United Kingdom 99.8 Thailand 64.7 
Japan 85.7 Malaysia 56.7 
Korea, Rep. 80.5 Argentina 51.0 
United States 737 United States 46.4 
Argentina 68.9 Germany 34-9 
Singapore 68.5 Saudi Arabia 32.0 
Australia 67.7 Korea, Rep. 30.7 
Hong Kong, China 57.8 Taiwan, China 22.3 
Malaysia 57-5 United Arab Emirates 21.5 
Switzerland 37-5 United Kingdom 21.5 
Note: Different sources and years used for check of consistency 
Table 4.13: N u m b e r of Products in the Sensitive Lists 
In use as of 2010 Agreed reduction In effect from November 2011 
Afghanistan 1072 214 858 
Bangladesh 1233* 246* 987* 
1 2 4 1 " 248** 993" 
Bhutan 150 0 150 
India 480* 96* 384* 
868" 1 7 3 - 1 695** 
Maldives 681 136 545 
Nepal 1257* 251* 1006* 
1295** 259** 10^6** 
Pakistan 1169 233 936 
Sri Lanka 1042 208 834 
Source: SAARC (2011); *For LDCs, " For Non-LDCs 
Table 4.14: Statutory and A p p l i e d Tariff Rates 
Statutory Rate (%) Mean Tariff (%) St. Dev 25th pet 7'5th pet Total Obs. 
5 4.92 1-37 5 5 53285 
10 9.92 0.97 10 10 28254 
15 14.88 1.31 15 15 49208 
20 19.98 0.56 20 20 26221 
30 2947 3.68 30 30 3320 
40 39.68 356 40 40 948 
80 77.72 1333 80 80 771 
Source; Government of Nepal (2009b) 
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Variables Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max Source 
Trade tax revenue relative to GDP (%) 933 4 1 5 4.10 0.04 33-33 IMF IPS 
Imports relative to GDP (%) 950 34.00 20.32 0. 12 148.58 IMF IFS 
Export of natural resources per capita (log) 965 5.21 3.01 -5-15 12.22 World Bank 
Oil and gas rent per capita (log) 1000 -2.02 3.24 -3.91 7-31 WDI 
Per capita GDP (log) 943 5.78 0.55 4.52 7-25 WDI 
Inflation (log) 804 2.21 1 . 18 -3.91 7.00 IMF IFS 
Share of aid in GDP 938 12.48 10.43 0.05 94.92 WDI 
Share of agriculture in G D P 906 33-59 1 2 . 1 2 4.21 68.88 WDI 
VAT rates 1000 6.27 8.06 0 35 Author 
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Table 4.16: List of Countr ies and Related Tax Data 
Country Total Tax Rev. Total Tax Rev. Trade Tax Rev. Trade Tax Rev. VAT rate 
(1982-1986) (2002-2006) (1982-1986) (2002-2006) 
Bangladesh 5-9 9-3 2.4 2,3 15 
Benin 11.5 14.7 7.0 1-9 18 
Bhutan 5-9 9.6 0.1 0.5 
Burkina Faso 11.4 11.2 4-7 1.6 18 
Burundi 13.2 18.2 4.8 3.0 
Cameroon 19.4 21.3 3.8 2.2 19.3 
Central African Republic 11.5 7-5 4-9 1-5 18 
Chad 3-3 6.0 1.8 1.6 18 
Comoros* 11.5 10.3 9 1 3-5 
Congo, Rep. 32.8 13.6 4.0 1-9 18.9 
Cote dTvoire 19.9 14.9 8.6 4.8 18 
Ethiopia 14.8 14.6 3-4 3.0 15 
Gambia, The* 21.0 17.8 16.1 3.6 
Ghana 7.6 20.0 3-2 4-5 12.5 
Guinea 14.5 11.0 2-3 2.1 18 
Haiti 10.5 9.2 3-3 2-5 10 
India 10.5 9.8 3-2 1.8 12.5 
Indonesia 17.1 12.0 0.8 0.6 10 
Kenya 23.1 18.6 5-4 1-7 16 
Lesotho 37-3 39-7 27.2 21.7 14 
Madagascar* 10.4 10.3 3-5 3.0 18 
Malawi 17-5 21.5 4.1 2.8 17-5 
Mali* 11.4 12.6 2.9 4-5 15 
Mozambique 17.0 12.1 2.1 1-9 17 
Myanmar* 8.7 3 4 2-3 0.4 
Nepal 6.9 10.1 2-3 3 1 13 
Niger 9 1 10.0 3-9 4-9 19 
Nigeria 16.1 15-3 2.2 3-3 5 
Pakistan 14.6 11.4 5.8 1.8 15 
Papua New Guinea 17.9 21.4 5.0 1.6 10 
Rwanda 10.4 12.1 4-7 2.0 18 
Sao Tome and Principe 25,1 21.2 10.6 5-4 
Senegal 15-3 16.9 6.3 3.0 18 
Sierra Leone 11.0 12.0 5-4 5.8 
Solomon Islands 19.2 20.6 11.7 7-1 
Tanzania 16.3 12.7 1.4 1.1 20 
Togo 22.1 14.2 7-1 6.8 18 
Uganda 11.8 12.8 7-2 1-3 18 
Zambia 21.5 17.1 4.0 2.1 17-5 
Zimbabwe 24.8 2 4 5 3-9 2.4 15 
Source: Tax data from Baunsgaard and Keen (2010); 
VAT rates (in 2006) from Krever (2008), Ernst and Young (2008), 
Note 1: Revenue figures are relative to GDP (in percent) 
Note 2: Average years of the second period for starred countries 
and Doing Business indicators 
(*) is 1997-2001 
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